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UNDERSTANDING CORRUPTION IN THE RUSSIAN POLICE: COMPARING THE ATTITUDES OF TRAINEES AND SERVING OFFICERS

Adrian Beck and Ruth Lee

COLPI Paper No. 5

Prepared for COLPI by:
Adrian Beck and Ruth Lee
Scarman Centre, University of Leicester

January 2001
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report details the findings of a survey on attitudes to corruption amongst students attending a training institution for police officers and lawyers in Western Russia. It provided strong evidence that a tolerant attitude to some corrupt behaviours, an acceptance of particular circumstances as justifying corruption, and of particular conditions as increasing its acceptability, are already present amongst trainee officers, as well as amongst currently serving officers.

Rationale

One of the systemic problems facing post-Soviet societies is the fact that corrupt income-generation strategies and reciprocal networks continue to offer the greatest chance of individual and institutional economic survival. In the Russian Federation, police are often reported by the media and the public to be open to using their positions at work to attain money, goods, or services. This project set out to outline some factors in respondents' attitudes to corruption by asking respondents about the relative importance of institutional factors; circumstances and conditions which might justify corruption; arguments for and against taking small gifts and gratuities; and punishment and deterrence.

Methodology

The data presented is based on completed questionnaires from 383 first year students, 445 fourth year students and 297 serving officers undertaking short courses or Masters/PhD studies. These groups represent almost the entire populations of first and fourth year students; the serving officer cohort was statistically representative in terms of age and gender.

Corruption in context

Educational input to students' thinking on corruption appears to be as much informal as formal. By the fourth year of study, students appear to be discussing the issue of corruption actively with their peer group. One-half of
serving officers said that the information which they receive at the training institution about use of position for personal ends was either not entirely sufficient or insufficient to deal with the problem.

Reasons for training as a police officer may be motivated by the opportunity for a legal position. Most respondents' primary reason for joining the police had been that police receive a good legal education. Also important were considerations of job satisfaction (police work as 'interesting' and 'useful to society'), while least important to respondents were a sense of commanding power and respect. The vast majority of respondents considered that the work of the police has become harder over the last few years.

The police-public relationship is perceived to have deteriorated by just over one-half of respondents, although 15 per cent thought that it had improved. Serving officers were more inclined to a pessimistic view about the police-public relationship, while first year students were the most optimistic cohort. 'Bureaucracy and procrastination' and 'indifference and lack of respect' on the part of the police were considered important factors in reducing the trust of the police by the public. Forty per cent of respondents thought that corruption plays a role in reducing trust, with serving officers substantially more likely to believe this to be the case than students.

The extent of the problem of corruption was perceived to have worsened over the last few years by more than 70 per cent of serving officers. Almost two-thirds of respondents overall thought that a temporary economic crisis in Russia was the primary underlying cause. First years subscribed more strongly than either of the other two cohorts to economic crisis as a primary explanation. Of ten professions presented to respondents, operational police and criminal investigation detectives were considered the least likely (along with doctors) to use their position at work for personal ends on a regular basis. Between one-quarter and one-fifth of respondents nevertheless thought they did so 'often' or 'very often'. Of all ten professions, the only group perceived to use their position at work more often than traffic police were politicians.

**Motivation for corruption**

Low pay and institutional pressure are perceived as key factors. A majority thought that low pay was the most important of ten listed factors, with 'Due to pressure from above to achieve good clear-up rates' ranked second. Ranked third was 'Because there are plenty of opportunities;' however, 'Peer pressure' ranked last, suggesting a
distinction between taking opportunities because they are there and feeling under pressure from colleagues to do so. Serving officers identified five of the ten listed factors as playing a greater role in reality than they had anticipated during their studies.

Moral judgements

Moral tolerance of low-level corruption appears to be increased during the educational process and also by experience as a serving officer, while moral tolerance of scenarios involving serious corruption appears to decrease. A majority of respondents agreed with the statement that 'Police can generally distinguish between a friendly gesture and a bribe'. Those respondents who thought that public duty alone should motivate police actions were nevertheless not sure that police are actually able to distinguish clearly in this way. Respondents were by no means agreed about whether taking small gifts and services has become an inextricable part of police culture in Russia. However, almost two-thirds of respondents thought that when a gift is given to police, there was no expectation or demand for a gift.

