European citizenship and EU expansion: Perspectives on Europeanness and Citizenship Education from Britain and Turkey

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Abstract:

This paper discusses some perspectives on Citizenship Education in Turkey and Britain in the context of current contested discourses on the nature of European identity and of the European Union. It is based on data collected during an EU funded student teacher exchange programme between three Universities in Turkey and Leicester University, England (UK). The programme facilitated participants’ investigations of their understandings of citizenship and Citizenship Education in Britain and Turkey. Data was collected by questionnaire from 581 Turkish student teachers and 85 British student teachers involved with Citizenship Education and, during the exchange visits, through focus group interviews with 14 British and 14 Turkish students. Both groups thought citizenship education was key to creating ‘good citizens’ in their countries, but the nature of this citizenship was perceived to differ between countries. Turkish students placed a strong emphasis on national identity and Turkish citizenship whilst British students focused more on democracy, social justice, global citizenship and human rights. Students from both countries questioned the efficacy of the pedagogical approaches that they observed during school visits in each others’ countries.

Key words: EU education policy; citizenship; Europeanness; student voice

Introduction

This paper discusses some perspectives on Citizenship Education in Turkey and Britain in the context of current contested discourses on the nature of the European Union and European identity. The data arises from a student teacher exchange programme (jointly funded by the EU and the Turkish government) between three Universities in Turkey and Leicester University, England (UK). The three Turkish Universities were: Uşak University, Dokuz Eylül University, Middle East Technical University. The programme was designed to promote civil society dialogue in the context of Turkey’s
candidature for accession to the EU through explorations of participants’ understandings of citizenship, Citizenship Education and attitudes towards students’ voices in schools in England and Turkey. The term ‘England’ is used when referring to educational or political systems to acknowledge the diversity of Education systems in the UK. The term ‘British’ is used for the postgraduate students since they came from all parts of the UK.

During the exchange programme Turkish and British student teachers’ perspectives on Citizenship Education and notions of citizenship of their own countries and of Europe were collected using a questionnaire and focus group interviews. The questionnaire was answered by 581 Turkish university students and 85 British postgraduate students. Of the British students, 27 were training to be Primary School teachers and 58 to be Secondary School teachers (the quantitative data analysis reported here amalgamates the two groups). This analysis used simple descriptive statistics to interrogate the proportion of each sample of students holding particular views, including none, either stated or unstated, for each question. During the exchange visits in February and April 2009, focus group interviews were carried out with 14 British and 14 Turkish student teachers. The interview schedule was drawn up partly to complement issues investigated through the questionnaire and partly from participants’ responses to the questionnaire, and the resultant qualitative data was analysed thematically. More detailed discussion of the data and methodology are reported elsewhere (Busher, et al., 2009).

**Background**

Education is both a site and a conduit for struggles (Foucault, 1976) through which students can explore the tensions of being and becoming as they (re)construct their identities (Giddens, 1991; Kearney, 2003) in situational contexts. The pursuit and enactment of self-identity is central to the development of agency (Giddens, 1991) through which people interact with others and with constructed social systems/structures (Giddens, 1984). The students in the exchange programme were near a critical point in this journey, moving from being students to professionals. Their contexts were, then, particularly volatile at the micro level, but also at the macro level, because of globalisation, fears of world climate change, the near collapse of the world economic order that enshrines Western dominance and the emergence of additional layers of identity, such as the European Union.

Schools are sites in which national policies and local perspectives intersect as people struggle to construct implementable educational policies and practices (Grace, 1995; Riley & Docking, 2002) that reflect particular but contested values (Starratt, 2007). The importance of schools and schooling in shaping social constructions, such as society’s views on identity, pluralism and social cohesion, has been increasingly acknowledged by both national governments within Europe and by the EU. This awareness has been heightened by the observed decline in civic engagement and in participatory politics, especially by young people (Citizenship Foundation, 1997), in the second half of the twentieth century.

