Pressure groups are viewed by many contemporary political theorists as desirable or even indispensible instruments for the defence and promotion of liberty and justice in modern industrial democracies. The case has been argued most zealously by S. E. Finer in *The Anonymous Empire* (Pall Mall, 1966) and by S. M. Lipset, W. Kornhauser and others in their various writings on 'pluralism'. It has been suggested, furthermore, that the various pressure groups in present day Britain collectively embody an informal representative system of possibly greater importance than the formal representation built into our parliamentary structure (S. H. Beer, *Modern British Politics*, Faber, 1965).

The favourable public image enjoyed by pressure groups today stands in sharp contrast to the abhorrence and apprehension with which they were viewed by Rousseau and most philosophers of the classical liberal tradition, who considered the organized pursuit of sectional or vested interests to be inherently conspiratorial and inimical to the public interest. According to that tradition, citizens should be encouraged to follow their various self-interested ends as individuals, and the state should be conceived as the embodiment of their collective will.

The growth in scale and complexity of the governmental process which followed in the wake of the industrial revolution led on the one hand to an inevitable erosion of this individualistic conception of democracy, and on the other to an ever-increasing celebration of pressure groups. It led also to what R. P. Wolff has described, in *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (Cape, 1969), as the modern 'vector-sum' conception of democracy, which views the government as a pivotal point of forces exerted on it by pressure groups throughout the nation, its function being to resolve these conflicting forces into a single balanced policy. As the relative weights of the various groups change, the fulcrum of government swings about, in sympathy with the drift of public opinion. Instead of being jostled by a bewildering array of inarticulate private citizens, the government can weigh up the various interests of a manageable and clearly distinguishable set of organized pressure groups, in which all significant interests in the nation are represented, and dispense political, social and economic goodies to each in rough proportion to its relative size and intensity.

The fact that the British government does not actually reach
decisions in this manner is aptly illustrated by the refusal of successive Home Secretaries in recent years to re-introduce capital punishment for crimes other than treason, despite the relative size and intensity of the pro-hanging lobby. The reason for this is that human actions (including those of Home Secretaries) are often motivated by principles rather than interests. R. P. Wolff has pointed out that the ‘vector-sum’ conception of democracy is premised on the possibility and desirability of compromise or give-and-take, which is wholly inappropriate in matters of principle, when opposing views are indivisible and cannot be resolved by a process of distributive justice, and each side claims universal validity for its point of view. One of the fallacies of the ‘vector-sum’ conception resides, therefore, in the psychologically naive theory of human motivation and decision-making, a relic of the discredited Utilitarianism of Bentham and J. S. Mill, which lurks behind it, and which views all human action as motivated by interests. It is, nevertheless, true that compromise between conflicting interest groups does frequently form the basis of government decisions, and what many people consider to be matters of principle are sometimes treated as though they were simply conflicts of interest. The constraints on the BBC to balance programmes which promote controversial points of view with programmes promoting ‘the other side’ frequently result in frustration and anger among sections of the viewing and listening public for this reason. Access programmes such as Open Door, in which groups promoting sense and nonsense, progressive and reactionary views, truth and falsehood are given equal exposure, treated with equal seriousness and thus reduced to a common denominator, evoke similar reactions among those who believe that the right to access cannot be ethically decided upon as if it were purely a matter of distributive justice.

In practice, a pressure group in Britain usually finds itself confronted by a more or less principled government policy on the issue at hand, and its task is to influence the decision-makers to change that policy. This in turn usually involves inducing them either to modify the principles which guide their existing policy, or to modify the policy in spite of the principles, in the interests of expediency for example. The former course is open to any pressure group, and involves an exercise in persuasive attitude change directed at the decision-makers or the public at large. The latter, which is more frequently successful, is available only to
groups which possess some measure of power over the government through, for example, their control over resources which the government depends upon, and involves an exercise in bargaining. These are, of course, ideal types, and numerous finer distinctions could be made. It would be reasonable, however, to characterise the Homosexual Law Reform Society as a typical persuasive pressure group, and the trade unions, in so far as they attempt to influence government policy, as typical bargaining pressure groups. In general, interest groups which represent clearly identifiable sections of society, such as the National Union of Mineworkers, the Provisional IRA or the British Medical Association, tend more often to be able to engage in genuine bargaining than do purely promotional or cause groups which do not speak for any specific interest other than society at large, such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the Aid Lobby or the Friends of the Earth.