Justifications

A culture of justification by reference to conditions and circumstances seems to exist amongst a significant minority of respondents. Of a list of ten justifications for potentially corrupt behaviour, ('It is acceptable to use position at work for one's own ends if...') none was accepted by less than 1 in 10 respondents: One-third accepted 'If their very close friends and family are involved', and just under one-third tacitly accepted a moral distinction between money and other forms of reward by accepting 'Money isn't involved'. A significant minority of respondents agreed with the other three justifications, 'Superior officers are aware of it', 'It doesn't happen very regularly,' and 'The favours are not very large'. This last justification was the only one to be accepted by significantly more serving officers than other cohorts.

Prevention and Punishment

Fear of exposure or punishment was considered the primary reason for refraining from corruption by almost-one half of respondents, whereas just over one-third thought that moral issues were paramount. There is some evidence that 'sticking to the letter of the law' is also perceived as a moral stance.
Reluctance to report was almost universal: only 5 per cent of respondents said that they would report incidents of corruption which they come across to senior officers, and no significant differences were found between the responses of serving officers and students.

A substantial minority supported a shift in responsibility for investigating corruption cases. Almost one-half of respondents (46%) thought that the current arrangements for investigating corruption (specialist anti-corruption police) were the most appropriate. Over one-quarter of respondents overall, and one-third of serving officers in particular, felt that responsibility should be transferred to the procuracy. Almost one-fifth of respondents supported the idea that an independent bureau of lay people should have responsibility for dealing with corruption, although serving officers were less supportive of this option than students. There was markedly less confidence (37%) in the potential effectiveness of an independent bureau for investigating corruption than in a separate police unit for dealing with corruption (63%), which is the current status quo.

Higher salaries and/or bonuses were considered likely to be effective by the vast majority of respondents.

Stricter penalties for both bribe-givers and bribe-takers were supported by over half of respondents. One-half of respondents thought that tightening corruption laws would be effective.

Attempts to effect cultural change also had a significant level of support. Over one-half of respondents thought that more ethics training would be effective. Approaching the problem by strengthening citizens’ rights, or awareness of their rights, was considered to have a reasonable chance of success: 41 per cent of respondents thought that better appeal and complaints procedures for citizens would be effective, and 38 per cent that displaying citizens’ rights at all police stations would be effective.
Recommendations

• Explicit inclusion of practical, realistic, examples of existing problems with corruption within the current provision for courses on ethics, morals, and law.
• Greater emphasis within these courses on the damaging impact of corruption on the relationship between the police and the public. The development of short refresher courses for serving officers. Consideration of an annual 'anti-corruption week' within the Training Institution focusing on its impact and the consequences of involvement.
• Increased informal emphasis on awareness of the consequences of becoming involved in corrupt practices.
• The development of specialist short courses for senior police managers on effective performance monitoring. Staff training and development in order to put this into effect.
• A radical review of the pay structure for Russian police officers.
• The development of a new set of performance indicators for measuring police 'effectiveness' which take account of a broad range of factors apart from rates of crime and clearance rates (Ministry of Interior officials are already considering such a change).
• Creation of 'dedicated officer' posts trained to take reports of public interest disclosure matters.
• Clear indications from staff to students that it is not necessarily wrong to raise matters concerning corruption externally.
• Review of existing internal sanctions within the disciplinary code of the police.
INTRODUCTION

Post-communist states and societies are attempting to define and attain the relatively high standards of transparency in government and business practice demanded (if not always met) by Western trading partners and political allies. Western organisations have tried to find ways of curbing corruption in transitional societies using three basic approaches. Firstly, they have provided technical assistance to facilitate 'grassroots change' through education and training. Secondly, they have supported organisations, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), that they perceive as enriching civil society, encouraging them to attempt civilian oversight. Thirdly, they have tried to foster local political will to introduce organisational and legal remedies, and to encourage a culture of what is often termed 'good governance'. Judging the correct approach to take in order to influence a society is difficult, as many government campaigns in stable societies have testified; attempting to do this in a transitional society is perhaps even more difficult. The recent Issues Paper on corruption published by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) attempted to determine how its development programme can be made more effective in helping governments tackle corruption, ending with the following questions for discussion: 'Has the international development community identified the key problems? Are there other, better ways to tackle corruption? How can international collaboration be promoted?' These are extremely difficult questions to answer in general terms. Inevitably, the answers are contingent upon context-specific information about particular countries and particular agencies.