This ‘democratic deficit’ (Featherstone, 1994) has led national governments across Europe to be increasingly interventionist in shaping the structures and processes of schooling, for example, by developing more overtly ‘socially engaged’ curricular areas, such as ‘education for democracy’ and ‘Citizenship Education’ (Ross, 2000). Citizenship Education in particular has been a key mechanism by which governments have tried to influence the development of social values and practices, albeit with different emphases according to their national context (Kerr, 2005; Osler & Starkey, 1999). For instance, when the UK government made Citizenship Education a compulsory subject for pupils in
England between the ages of 11-16, it rejected the recommendation of its own Committee of Inquiry that it should be compulsory from 5 years old (Wilkins, 2000).

There is some evidence that disengagement (and distrust) of political processes and institutions is particularly marked in the EU (Cleaver et al., 2005), and so the notion of a democratic deficit in respect of the EU has been widely debated (Moravcsik, 2002; Crombez, 2003; Rittberger, 2004; Schmidt, 2007). The EU has long recognised the role of education in addressing the matter of political legitimacy (Lawn & Lingard, 2002) so it has funded a range of education programmes (e.g. Leonardo, Socrates, Comenius) intended to construct not simply a common approach to education and training, but a ‘Europe of Knowledge’ (Moutsios, 2007, p.16) and understandings of ‘Europeanness’ (European identity and citizenship). Article 8 of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty formally established the notion of European citizenship and the responsibilities of member states in the “construction of such citizenship, consolidating existing citizenship rights and instituting new rights” (Osler & Starkey, 1999, p.202). This expressed political will for a coherent ‘EU-wide’ model of citizenship and identity (and a coherent European dimension within national education systems) is fraught with tensions and contradictions.

The very notion of constructing through schooling a shared sense of ‘European citizen identity’ is problematic given the continuing insistence in the EU of education as being the responsibility of individual member states (Novoa, 2001). The contestation of values at particular national and, sometimes, sub-national levels, has led to very different models of Citizenship Education being adopted by member states (Hahn, 1999; Kerr, 2005). For some educators, too, the pursuit of a coherent European model of Citizenship Education is fraught with danger, potentially leading to a confining, exclusionary model (Ross, 2003, p.22) which would focus on the rights and privileges of ‘community membership’. In this model ‘the other’ would be those people not entitled to these. For others, the very notion of European citizenship is flawed. Kearney (2007, p.132) argues that the European citizen identity, as envisioned by the EU political elite, can be most closely aligned with Habermas’s concept of a citizenship defined by enacted rights (political and civic) (Habermas, 1992). Whilst national political cultures are dominated by the more visceral allegiances of nationality, ethnicity and faith, European identity is likely to remain, by comparison, weak (Kearney, 2007).

Whilst the complexities of constructing European citizen identity are profound, perhaps wider and more fundamental challenges lie in the contested discourses surrounding the development of the EU project (Dale & Robertson, 2009). Although the economic model of the EU has long been predicated on the hegemony of neo-liberal ‘economic dynamism’ (Lynch, 2006), some aspects of EU social policy have contradicted this through emphasis on social protection and equality (Scharpf, 2002). Furthermore, although the concept of the ‘European Social Model’ is often portrayed as lying at the heart of the EU project (Giddens, 2007), it carries different meanings in different contexts. Most commonly, it is used to define a specific area of EU policy, concerning employment, social welfare, community cohesion and inclusion/equality issues (Rasmussen et al., 2009). However, it is also used more broadly to define the characteristic ‘qualities of social life and welfare’ in Europe (Rasmussen et al., 2009, pp. 160-161). Further, it is used aspirationally, particularly by broadly socialist political groupings in the EU and trade unions, to indicate their vision for a Europe that counters the economic neo-liberal hegemony enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty (Dale & Robertson, 2009).