In what follows, an attempt will be made to summarise some of the more significant findings to have emerged from psychological research on attitude change and persuasion in so far as they bear on the concrete situations in which pressure groups typically find themselves, and an outline will then be given of the strategy of bargaining as it has been elucidated by informal game theory. The process of attitude change has attracted an enormous amount of attention from research workers, and constitutes one of the most well-established areas of social psychology; no attempt will therefore be made to cover it exhaustively. The strategy of bargaining, in contrast, is still in its infancy as a field of research, and it will therefore be possible to make only a few generalised comments, although it must be stressed that bargaining is at least as important as attitude change for a genuine understanding of the behaviour of pressure groups and related phenomena.

A few scattered studies of attitude change were carried out by social psychologists in the 1920s and 1930s, but it was during World War II that the solid foundations were laid by Carl Hovland in the United States. The problems which motivated his early research were directly pragmatic: how to indoctrinate reluctant army recruits and the general public into believing in the American and Allied cause against Nazi Germany, and how best to combat counter-propaganda. The field soon expanded to embrace wider issues of attitude change and persuasion, and continued after the war at Yale University and subsequently at other research centres in the United States and abroad. The categories
of variables examined in the attitude-change process have been conveniently captured by the question: *Who* says *what* to *whom* through what *channel*? These are normally referred to as source, message, audience and channel variables.

Most of the research on source variables has focused on prestige and credibility. The reason why advertisers frequently enlist the costly services of famous personalities to sell their products is that messages delivered by sources of high prestige tend to be more persuasive than those from sources of low prestige. The influence on public opinion of such pressure groups as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament owed a great deal to the conspicuous support they received from such highly regarded personalities as Bertrand Russell. The connection between prestige and credibility is not of course, a startling discovery, nor is it a new one; Aristotle wrote in his *Rhetoric*, the attitude change manual of its day, that ‘we believe good men more fully and readily than others; this is true generally whatever the question is’. The personal quality which makes some people more persuasive than others was referred to by Aristotle as *ethos*, and corresponds to the modern term *credibility*. Research on communicator credibility has, however, revealed some less obvious facts as well. Chief among these is the ‘sleeper’ effect: when the same message is delivered by a high-credibility source to half the audience and a low-credibility source to the rest, the greater initial impact of the high-credibility source tends to evaporate over a period of a few weeks, but, more surprisingly, the impact of the low-credibility source gradually increases by a sort of delayed action. Both halves of the audience display the same amount of attitude change in the long run, as if they remember only the arguments, not who delivered them.

Further research on the nature of credibility has revealed that the quality which makes some people more persuasive than others is compounded of apparent trustworthiness and expertness which combine multiplicatively rather than additively, so that if either is entirely absent, overall credibility will be zero, since any value multiplied by zero remains zero. The most persuasive spokesman is accordingly someone whom the audience has reason to believe firstly has no ulterior reason for arguing the case in question, and secondly knows what he is talking about. Expertness obviously depends upon the credentials of the source; the views of the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the state of the economy have to be taken seriously, but he may not be
believed if he is thought to have good reasons for presenting a biased picture. Convincing the audience of one's trustworthiness is, in fact, a major problem facing anyone engaged in a persuasive appeal. One ingenious method of ensuring trustworthiness which has proved extremely effective in the laboratory, is by allowing the audience to 'overhear' the speaker expressing his viewpoint casually to a friend or colleague, apparently unaware that anyone else is listening. Messages received under these conditions are very much more persuasive than those which appear as calculated attempts at persuasion, since the latter usually raise at least some doubts about trustworthiness and tend to raise defences in the audience.

Message variables have been subjected to close scrutiny by research workers, but the findings have often turned out to be unclear or even contradictory. Numerous experimenters have, for example, attempted to unravel the Gordian knot of data surrounding primacy and recency effects, but the strands now appear more tangled than ever. In 1925, on the basis of only one experiment, and a blatantly flawed one at that, F. H. Lund propounded the so-called Law of Primacy in Persuasion, which asserted that if an audience is exposed to two conflicting arguments on an issue, the argument which is presented first exerts the greater persuasive influence. If this law were valid, it would have the most far-reaching implications, not only for pressure groups and other would-be persuaders of the public at large, but also for parliamentary debates and courtroom proceedings. Careful investigation by Hovland, however, forced him to conclude three decades later that 'when two sides of an issue are present successively by different communicators, the side presented first does not necessarily have the advantage'. Although various complex interactions between primacy, recency and a host of other seemingly related variables have been suggested by more recent work, Hovland's comment remains a fair reflection of our present state of ignorance.