The reputation of the police in Russia differs somewhat from the reputation of its most prestigious training institutions. Whereas most police are trained for six months and concentrate on procedural and firearms training, the brightest recruits receive a four-year higher education at an Institute, Academy or University of the Ministry of Interior (MVD). Graduates of these institutions leave as police officers and fully qualified lawyers ('officer' denotes a superior rank, rather than just a description of the police profession as in the UK and US usage). This officers' training is valued highly by applicants and their parents, and the institutions that pro-

1 Department for International Development, Tackling Corruption, January 2000: written following Development Policy Forum discussions.
2 The term 'police' is used throughout rather than 'militia', although militsia continues to be the noun of popular choice for the police in Russia.
vide it are perceived as maintaining high standards and training key specialists. Overall, however, the police in the Russian Federation do not have such an admirable reputation. Police are often reported by the media and the public as willing to using their positions at work to attain money, goods or services, and not averse to causing difficulties for those who refuse to co-operate.

This report seeks to explore some of the beliefs, attitudes and values held by three groups about the use of position at work for one's own ends. These groups were first-year and fourth-year undergraduates training to be officers, and serving officers undergoing retraining. All three cohorts have been sampled from attendees at one of the largest providers of officer training in the Russian Federation. As future key police personnel, they are amongst the most likely individuals to play important roles not only in the policy decisions which the police will take over the next few decades, but also in its framework of institutional beliefs and values. This is all the more likely to be the case given the current trend for mid-ranking police in Russia to leave the organisation and join private security companies, or simply change jobs.

We have addressed some of the key issues in police ethics: What justifications do respondents accept for corrupt behaviour? Do they approve the acceptance of small but potentially corrupting gifts or services, and what beliefs and ideas about the role of the police in society underlie their acceptance or rejection? Are they believers in the 'slippery slope' theory of corruption, which posits that once gifts or services have been accepted, the recipients are more likely to take more?

The survey addresses perceptions of motivation, acceptability and boundaries of acceptable behaviour filtered through questions regarding specific policing practices, education and the police's relationship with the public. It also solicits opinion regarding the appropriateness of various preventative measures.

Following a discussion of methodology, the report is divided into four main sections. 'Corruption in Context' deals with respondents' views about the education system, joining the police, the police's relationship with the public and trends in the use of position at work for one's own ends within the police. 'Motivation' attempts to assess the relative importance of some of the factors which can lead to corruption,

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3 For instance, the newspaper Novaya Gazeta ran a campaign in 1999 encouraging readers to submit their experiences of police corruption and abuse.

including working practices, cultural attitudes and economic problems. 'Attitudes Towards Acceptability' addresses respondents' ethical positions relating to acts which might normatively be regarded as corrupt and whether respondents perceive them to be problematic. 'Prevention and Punishment' examines respondents' opinions about who should deal with investigation and punishment and how they should take place. Finally, a discussion section draws together data and analysis from each section of the report.
Methodology

Carrying out research on a topic as potentially sensitive as corruption is inevitably problematic - even more so when the research concerns respondents' own attitudes towards its acceptability, extent and control. Investigating such topics raises difficult methodological and technical problems of trust, access and conceptualisation. When a topic is perceived to be threatening, the relationship between the researcher and the researched is likely to become 'hedged about with mistrust, concealment and dissimulation'\(^5\). This in turn can lead to adverse consequences for the levels of reliability and validity of the data collected. A survey methodology was therefore felt to provide the most appropriate approach to data collection; it protected the identities of the respondents, facilitated ease of comparison between cohorts of respondents, and allowed the researchers to gather data relatively easily and economically.

Respondents were not asked specific questions about their own deviant behaviour, but rather more generalised questions about their attitudes and beliefs. In addition, some questions used the common technique of 'loading' to encourage response rates; for instance, asking about frequency rather than whether the event had ever happened at all. The questionnaire also made use of a number of non-threatening questions early on, which asked respondents about topics such as their attitudes towards the training they had already received, their reasons for joining the police and the nature of the relationship between the police and the public. More sensitive questions were 'embedded' within the questionnaire in order to facilitate more open responses. A series of scenarios were used in order to anchor responses in situations bearing as close a resemblance as possible to those which respondents might encounter in their working lives.