These debates take place in the context of complex structural changes in the global economy, and the impact of globalization and regionalization at national and European levels (Dale & Robertson, 2009). Changing global political and economic conditions have had a major impact on developing a common EU outlook, as has EU expansion eastward since 1989 since the collapse of Communism. The last has brought in to EU membership states with different historical ‘social models’, and
different economic conditions, democratic structures and traditions of civil society, from those of the founding states of Western Europe. Politically, for much of the first decade of the twenty-first century, many areas of EU policy (social, security and environment) conflicted with those of the only ‘global superpower’, the USA. The US President elected in 2008 is trying to change this dynamic for some issues. Economically, the global recession of 2008-9 is leading to a significant challenge within the EU to the neo-liberal hegemony of deregulation of financial markets (Stichele, 2008).

Given the complex and often contradictory forces at play in the development of EU social policy, it is not surprising that there is little evidence of a ‘coming together’ of member states’ education systems. Despite the significant spending on European education projects around issues of citizenship, identity, social justice, democracy and human rights, the lack of coherence is particularly apparent in those aspects of education related to the promotion of ‘Europeanness’ and the European ‘social model’ as envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty. This seems to be because models of Citizenship Education tend to mirror the political traditions and cultures of nation states (Hahn, 1999; Kerr, 2005). In states where centre-left social democratic parties generally dominate (such as in the Nordic bloc), more participatory, process-led approaches to Citizenship Education prevail, whilst more didactic, content-led approaches pertain in states dominated by centre-right politics (Hahn, 1999; Kerr, 2005). The piecemeal national level development of Citizenship Education appears to reduce the transformative potential for the subject, being all too often merely conforming (Wilkins, 2000).

The contrasting approaches to Citizenship Education can be perceived as the extremes of a continuum, from the process-led, activist maximal interpretation to the formal, content-led minimal one (McLaughlin, 1992). For example, in the English education system, specific national political and cultural contexts shape the model of Citizenship Education. The primary stimulus for the subject becoming a compulsory component of the National Curriculum in 2002 was a belated response to widespread public and political concern following the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence in the mid 1990s, not a grand vision for constructing Europeanness. The resultant curriculum content and guidance, however, revealed government ambivalence to Citizenship Education. Key recommendations of the independent report commissioned to advise on the subject were watered down or ignored (Wilkins, 2001). Further, those aspects of the Citizenship Education curriculum addressing racism were, for many, inadequate (Osler and Starkey, 2000; Hall, 2000; Wilkins, 2005; Gillborn, 2006). The element of social control implied within the English Citizenship Education model reflected the shift in the balance of political discourse during the 1980s and 1990s in England from an emphasis on citizens’ rights to focusing on citizens’ duties and responsibilities (Ross, 2003).

The wide variety of conceptualisations of citizenship and the resultant curriculum models in EU member states suggests that the Maastricht vision of constructing a shared European citizenship identity is unlikely to be realised in the foreseeable future. Further, the continued expansion of the EU will also militate against this. Whilst there is a strong argument for promoting Europeanness as a counter to xenophobia and overly nationalistic ‘localism’, identity can also be problematised where it is defined in an exclusive way, as being not ‘the other’ (Ross, 2000).

Where people inhabit more than one world, whether of overlapping groups in a school or local community, or belonging to more than one national community, they seem able to accommodate this comfortably, albeit within a ‘hierarchy of identification’. In a study of young people’s (age 18-25) attitudes of European identity and citizenship in England, Spain and France, Edye (2003) found that people were broadly comfortable with the notion of multiple identities, but that ‘home’ is a ‘primary locator of belonging’ (p.110). This hierarchy echoes Colley’s distinction between identity as ‘ancestral and visceral’ as opposed to the ‘political and functional’ nature of citizenship (Colley,
1999, p4, cited in Edye, 2003, p.96; as Etzioni (2009) points out, wherever supra-national communities such as the EU are formed, individual identity continues to be “...profoundly linked to [national] community” (p.101).

Edye also found that there were some distinct national differences in understandings of Europeanness, with a greater emphasis on ‘active citizenship’ in England whereas the French and Spanish respondents focused more on predominantly instrumental citizen rights (right to travel/work, etc.). These apparently distinct national trends in young people’s attitudes to citizenship supports the earlier findings of Hahn, who also suggested a link between the models of Citizenship Education in place and political attitudes and perceptions in a state (Hahn, 1999).

