Stefano Bertea

Stefano BerteaAssociate Professor
Telephone: 0116 233 1061

Personal Details

Laureato in Giurisprudenza (Modena and Reggio Emilia), Dottore di ricerca (Milan)

Stefano Bertea, who joined the School of Law in 2004, is an associate professor at the School of Law of the University of Leicester. In his academic career he has been a DFG research fellow at the Goethe University of Frankfurt am Main, a Marie Skłodowska-Curie research fellow at the University of Edinburgh and at the Goethe University of Frankfurt am Main, a visiting research fellow at the University of Amsterdam and at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg, an Alexander von Humboldt research fellow at the University of Kiel, a senior research fellow at the University of Antwerp, and a visiting professor at the University of Catanzaro, at the University of Verona and at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia.

The output of his research work has been published in the form of monographs, articles in academic journals and contributions to edited collections. He has also given several talks on his research projects in academic institutions around the world.

SSRN Author page


Legal theory, theory of legal reasoning, and practical philosophy.

He welcomes PhD applications in the following topics: nature of law, legal obligation, and normative dimension of law.


  • A Theory of Legal Obligation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, in press (expected publication date: December 2019; length: 160,000 words; ISBN: 9781108475105)
  • “Social-Practice Legal Positivism: A Critical View”, in P. Mindus and T. Spaak (eds.), Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming, 2020, word length: 9,000
  • “A Problem for the Unambitious View of Legal Normativity”, Revus, 37, 2019, 7-13,  Open access version
  • “Critical Remarks on Andrei Marmor’s Theory of Legal Obligation”, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 42, 2017, 26-46,  Open access version
  • “Why Practical Reasons are not just One’s Own Private Affair”, Philosophical Inquiry, 41, 2017, 63-85,  Open access version
  • “A Foundation for the Conception of Law as Practical Reason”, Law and Philosophy 34, 2015, 55-88
  • “Law, Shared Activities, and Obligation”, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 27, 2014, 357-381,  Open access version
  • “Obligation: A Legal-Theoretical Perspective” in T. Gizbert Studnicki (ed.), Problems of Normativity, Rules and Rule-Following, Dordrecht: Springer, 2014, 147-163,  Open access version


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