As detailed earlier, the project aimed to assess the attitudes of officers in a large Russian city to corrupt practices, and analyse the context within which they might take place. It adopted a comparative approach, seeking to chart changes in police views of corruption during progression through the various stages of training and police career. We hoped that this approach would allow the study to generate concrete proposals on future changes to the nature of training offered to different cohorts of police officers, and also structural changes. The study also set out to provide data on the attitudes of officers towards current working practices and the var-

ious forms of deterrence and detection presently adopted by agencies responsible for dealing with the problem of corruption within the police.

Three samples were used: police recruits in their first year of study; police recruits in the final year of study (year 4); and serving officers receiving retraining at the Training Institution. For ease of categorisation, serving officers receiving retraining will frequently be referred to as a 'year group' in this report. Of the serving officer sample, 86 per cent are aged between 21 and 30, and the majority began studying as undergraduates between 1992 and 1996. Almost the entire populations of first-year and fourth-year students took part, and a random sample of serving officers from the postgraduate and retraining population was statistically confirmed as representative of the entire cohort in terms of age and gender. The questionnaire was thoroughly piloted in April 2000 with two groups of second year students and with some serving officers, and findings from the pilot were used to make small alterations to the final questionnaire.

The questionnaire was provided to respondents in Russian. The small changes in meaning which inevitably accompany translation have been controlled as closely as possible; the questions were initially drafted in English, and translation of the first draft was undertaken by one of the authors together with a native speaker of Russian who is also an officer in the Russian police. Subsequent changes were then made to the research instrument and the final Russian version of the questionnaire was agreed by a panel of academics from the Training Institution taking part in the project. This version was then translated back into English.

It should be stressed that no attempt was made to arrive at a 'universal' definition of corruption for the purposes of the research: the project team concerned itself only with delineating aspects of corruption on which the project could usefully focus. However, the following working definition was agreed upon: 'Corruption entails a transaction involving the misuse of power, position or authority on the part of a state official for the benefit of an individual, group or organisation'.

Nevertheless, a key issue was the problem of how to refer to corruption: direct use of the word itself might lead respondents to be wary of the intentions of the researchers, and so the phrase 'use of position at work for one's own ends' was used almost throughout. The exception occurs towards the end of the questionnaire (Question 22) in order to elicit respondents' views about appropriate punishment.

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6 Serving officers who participated in the pilot study were not used as respondents in subsequent data collection.
However, the word has been used from time to time in this paper, partly in order to clarify sentences which would otherwise be rendered clumsy by the length of the phrase 'use of position at work for one's own ends'.

Some personal data was collected in order to enable more detailed analysis and to validate the representative nature of the sample. Detailed below is a breakdown of the number of respondents in each group:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of respondent</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Year</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Year</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving Officers</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,125</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data were collected from 1,125 respondents in May 2000, at the end of the academic year; this meant that the first-years had almost completed one year of study, and the fourth-years had almost completed their courses in full. Fourth-year students, whilst not yet serving officers, do receive some practical work placement experience, and had completed this at the time of the survey. All the serving officers in our sample were also either undergoing retraining or attending the Training Institution as postgraduate students; they are identified as 'serving officers' in tables, although the term used in the body of the text depends on the analytical context. Certain questions included in this report were answered only by serving officers, and where appropriate, these are highlighted in the report.

Curriculum Changes

Several curriculum changes have come into effect since most of our current serving officer sample were undergraduate students, and these need to be borne in mind when assessing their attitudes towards the training they originally received and how it varies with the other groups of respondents. Many of these changes have had the effect of introducing students to practical work at an earlier stage in their careers, which is likely to expose them to situations and force them to take decisions. This experience carries the potential for changing their attitudes to corruption.

See the section entitled 'Curriculum Changes' immediately below for further details about fourth-years' practical experience.
• A 15 to 20 per cent increase in practical sessions linked to student specializations.
• One extra week of practical police work attachments.
• Extra, more specific practical police work attachments for fourth-year students specialising in detective work.
• More practitioners invited to lead practical sessions at the Training Institution.