This research was carried out as part of a student teacher exchange programme between Britain and Turkey, designed to promote civil society dialogue and raise awareness of issues of citizenship and identity in the context of Turkey’s possible accession to the EU. The two countries provide an interesting comparative dimension to this issue, given their positioning within Europe and in relation to the EU. Both might be viewed as ‘marginal’ to Europe, and not simply geographically; they both have strong historical, political and cultural affiliations and affinities that may lead citizens to construct societal values, or ‘normative community bonds’, that in many ways distinguish them not only from each other, but from the Western European core of the EU. In addition, they have very different political cultures and distinctive models of Citizenship Education, and so the perspective of student teachers in the two countries provides a useful empirical addition to our understanding of complex issue of European citizenship during a period of EU expansion.

This paper explores this perspective by asking about their views on:

- Europe and Europeanness;
- citizenship education;
- student voice/empowerment.

Findings

Views on being European citizens

What is Europe?

Despite participants in the survey being student teachers who will, in due course as part of their professional practice, have to teach children about the European Union, the results of the survey suggest that their knowledge of it was limited. A very small proportion of each cohort (Turkish 5%, British 5%) was able accurately to define the boundaries of the EU, while a considerable proportion (Turkish 39%, British 66%) made major errors in drawing the boundary of the EU on an outline map of geographical Europe. Although a large proportion (Turkish 83%, British 92%) of student teachers in both cohorts recognised France as one of the founder members of the European Union, British students were more strongly aware (76%) than Turkish students (53%) of the centrality of Germany to its construction. Few participants recognised that the Netherlands or Luxembourg played a significant part.
Being a British and European citizen

The vast majority of British student teachers (84%) considered Britain to be a European country that was predominantly secular (60%), despite a formally established state church (the Church of England). However, a large proportion of Turkish student teachers (60%) considered Britain to be Christian and many thought it to be on the Atlantic fringes of Europe (39%). British student teachers generally considered themselves firstly as British Citizens (71%) and secondly as European citizens (58%), rather than world citizens.

However, their views on being part of the European Union showed some ambivalence. British student teachers generally approved of membership of the EU for removing trade barriers (85%), improving consumers’ rights (73%), bringing peace and stability to Europe (72%), and giving Europe a more powerful voice in the world (81%). However, there was some scepticism about the EU’s positive contribution to improving the environment (only 33% had a positive view) and to fighting international crime (49%). British student teachers generally thought that Britain gained economically and strategically from membership of the EU, and could see no drawbacks to the EU from British membership.

This positive view of the EU was partially confirmed by British student teachers’ general disagreement with some of the negative views of the EU often put forward in various sectors of the British media. Although 46% agreed that the EU reduced member countries’ sovereignty, 68% thought it increased people’s freedom. Although 31% agreed that the EU increased taxation, 41% thought it did not waste taxpayers’ money. Concerns about increased immigration (27% British students) seemed balanced against improvement in the economy (28%) and greater opportunities for movement around Europe in search of jobs (16%) and increased multicultural interaction (19%).

Being a Turkish and European citizen

A very large majority of Turkish students considered themselves Turkish citizens in the first place (86%) and then global citizens (51%). Perhaps not surprisingly, there was little sense of being European citizens; some (35%) thought being a European citizen meant nothing to them while a further 32% gave no answer to this question. 25% were concerned that membership of the EU would damage national identity or contribute to cultural deformation (32%). The strongest positive comments focused on economic development (43% thought membership of the EU would help this), the development of human rights and democracy (14%) and improved social life (9%).

The lack of enthusiasm for the EU may, in part, be related to more than half the Turkish students perceiving Turkey as both a European and an Asian Country and nearly half perceiving it as both an Islamic and a secular country. A further quarter perceived Turkey as an Asian country not a European one. This is compared to less than a third of Turkish students who perceived it as a secular, Western oriented country, the official Turkish government view. Over a third of Turkish students apparently perceived no benefits to the EU from Turkish membership of it and some (10%) thought Turkish membership would cause the EU cultural or economic problems. Of those Turkish students who commented on the relationship between Turkey and the EU, less than a fifth referred to benefits for the EU from Turkish membership and perceived these as economic and strengthened military capacity. 11% thought it would prevent the EU being a ‘Christian club’.