Pressure groups and other agents of attitude change can derive more valuable counsel from the findings on one-sided versus two-sided persuasive communications. The former simply present the communicator's own point of view, while the latter include arguments from the opposing side together with appropriate rebuttals. The most important discovery in this area has been that whereas one-sided messages are, under certain specified conditions, more effective than two-sided messages, two-sided
presentations nevertheless induce a greater resistance to counter-propaganda in the audience. A two-sided message sometimes (though by no means always) results in a relatively small initial attitude change, but in any event it has the effect of inoculating the audience against arguments they may later encounter from the opposition, even, curiously enough, when the arguments actually used by the opposition are completely different from those discussed in the original two-sided persuasive message.

An interesting special case involves beliefs which are almost universally accepted by members of a given culture, so that most people have never heard them questioned or even entertained such a possibility. In the early 1960s William McGuire identified several such ‘cultural truisms’ in the United States. A typical example is: ‘It is a good idea to brush your teeth three times a day if possible’. On the basis of a biological analogy, McGuire predicted that these cultural truisms would turn out to be extremely vulnerable to persuasive arguments attacking them. The point is that they have developed in a ‘germ-free’ environment, never having been subjected to even small doses of an attacking virus. Organisms which have developed in sterile environments appear superficially to be robust and healthy, as do cultural truisms, but they are in fact unable to resist later exposure to germs. Most controversial beliefs, like most organisms, have over time been repeatedly exposed to varying doses of the attacking arguments or germs, and are therefore more or less resistant to persuasion or disease. McGuire was able to demonstrate that the resistance of cultural truisms to persuasion, which is normally very low, can be greatly increased by inoculation. The method of inoculation, which is based on an extension of the biological analogy, consists of exposing the audience to a few relatively weak arguments against the cultural truism, together with rebuttals, before the massive persuasive onslaught. The process of inoculation is essentially identical to exposing the audience to two-sided persuasive messages in favour of the cultural truisms.

Apart from neglecting to present two-sided messages, which are clearly indicated by the considerations above, individuals and pressure groups frequently water down their persuasive communications out of a fear of alienating their sympathisers and producing the dreaded ‘backlash’ if they articulate too extreme a position. The National Union of Students, for example, may seriously consider campaigning for a doubling of student grants, but eventually settle on a more modest request in the belief that
the milder version has a chance of gaining support, whereas asking for too much may actually lead to a loss of support.

Discrepancy effects, as they are called, have received a considerable amount of attention over the past fifteen years, and it is worth noting that, despite numerous attempts, no experimenter has ever produced a significant negative change by exposing people to too extreme an argument. If not in fact a myth, the backlash phenomenon would therefore seem to be far less ubiquitous than might have been anticipated. When presented by a low-credibility source, an extreme appeal may be less effective than a more moderate one, but it never seems to actually harm the cause, and in virtually all other cases the greatest attitude change results from the most extreme appeal until a limit of absurdity is reached. In one typical experiment, an attempt was made to persuade the subjects that the ideal number of hours of sleep was less than the conventional seven or eight. It was found that a 'Nobel Prize-winning physiologist' produced the greatest change in the subjects' opinions when he advocated one hour of sleep a night, while a source of low credibility was most effective when advocating three hours. Taken as a whole, research findings in this area would seem to suggest that the appropriate strategy for a reasonably credible pressure group spokesman wishing to shift public opinion on some issue, is to articulate his position uncompromisingly, however discrepant it is from that of his audience, rather than to dilute his beliefs for public consumption in the hope of winning more support by appearing more reasonable or moderate. The uncompromising approach is likely to produce the maximum attitude change, and there is nothing in the literature to suggest that he could ever damage his cause by over-selling it, in spite of the received ideas of seasoned political campaigners.

Audience variables have been extremely analysed, but there is no point in treating them in depth here, since they seem to be of only indirect relevance to the problems confronting pressure groups. A very brief résumé would not, however, be out of place.