Data were collected following lectures or retraining sessions at the Training Institute; no senior staff were present. Anonymity was guaranteed to all respondents and was made clear both on the printed questionnaire and orally, before respondents began completing the questionnaire. A large ballot-style sealed box was placed at the front of the room, in which respondents deposited their questionnaires before leaving the room. There was no limit on the amount of time respondents could take to complete the questionnaire, and completion times varied between five and thirty minutes, with the majority taking between 15 and 20 minutes to complete the 25 questions. Data were coded in Russia and then returned to the UK for analysis.

Missing data have not been represented in the results; in some tables, this will result in varying numbers for the value of ‘total number of responses’. All results have been rounded to the nearest whole number. Reported results are all significant at the 95 per cent confidence interval unless otherwise stated (p< 0.05). In order to avoid the unnecessary inclusion of results which are not significant at this level, two tables have often been used: one to represent overall results, and one to indicate significant results by year group.

For some questions, respondents were asked to give additional written responses. Some of these responses simply supported or elaborated the options in the questionnaire, and where appropriate, these have been used to illustrate points made in the text. Others added to the options provided to respondents, and where appropriate, these have been incorporated into the analysis.

The project concluded with a successful research seminar at which findings were disseminated. Attendees included specialist anti-corruption police, academics from MVD training institutions, the distinguished academic Yakov Gilinskiy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and representatives from the procurator’s office. Numbers were strictly limited in order to facilitate a full and frank discussion about the implications of the research findings. Where appropriate, conclusions from this seminar have been included in the final report.
1. CORRUPTION IN CONTEXT

Understanding the context in which attitudes to corruption are fostered and developed is a necessary prerequisite for interpreting them accurately. In this section, respondents' views are examined on several issues: the education system, joining the police, the police's relationship with the public and trends within the police in the use of position at work for one's own ends.

1.1 Attitudes to Education

Students' perceptions of how issues of corruption are addressed at the Training Institution are central to the accurate interpretation of the survey data. The curriculum review (see Appendix 1) undertaken at the Training Institution showed that a number of courses were relevant to moral and ethical issues touching on corruption. The survey attempted to assess how high a profile the relevant aspects have with students and with those undergoing retraining, their practical content, and their applicability to 'real-life' policing.

Respondents were asked who, if anyone, explains to them the unacceptability of the use of position at work for one's own ends during their education. They could choose as many options as they wished.

Table 1.1 Groups who explain the undesirability of use of position at work for personal ends during the educational process (Q4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>All respondents*</th>
<th>1st Years</th>
<th>4th Years</th>
<th>Serving officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Per cent</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturers</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officers</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporaries</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-one</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondents could choose more than one group
Overall, just over two-thirds of respondents perceived teachers to explain and just under two-thirds perceived senior officers to explain, whereas only 19 per cent of respondents perceived their peers to undertake this. A significant minority (15%) did not perceive that any group actively addressed the unacceptability of using position at work for one's own ends.

As we might have expected, it is fourth-year students who perceive most strongly that lecturers explain unacceptability, having at the time of the survey almost completed their higher education. A greater number of serving officers than students perceive that 'no-one' explains unacceptability, and this could be partly attributable to fading memories of education, and also to changes in courses which have taken place since some of the officers attended. However, one in ten first-years—who have completed a year of study—also perceive that 'no-one' explains unacceptability. Given that 40 hours of the 70-hour Professional Ethics course take place in the first year of study, this might be viewed as a cause for concern.

Serving officers are more likely than students to hear their contemporaries explain unacceptability, probably due to their need to face related issues on a day-to-day basis and therefore to discuss them more frequently; but fourth-year students are almost as likely to do so. This suggests that by the fourth year, students are already discussing the issue actively with their peer group.

It is highly unlikely that respondents who answered 'no-one' have actually not been present for the relevant courses at the Training Institution. Instead, they are likely to be interpreting the information they receive differently than their peers. The question asks not simply about the discussion of the issue, but specifically about explanations of unacceptability; there could be an issue here of students' perceptions of either the intent or the integrity of statements about corruption which ostensibly refer to unacceptability.