The relationship between religion and the state in Turkey is, of course, a complex one, and cannot be discussed in detail here. However, perhaps significant in terms of this study is the distinction drawn by some theorists between the varieties of secularism characterising most EU countries and
Turkey. Hurd (2004, 2006) describes the Turkish Kemalist model as laicist (with absolute, unbreachable separation between religion and the state) and the core socio-political values of the EU as ‘Judeo-Christian secularism’, based on a duality of church and state (Hurd, 2004, pp.242-251). She also goes on to argue that it is this distinction that provides the greater tension rather than the Christian-Muslim distinction (Hurd, 2006, pp.402-403). Whilst this conceptualisation has some merit, it also illustrates the complexities involved in defining the ‘European social/cultural space’. The post-2004 eastwards expansion of the EU makes this dichotomy less easy to delineate.

According to Turkish students the chief gains from membership of the EU lay in economic arenas (removing trade barriers (51%) and giving greater protection to consumers (63%)). However, like their British counterparts they expressed scepticism about how strong its role was in improving the environment (only 38% agreed) or fighting international crime (only 42% agreed). Unlike their British counterparts, Turkish students were evenly divided as to whether or not the EU brought stability to Europe. This possibly reflects the different historical experiences the two countries have had over the last century. However Turkish students, unlike their British counterparts, were concerned that membership of the EU might increase taxation (74%), create unnecessary controls on business (62%) and create unnecessary rules and regulations (65%). Like their British counterparts, they were concerned that the EU might reduce member countries’ sovereignty.

**Views on Citizenship Education**

Both cohorts of students thought that Citizenship Education was of major importance for their countries (Turkish 94%, British 78%). However, more British Primary postgraduate students (90%) agreed with the statement than Secondary postgraduate students (72%). A possible explanation for this is that in the English education system, whilst Citizenship Education is non-statutory in the Primary age phase, all student teachers are required to be trained to teach the subject. However, amongst the Secondary trainee teachers’ in this study there were specialists in subjects such as Mathematics and Science as well as in Citizenship Education and Social Science.

When asked why citizenship education was important the views of Turkish and British cohorts diverge. 56% of Turkish university students attached most importance to the knowledge base of citizenship, teaching the rights and responsibilities of citizens (the political literacy dimension (Crick & Porter, 1978)). Further, there was a large proportion of blank responses by Turkish students to this question. This may be explained by the socio-cultural and political contexts of Turkey. The Turkish approach to citizenship education before the curriculum reforms in 2004 (and so those experienced by these student teachers as pupils) was rooted in the relationship between individuals and the nation state. It concentrated on fostering students’ consciousness of notions of rights and responsibilities, freedom of speech, sovereignty, and national identity, not on transnational and global issues. The British student teachers offered a more ‘outward-looking’ perspective, referring not only to making pupils aware of their own cultural identity (15%), but learning about global responsibility (15%) and enhancing pupils’ understanding of countries other than their own (11%). This divergence was further mirrored in students’ answers to what they thought people in their own country would most gain from education for Citizenship. Turkish students emphasised human rights (29%) and social responsibilities (16%) in Turkey compared with British students’ emphasis on knowledge of societies in Europe (27%) and the wider world (20%).

When asked in the focus groups to elaborate on the role of citizenship education, and particularly of how citizenship is enacted in schools, postgraduate students’ views were broadly consistent with those of the questionnaire data. For the Turkish postgraduate students, the ways in which citizenship principles were enacted in the English schools they visited were highly visible, and they
drew explicit comparisons between the way in which ‘theory’ was embedded in ‘practice’, some contrasting this with a more ‘abstract’, knowledge-based approach in Turkey.