A rather weak trait of general persuasibility has been established: some people are undoubtedly slightly more persuasible than others, irrespective of the issues (within fairly broad limits) on which they are persuaded. Attempts to link this trait up with specific personality characteristics have led to disappointing results. The level of intelligence of the audience, for example, does not appear to relate to general persuasibility in any
consistent way except at the lower extreme: mentally defective individuals may be resistant to persuasion because of their inability to comprehend arguments. The most suggestive findings concern self-esteem; there is some evidence to suggest that people of low self-esteem are more generally persuasible than others. This may be because, having a low opinion of themselves in general, they have a low opinion of their attitudes in particular and therefore give more weight to the attitudes of others, or because they are anxious to improve their self-images by ingratiating themselves with others through agreeing with them, or for a number of other plausible reasons.

Work on channel variables has produced results which are more straightforward and have clearer implications for pressure groups. Repeated studies have shown that identical messages produce markedly different levels of attitude change in audiences depending on the channel through which they are communicated. Most effective by far is face-to-face communication, then in descending order of effectiveness come films, television, radio, and least effective of all, the printed word.

One of the reasons for the relative ineffectiveness of appeals presented through the various mass media may be the phenomenon known as selective exposure. Leaving aside the theoretical background and empirical controversies which would need discussion in a more detailed treatment, selective exposure refers to the tendency of most people actively to seek exposure to arguments which contradict them. People can more easily ‘switch off’ (literally or metaphorically) an appeal presented through the mass media than one presented face to face. Groups attempting to influence public opinion are usually more successful, therefore, when they supplement their mass media communications with meetings, door-to-door canvassing and other forms of face-to-face persuasion. This seems to have been intuitively appreciated by many religious movements, and undoubtedly accounts, in part, for their propagandistic successes. The same may be said of the People’s Liberation Army in China during and after the revolution.

The question of the effectiveness of messages presented through the mass media raises what at first seems to be a paradox. On the one hand, as every politician and advertiser knows, persuasive appeals in the media often result in significant changes in public opinion, but on the other, it has been firmly established that the overwhelming majority of people are not persuaded to any noticeable extent by mere exposure to such
messages; when their attitudes do change, the effect can usually be traced to face-to-face encounters of some kind or other. This apparent contradiction was a source of embarrassment to social psychologists for many years, until it was resolved in the late 1940s by Paul Lazarsfeld’s discovery of the two-step flow of information. In the course of a detailed panel study of a Presidential election, which involved the repeated interviewing of a representative sample throughout the campaign, Lazarsfeld and his co-workers found that mass media appeals did indeed produce significant shifts in public opinion, but that this effect was for the most part indirect. A small minority of people in all sections of the community, whom they labelled opinion leaders, were directly persuaded by the mass media appeals, and they in turn influenced large numbers of friends, relatives and acquaintances through face-to-face encounters, thereby setting off a sort of chain reaction among the rank and file. Thus most people were more or less unmoved by direct exposure to mass communications, but the effects ultimately reached them indirectly, by way of the two-step flow of information. This mechanism has been shown to operate in the dissemination of new ideas from the spread of clothing fashions among women to the adoption of new drugs by general practitioners. It should be recognised, therefore, that the immediate target of a mass media appeal is not the public at large, but a tiny army of opinion leaders. A failure to appreciate this fact frequently results in condescending messages which insult the intelligence, background knowledge and attentiveness of these key members of the audience.

Successful attempts by pressure groups to change government policy by mere persuasion, either directly or through mobilisation of mass support, are comparatively rare, and each positive instance in Britain (such as the suffragette movement in the early 1900s or the Commercial Television lobby in the 1950s) can be countered by numerous unsuccessful campaigns (the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the Stop The Seventy Tour Campaign, the Biafra Lobby and so on). Pressure groups which command the necessary resources to engage the government in genuine bargaining are, on the other hand, much better placed to influence decisions, and not infrequently achieve their goals relatively quickly and easily. It is therefore necessary, for the sake of completeness, to discuss briefly some of the scattered results which have been reached through strategic analyses of bargaining situations by informal game theorists. Most pertinent
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is the pioneering work of Thomas C. Schelling, from whose book *The Strategy of Conflict* (Oxford, 1963) the discussion will draw heavily.