There may also be an issue of visibility of content: is the 'explanation of unacceptability' sufficiently overt? As detailed in the Curriculum Review (Appendix A), the Professional Ethics course, which specifically addresses corruption issues, concentrates almost exclusively on moral and ethical philosophy and theory. More practical lectures and seminars deal with practical scenarios, but make no acknowledgement of the specific corrupt practices which staff know to occur.

Responses to the next question appear to confirm that visibility of content is a problem at the Training Institution. Respondents were asked how often specific problem-solving tasks concerning the use of position at work are set as part of their education.
Role plays are used for training students in practical protocol, for instance, the preliminary steps in investigating the scene of a burglary. Staff at the research seminar said that during these role plays, some attention is paid to issues of ethical and non-corrupt behaviour. However, a large majority of respondents (86%) said that problem-solving tasks concerning the use of position at work for one's own ends are set rarely or never. Only 14 per cent of respondents said that such an approach had been adopted often. No statistically significant difference was found when comparing serving officers with first- and fourth-year students, suggesting that despite the steadily heightening profile of the problem of corruption in the Russian police and in Russia as a whole, the impact of courses designed to address it has not risen since our officer cohort graduated.

Serving officers were then asked a supplementary question which addressed directly whether they had received sufficient information during their education to deal with the problems they face at work.

Table 1.3 Sufficiency of information given during education about the use of position for one's own ends (Q6; serving officers only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sufficiency</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sufficient</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not entirely sufficient</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results appear to confirm the tentative conclusions drawn above regarding the profile of explanations and their perceived integrity: exactly one-half of the serving officers said that information was either not entirely sufficient or insufficient. Here, it should be noted that respondents perceive the problem itself to be getting worse (see Table 1.9 below), and so might have indicated by their answers a certain pessimism as to whether any level of training can be described as 'sufficient' to tackle a problem without corresponding structural measures being taken.
1.2 Joining the Police

In order to understand the context within which students' and officers' attitudes should be understood, it was important to find out why they decided to join the police in the first instance. We asked them to rank six suggested factors in order of importance, ranging from 1 (most important) to 6 (least important).

Table 1.4 summarises the data for all respondents while Table 1.5 looks in more detail at the differences between each group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>All respondents*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The police receive a good legal education</td>
<td>2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police work is interesting</td>
<td>3.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police work involves being useful to society</td>
<td>3.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police have a stable job</td>
<td>3.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a police officer you have power in society</td>
<td>4.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a police officer you get respect from the public</td>
<td>4.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Mean rank scores where 1 equalled most important reason and 6 equalled least important reason

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>1st Years</th>
<th>4th Years</th>
<th>Serving officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The police receive a good legal education</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police work involves being useful to society</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police have a stable job</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>2.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Mean rank scores where 1 equalled most important reason and 6 equalled least important reason
† Only those categories that are statistically significant are listed

8 Results from one-way ANOVA test.
9 Results from one-way ANOVA test.
Overall, the highest-ranking answer was 'The police receive a good legal education'. A degree from a Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Training Institution confers the status of lawyer as well as the status of officer in the police. Any higher education is valued by employers, and a legal education is particularly prestigious, as it may be seen as helpful for firms in negotiating day-to-day legal problems or questions. Ranked second and third overall were considerations of job satisfaction: police work is 'interesting' and 'useful to society'. Least important to respondents were a sense of commanding power and respect. The reasons for joining recalled by serving officers differed from the overall sample somewhat, placing less emphasis on a good legal education and more on a stable job. This may indicate that the idea of a prestigious education fades into the background once life is taken up with work rather than study, and with the passage of time (fourth-years also gave 'a good legal education' a lower ranking than first-years). 'Police work involves being useful to society' was the highest-ranking answer amongst serving officers. These data may in part reflect a shift in police values amongst recruits since our postgraduate sample began their undergraduate studies at the Training Institution. For the vast majority, this will have been between 1992 and 1996. However, they are also likely to reflect the fact that serving officers have chosen to work in the police, rather than as lawyers, and so core police values may now be remembered as particularly important to them. If we allow for some degree of retrospective attribution of values, on which this latter interpretation relies, we could then say that usefulness to society has retained its power as a draw to the job.