“I agree that in our educational system, things were taught in theory, I believe that teachers should know the law and they should teach the law through experience, this is the part I would like to link to England. None of the teachers I have observed told pupils their rights and asked them to learn the law off by heart but they gave the understanding of it”.

However, there was a robust exchange within the Turkish group about the Turkish curriculum. Despite the broad consensus that the citizenship education they had experienced as school pupils was too focused on knowledge of civic rights and duties, they were ambivalent about the balance between the content and process-led approaches to citizenship education they saw in England. Whilst acknowledging the weaknesses of the Turkish curricular approach and were approving on the way the English model put principles into practice, they felt that some aspects of the English model were weaker in not giving pupils essential knowledge.

“In [Turkey], it is largely based on rote-learning... Learning the dates of wars and it, unfortunately, impedes the learning process as it sounds boring to students...here in the UK they learn something practical.....but they [are] not able to remember and answer very simple questions. This shows that the education system [in UK] is shallow ... Students are given a couple of handouts and the things are presented superficially... this is the problem”.

The British postgraduate teacher trainee students focused more on overall teaching approaches and organisation and resourcing issues. They noted the differing approaches to ‘diversity’ in schooling between England and Turkey but linked this to different pedagogical approaches as well as the wider issue of cultural identity.

“I’ve just realised that in the UK we inform all our students of diversity and...embracing it...I don’t think the Turkish have grasped the idea of doing and making their students aware of the wider, like global context. To be part of the European Union they need to start incorporating some sort of awareness of other existences”.

There were differences in the group of British student teachers, however. Some noted that despite the more global perspective of English schooling, they were not convinced this had a real impact:

“I don’t think English children are particularly globally aware...any more than the Turkish children. I think the Turkish are more globally aware than the English.... all of the kids could speak English quite well.

**Student voice/empowerment**

An important element in teaching citizenship is helping students to understand their rights as citizens and consumers. British and Turkish postgraduate students thought that education policy in each country appeared to mirror its society. The enactment of child rights in school was viewed by students in both cohorts as a key element in citizenship education. Students across both cohorts viewed this in terms of equity and of concepts of human rights and freedom of speech and thought.

However, Turkish students interpreted ‘school students’ rights’ in terms wider than education, while British students focused narrowly on school students’ rights in school. Some of the explanation for this may lie in Turkish university students’ hunger to obtain basic rights as consumers, patients, voter and workers. Further, their experience of schooling was prior to the era of Turkish curriculum reforms since 2004. In traditional Turkish education students did not have many rights.
The enactment of student rights to participate as citizens in schools, as compared to the teaching about citizenship rights, drew a rather mechanical view from both British and Turkish university students. Apart from that proportion of Turkish university students who thought school students in Turkey had little chance of any active involvement in influencing the organisation of their schools, British and Turkish university students focused on formal consultative procedures—support for school councils, suggestion boxes, talking with staff and parents.

While it might be argued that the use of school student councils, mentioned by nearly half of the British postgraduate student teachers, indicates school student engagement in at least a formalised arena for discussing school policy, there is much debate about the extent to which such arena are dominated by the agenda of senior staff (Fielding, 2008) which mediate school students’ views. Cynically one might argue that that is accurately representative of and reasonable training for the democratic roles actually ascribed to people in both Britain and Turkey at present.

In the focus group discussions, Turkish postgraduate students thought school students in England had more freedom than those in Turkey in not having to wear school uniforms, although this seems to be a very partial view of school practice in England where many Primary and Secondary schools compel students to conform to a school uniform. The Turkish postgraduate students perceived school uniform as a means of standardisation which gave teachers a greater sense of their authority over their students. They also thought that school students in England had more freedom of speech than those in Turkey, indicating, they argued, a respect for personal differences that applied in social life as well as in school.

“In general, respecting individual differences was a recurrent theme in the seminars... and we had experiences that they put this theory into practice... it should be admitted that British teachers respect their students to a greater extent than Turkish teachers do. We as educationalists we assume that we are the sole authority...but this is not the case in Britain”.

They thought this was how teachers taught school students the tolerance of different people’s rights needed in a multi-cultural society like Britain.