A pressure group finds itself in a bargaining situation vis-à-vis the government when the ability of each to achieve certain desired ends depends upon what the other does. The National Union of Mineworkers may, for example, desire a pay rise for its members which would exceed a government’s limit on wage increases and breach its anti-inflationary policy. Or the Provisional IRA may wish the government to transfer convicted bomb planters from prisons in England to Northern Ireland. Or finally, the British Medical Association may seek to resist a proposed government policy of forbidding its members to use National Health facilities and hospital beds for treating private patients. In each case a genuine bargaining situation exists because of the mutual interdependence of the decisions which each side can make. Each of these pressure groups depends upon government action to achieve its goal, and the government, for its part, depends upon the mineworkers not going on strike, the Provisionals not escalating their bombing campaign, and the doctors not withdrawing from the National Health Service or even emigrating.

The most striking conclusion which has emerged from a theoretical analysis of such situations is somewhat counterintuitive; it contradicts conventional wisdom and ‘common sense’. It is that bargaining power derives largely from some voluntary and irreversible sacrifice of freedom of choice. ‘Keeping all options open’ is a faulty policy based on incomplete understanding, and one which may significantly weaken one’s bargaining position. The practice among invading armies of burning their bridges (or boats) and thereby voluntarily relinquishing the option of withdrawing, is strategically analogous to the tactic of the suffragettes of chaining themselves to the railings. By this action they rendered themselves impervious to threats to disperse or be punished. The National Union of Mineworkers, in the example cited above, would greatly increase its bargaining power at the conference table if it could demonstrate that it was simply not able to accept a wage settlement below a certain level, since its members had already voted to go on strike unless the settlement exceeded this limit. In practice, trade unions normally delay such votes until their negotiators have provisionally accepted an offer, in the belief that tying the hands of the negotiators would sap their bargaining strength. Flexible negotiators with full authority
The psychology of influence 21 from their members to accept any offer at their own discretion are, on the contrary, the relatively weak ones.

The analysis of threats has led to similar conclusions. It is of the essence of a threat that neither the threatening party nor the recipient wishes it to be carried out. A threat by the mineworkers to call a strike unless their pay demands are met would clearly display this property; neither the mineworkers nor the government desires a strike. So would a threat by doctors to withdraw from the National Health Service unless their wishes are granted. And a threat by the Provisionals to blow up Westminster unless certain prisoners are transferred to Northern Ireland may be something they would far rather not have to carry out. A major problem which the protagonist always has to solve, therefore, is how to make his threat credible. Here again, the solution often lies in voluntarily relinquishing freedom of action. A sniper on the rampage in a public street would be invulnerable to arrest if he was known to be wired up with dynamite in such a way that any attempt to arrest him would result in an explosion killing himself and everyone within a half-mile radius. If, however, he had some visible means of preventing the detonation, the police might be more likely to risk an arrest, since the threat to kill himself (and others) would be much less credible and could be interpreted as a bluff. A related tactic often used by pressure groups (and governments) to make their threats credible is the establishment of precedents. The Provisionals' threat might be believed because they have done such things in the past, but a bomb threat from the British Medical Association would be treated as a joke in poor taste.

A counter-tactic in the face of an imminent threat is to interfere with the channels of communication. Most parents, and apparently some of their children, realise that an injunction to 'stop crying' together with a threat 'or you'll get no ice-cream' is ineffective if it cannot be heard above the din. Schelling has suggested that a law requiring all interested friends and relatives of a kidnap victim to be held incommunicado in prison, thus making it impossible for the kidnapper to communicate his threats, would make the prospects for exacting ransom seem unprofitably dim, and it is worth adding that such a law would probably never have to be enforced in practice. Similarly, if the government could convince the Provisionals that so many hoax threats are received every day that it is impossible to identify the genuine ones, the power of the Provisionals to issue effective
threats would be placed in jeopardy. A secret code-word, known only to the Provisionals and the authorities is, in fact, presently used in communications for this very reason, but circumstances could arise in which it would be in the government’s interest to leak the code-word to the press, thereby disrupting the communication system. An ultra-subtle manoeuvre on the part of the Provisionals would be to pre-empt a government press leak by themselves ‘leaking’ a variety of false code-words. These fanciful suggestions merely go to show that the strategic connection between the availability of threats and the possibility of transmitting unambiguous messages is a complex one. Enough has been said, however, to discredit the widely-held dogma that, in bargaining situations, it is always to one’s advantage to keep the lines of communication open.