The desire for power and respect are by no means always incompatible with the desire to be useful to society, but had the former been ranked higher by respondents, this might have pointed to a perception that police can only be useful to society by taking an overtly dominant position. It is important not to extrapolate from these data that past reasons for joining the police are the same as current motivations for staying, i.e. we cannot say that serving officers remain in the police due to a desire to be useful to society. Nevertheless, responses are likely to reflect not only respondents' initial reasons for joining the police, but also the reasons as they remember them following their more recent experiences. These experiences are likely to have affected which reasons they recall best and to which they attribute the most importance. Were serving officers entirely cynical about their reasons for remaining in the police, we might expect them to project this somewhat onto their remembered reasons for joining.
Once established at various stages of training and work within the system, as police recruits or as serving officers, how do the various cohorts perceive their jobs changing? Are they becoming easier or more difficult? Problems with pay, equipment and rising crime rates have been widely publicised since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but police are now working with a freer society than ever before, unencumbered by the interests of any particular ideological position.

Serving officers were asked whether they felt that police work has become harder, easier or stayed the same over the last few years (Table 1.6).

Table 1.6 Extent to which police work has become harder or easier over the last few years (Q1; serving officers only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has become harder</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has become easier</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has stayed the same</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The vast majority of respondents (9 in 10) considered that the work of the police has become harder over the last few years. Only 1 in 50 respondents thought that the work of the police had actually become easier, and only 2 in 50 that it had stayed the same. Many other professional groups in Russia might be likely to have given the same response; however, it is important to bear this finding in mind when considering the context in which police operate in Russia, since it is likely to adversely affect morale.

1.3 Relationship with the Public

How did attendees at the Training Institution perceive the relationship which the police currently have with the public? To speak of students' 'relationship with the public' may seem odd, since they are not yet police officers; but students with whom we met mentioned in passing various situations, such as visiting bars and certain shops, that made them feel uncomfortable and closely watched if they were in uniform. Their initiation into police culture, then, starts early, in the sense that the public identify them with that culture early on along the road to actually doing the job, and respond accordingly.
All respondents were asked whether the police's relationship with the public has improved or deteriorated over the last few years.

Table 1.7 Trend in the relationship between the police and the public over the last few years by type of respondent (Q2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>All respondents</th>
<th>1st Years</th>
<th>4th Years</th>
<th>Serving officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Got better</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayed the same</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Got worse</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, just over one-half of respondents considered that it had deteriorated, and just over one-third that it had stayed the same. Only 15 per cent thought that it had improved.

Serving officers' pessimism might be attributed to time already spent interacting with the public, enhancing both their realism and their cynicism. They may also remember the Soviet era of policing with some degree of nostalgia in terms of the clarity of the parameters of their relationship with the public (although during perestroika years, this relationship became increasingly complex). First-year students' more positive outlook could be explained in terms of youthful optimism, and also by a degree of naïveté. Fourth-years were least likely to say that the relationship has deteriorated. This may be due to the fact that their removal from the ranks of 'the public' to uniform-wearing status, which identifies them in their own and the public's minds with the police, has not yet brought them into a relationship with the public where they carry out often problematic duties such as conflict resolution.

Richard Rose is very optimistic about the power of the police to take responsibility for building the trust of the public, although he acknowledges that in much of Eastern Europe they have in the past been responsible for failing to court it: 'Insofar as institutional performance holds the key to trust in political institutions, then the process of building trust in institutions can occur much more rapidly than the generations or centuries suggested by cultural theories.... The character and performance of trustworthy institutions can generate trust just as the performance of the old

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untrustworthy institutions generated scepticism and distrust. Respondents were asked whether they thought that the use of position at work for one's own ends was currently an important factor in undermining the trust of the public in the police. They were asked to decide which factors of a list of five (including use of position at work for one's own ends) play a role in reducing the public's trust in the police, and were able to choose as many options as they wished (Table 1.8).

Table 1.8 Factors reducing the public's trust in the police (Q19)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Number*</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy, procrastination</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifference, lack of respect</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biased reporting by the mass media</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of position for one's own ends</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low level of professionalism</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondents could choose more than one factor

Bureaucracy and procrastination, problems at least partially inherited from the policing methods of the Soviet era, were indicated most often: almost two-thirds of respondents were in agreement, suggesting that respondents perceive 'lack of trust' to be an issue primarily concerned with the police being unable or unwilling to do their job. Indifference and lack of respect was indicated by just over one-half of respondents, reaffirming the data presented above in Table 1.2. Almost one-half of respondents who thought it was a factor also thought that biased reporting by the mass media, which was chosen by 45 per cent of respondents, plays a role. Lack of professionalism, which ranked last, was nevertheless indicated by 36 per cent of respondents.