British postgraduate students thought that student rights in Turkey were compromised in various ways.

“the attitude that Turkish people generally hold in society was definitely straight up like clearly mirrored in their education, like gender issues they ignore, sexual orientation, homophobia are ignored. Even in the classroom they are just not addressed”.

They thought gender issues were an aspect of education that was not critically considered in Turkey, and that women were as unwilling to address it as men.

Conclusions

Europe and Europeanness

Although this study reveals little fundamental difference between Turkish and British students’ views of the EU, it did highlight different perspectives on some aspects of ‘the European space’. In keeping with the findings of a study by Edye (2003), there is a significant degree of scepticism about the EU project alongside an acceptance of the notion of multiple identities; this reflects the differences
between policy elites and ordinary people in both countries noted by Cleaver et al. (2005) and Dale & Robertson (2009). Furthermore, it reinforces the notion of a democratic deficit in EU political legitimacy (Rittberger, 2004; Schmidt, 2007). The nature of this democratic deficit may be shifting as the tensions become more apparent between the centralising perspective that is embedded in the European Social Project (Giddens, 2007) and the neo-liberal model of the EU as a diverse free trade zone that was envisioned in the Lisbon agreement (Dale and Robertson, 2009).

The tensions displayed in the students’ perspectives on the EU seem to mirror the wider barriers to the acceptance of the European Social Project. This project, which necessitates the construction of a ‘European policy space’ (Lawn, 2002), confronts citizens of member states with the realisation that this in turn necessitates the construction of a much stronger form of common European citizen identity than Habermasian form of identity based on common economic and human rights (Habermas, 1992, Kearney, 2007). However, as Etzioni (2009) points out, wherever supra-national communities such as the EU are formed, individual identity continues to be “…profoundly linked to [national] community” (p.101).

Given Turkey’s status as an EU candidate nation, the attention given by the Turkish students to the potential loss (or dilution) of national identity as a result of membership is perhaps not surprising. However, this research suggests that in the weighing up the costs and benefits of membership, this issue features strongly on the negative side of the balance sheet. This did mean that Turkish students appear to look towards a more ‘minimalist, neo-liberal’ model of European space than the British students, one which is predominantly an economic space in which individuals and states can develop whilst each state retains its own (strong) national identity (Etzioni, 2009).

Whilst the British students were also critical of the impact of EU on Britain’s political sovereignty, they were less explicitly concerned about loss of national identity, although this issue has consistently underpinned much of the public discourse in the UK, as it has across the majority of European nations (McLaren, 2004). Interestingly, whilst the ongoing eastwards expansion of the EU is frequently reported as raising new questions about the nature of Europeanness and citizen identity (Delanty,1995; Karp & Bowler, 2006; Lauristin, 2007), this did not appear as a significant issue with the British students.

The issue of faith and secularism has been widely viewed as problematic in the context of Turkish accession, raising as it does a fundamental challenge to Western European concepts of the EU ‘social space’. Some argue that Turkish accession “destabilises European secular social imaginary” (Hurd, 2006, p.402). Others argue that some opposition from within the EU is motivated less by liberal angst about the potential loss of secularism in the social sphere than by a more or less overt Islamophobia (Marranci, 2004; Canan, 2009). However, no evidence of these tensions emerged from this study. British and Turkish students appeared sanguine about the possible accession of a politically laicist, culturally Islamic Turkey into a politically secular, culturally Judeo-Christian secularist EU. This lack of evidence may, of course, be a limitation of the research design, as an issue of such complexity and sensitivity would need more detailed qualitative research than was possible in this study. However, there is some evidence that it reflects wider Turkish attitudes towards EU accession (Somor, 2007; Kentman, 2008).

citizenship education

Although the development of Europeanness is seen as a construction project (Rasmussen et al., 2009), the development of European citizenship education is perceived as a dialogic growth process (Bush et al. 2009). Among the two cohorts of university students in this study, citizenship education was perceived as of great importance, but the emphasis given by each as to actually what
this meant was different, reflecting but also contradicting to some extent the policy perspectives of their national governments and the discourses of their national political elites.