It follows from the above analysis that, in some circumstances, communication with the opposition can positively harm the interests of one of the protagonists in a dispute. Experienced negotiators never seem to tire of reassuring their followers that it is always a good idea to meet the opposition over the conference table, and that talking with the adversary cannot possibly do any harm, but these assertions can easily be refuted with the aid of a hypothetical example. Suppose that the government were committed to granting an amnesty to twenty of the prisoners being held in Northern Ireland gaols, and proposed a secret conference with the Provisionals to help draw up a list of suitable candidates. Were the Provisionals to attend such a conference, they might be subjected to the threat that unless they stopped their bombing campaign, none of their members would be included in the amnesty. Assuming further that, had the meeting not taken place, the government would have had no incentive to exclude Provisional members from the amnesty, it is not difficult to see that merely by making themselves available for negotiation at the conference table, the Provisionals would have significantly damaged their own interests.

A poignant example of this bargaining paradox occurs in Act II of Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure. Angelo is holding a prisoner whom he intends to execute. The prisoner’s sister, Isabella, who is apparently not well-versed in informal game theory, arrives to plead for her brother’s life. Angelo is strongly attracted to Isabella and at length he proposes a dishonourable bargain—‘You must lay down the treasures of your body’—in order to save him. Isabella declines the offer—‘More than our brother is our
chastity'—whereupon Angelo threatens not merely to kill the prisoner, as he had originally intended, but to subject him to a lingering death unless she submits. At this point Isabella finds herself in a worse position than before the meeting, out of which she has clearly derived only negative value, and if Angelo’s threat is to be believed, her brother is also worse off.

Certain important strategic properties inhere in bargaining situations which force a protagonist to expose himself to risk in order to threaten his adversary, so that, although the threat may be issued unilaterally, punishment is always bilateral if it is carried out. Such situations are known technically as dangerous games. A typical example, which depends on the existence of certain structural features which cannot be explained here, is the game of ‘chicken’. ‘Chicken’ may be played by teenagers, who have been known to drive cars towards each other in an open field as a test of nerves; the winner is the one who holds out the longer before swerving out of the collision course. It may, however, also be played by two superpowers in an arms race, or, in certain circumstances, by the Trade Union Congress and the government.

A curious and once again somewhat paradoxical feature of such games is the advantage which goes to a protagonist who behaves irrationally. If one of the players in a game of automobile ‘chicken’ could convince the opponent that he had lost control of his rational facilities, by drinking half a bottle of whisky before the game for example, he would greatly increase his chances of winning against a rational opponent. If both players adopted this strategy, however, a catastrophic outcome would be likely. What Daniel Ellsberg has called ‘the political uses of madness’ would arise similarly if the Trades Union Congress threatened to call an extended general strike unless some piece of industrial legislation were repealed. If the leaders were able to convince the government that they were entirely at the mercy of a hysterical mob which could not be reasoned with, their bargaining power would be greatly increased. On the other hand, if the piece of legislation at stake were comparatively trivial, it would be difficult for the government to prove in advance that it was so unreasonable that it would rather face an extended general strike than make a small concession, whether this was true or not.

The process of bargaining and persuasive attitude change are not, of course, mutually exclusive. The Mineworkers’ Union, the Provisional IRA and the British Medical Association may all engage in attempts to persuade the government and the general
public of the justice of their demands while at the same time exerting influence through strategic bargaining manoeuvres. Pressure groups which do not command the necessary resources to bargain directly, which is the case with most promotional or cause groups, are, on the other hand, bound to restrict their efforts to attempts at persuasion. Mary Whitehouse’s National Viewers and Listeners Association and the Anti-Apartheid Movement, to mention two typical cases, may depend upon government action to achieve their ends, but they cannot bargain, because the government does not depend upon them in any concrete sense. The success of their campaigns therefore rests solely on the effectiveness of their persuasive appeals. The fairly impressive literature on the psychology of attitude change and the suggestive theoretical analysis of the strategy of bargaining which have been outlined above go some way towards a proper understanding of the activities of pressure groups. Perhaps the most important conclusion which can be drawn from this discussion is that the conventional wisdom which guides these activities may not always be adequate to the problems in hand or generate the most effective policies.