The current Turkish government, although more ready than its predecessors to move away from the rigid secularism of previous governments and allow symbols of Islam in public arenas, is strongly in favour of membership of the EU, leaving the established secular political elites in the country to take a more sceptical position (Aydın & Çarkır, 2007). The current government view regards the EU as a multi-faith as well as a multi-national group, rather than as a ‘Christian club’, a view expressed by some participants in this study, that will help Turkey modernise its society and economy. The global economic crisis has increased the urgency of its focus on the latter objective (Kutlay, 2009). To facilitate this project, the government has, since 2004, put in place a more liberal citizenship curriculum rather than one that focused narrowly on the civics of being a Turkish citizen. The Turkish students in this study perceived this as helping Turkish citizens gain and retain basic civil rights. However, perhaps because most of them had experienced the pre-2004 curriculum when they were in school, many were doubtful of the efficacy of pedagogical approaches that foster the enactment of school students’ citizenship in schools.

In England, on the other hand, although it already has a strong citizenship curriculum, which was made mandatory in schools in 2002, important elements of its political elite have recently begun to sound increasingly anti-European and increasingly concerned with law and order and security. Not surprisingly in this context, the British students in this study emphasised the importance of citizenship education helping students and teachers to build more equitable and mutually respecting relationships, perhaps to counteract the more authoritarian discourses emerging from Britain’s political elite. However, despite long-standing and significant scepticism in the discourses of many sectors of the British population and media about EU membership, British postgraduate students in this study also emphasised the importance of Citizenship Education teaching children about global responsibility and enhancing pupils’ understanding of Europe and countries other than their own.

**student voice/empowerment**

The high level of support for promoting children’s rights, amongst both British and Turkish students, indicates a concern with enhancing and sustaining democratic participation (at national and EU level) as well as economic empowerment. However, for Turkish students, there was a clear tension between the need to assert ‘control’ over curriculum content and delivery and their desire to allow school students to enact citizenship in their schools. This tension mirrors the wider debate in Turkish society about the balance of freedom, democracy, and the need to foster a clear national identity. The situation in Turkey was also complicated by a reluctance to engage pedagogically in the classroom and schools with issues such as gender equality and the rights of minorities. However, among both British and Turkish students, the conception of student voice had a formalistic tinge, with an emphasis on the mechanisms of engagement rather than the effectiveness of student voice in achieving change within schools.

The high level of support for promoting children’s rights, amongst both British and Turkish students, indicates a concern with enhancing and sustaining democratic participation (at national and EU level) as well as economic empowerment. However, for Turkish students, there was a clear tension between the need to assert ‘control’ over curriculum content and delivery and their desire to allow school students to enact citizenship in their schools. This tension mirrors the wider debate in Turkish society about the balance of freedom, democracy, and the need to foster a clear national identity. The situation in Turkey was also complicated by a reluctance to engage pedagogically in the classroom and schools with issues such as gender equality and the rights of minorities. However,
among both British and Turkish students, the conception of student voice had a formalistic tinge, with an emphasis on the mechanisms of engagement rather than the effectiveness of student voice in achieving change within schools.

This study (and the exchange programme which inspired it) provides an insight into the views on the emerging European space envisioned by the Lisbon Treaty from two countries that can be characterised (albeit in very different ways) as ‘marginal’ to Europe. With a particular focus on Citizenship Education, the perspectives of these student teachers reveals some of the complexities surrounding the ongoing evolution of Europeanness and European identity throughout this period of EU expansion. It also provides tentative support for the findings of Hahn (1999) and Edye (2003) and Kerr (2005) that young people are comfortable with multiple understandings of identity but that their understandings of citizenship education are linked to national notions of the purposes and processes of citizenship education and the national policy/cultural frameworks of individual countries. This would suggest that success of the EU’s project of developing a European Education Space in which a notional European citizen identity can be constructed will be constrained by the continuing particularist national foci of the models of citizenship education adopted by member states.

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