Use of position at work for one's own ends was cited by 40 per cent of respondents, and serving officers are substantially more likely than students to think that it plays a role. Respondents who stated that the police's relationship with the public had got worse over the last few years were more likely to agree that use of position at work plays a role in undermining trust between the police and the public. It is likely that a certain level of reflection about the state of the relationship between the police and the public in general is necessary for an understanding of the role which the corruption plays in that relationship.

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Assessing Table 1.8 in conjunction with Tables 1.6 and 1.7 presents us with a clear picture of the current perceptions of students and officers attending the Training Institution: the work itself is considered to be harder and co-operation with the public less easy. The picture that emerges is one of a perceived lack of respect for the police and a breakdown of the trust relationship between the police and the public; however, 40 per cent of respondents, and 54 per cent of serving officers with experience of actual police work, are prepared to point at themselves—at their own use of their positions for their own ends—as a factor.

This question also requested that respondents indicate any other factors which currently reduce the trust of the police by the public; twelve respondents from each year group cohort did so. Some responses were broadly covered by those factors listed in the question. Others named different or more specific factors. Nepotism in recruitment was mentioned several times: for instance, 'Whole families go into the police if the father is a senior officer, never mind the qualities of his "little boy"' (SO-5). Inability to fight crime due to lack of power, money or equipment was noted by several respondents as reducing trust in the police: for example, 'It is impossible to fight crime due to low levels of finance for the means and the personnel' (SO-31). Anti-police feeling in society, whether justified or not, was also noted: 'People's anger at life and at authorities higher up gets taken out on, how shall I put it, the lowest and most often encountered level of power - the police' (SO-1031); 'The thing is that at the moment the police get no respect, especially from youth' (1-810); 'Inability of citizens to adequately value the work of the police' (1-886).

Interestingly, one of the responses which falls into this category was 'People's jealousy of the police' (1-780); it would be interesting to explore using qualitative techniques whether and why other officers share the opinion that people are 'jealous' of the police. Mafia and criminal elements in the police were also mentioned: for instance, 'Because in the police there are a lot of mafia people' (4-232).

1.4 Use of Position at Work

Is corruption perceived to be altering in frequency? Moving on to ask - in very general terms - about the frequency with which the use of position at work for one's own ends actually occurs, we asked the serving officers alone whether they perceived a trend over the last few years (Table 1.9).

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12 Respondents are identified by their year group (1 for first-years, 4 for fourth-years, and SO for serving officers) and by a number.
Table 1.9 Trend in use of position at work over the last few years (Q8; serving officers only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trend</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased in the last few years</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased in the last few years</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayed the same</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The problem is perceived to be worsening. More than 70 per cent of serving officers thought that the problem had worsened over the last few years. Just 19 respondents, or 7 per cent, thought that it had decreased, and one-fifth that it had stayed the same. It is useful to note that no other significant results were obtained for this question when comparing sub-groups: we might have expected respondents with family in the police to be more aware of the presence of corruption or to categorise use of position at work as acceptable behaviour, due to exposure to police norms and values, but this effect does not appear to be present.

However, the profile of corruption has been raised over the last few years by reports in the press and on the internet\(^ {\text{13}}\), by research which has been carried amongst police by Russian sociologists such as Gilinskiy and Avrutin\(^ {\text{14}}\), and by recent announcements made by politicians to the effect that reducing levels of corruption in Russian society should be a priority\(^ {\text{15}}\). It is likely that respondents have become more aware of corruption as an issue in business and government over the last few years, in addition to noticing that it has worsened.

How did approaches to the roots of the problem fit into the picture?\(^ {\text{16}}\) Respondents were asked whether they perceived that officials in general in Russia use their posi-

\(^{13}\)For instance, the World Justice Network (www.wjin.net ) often reports corruption cases in the former Soviet Union.


\(^{16}\)This question was adapted from research conducted by Miller, Grødeland and Koshechkina, who describe and discuss their project data on the extent to which citizens can be said to collude with officials in promoting low-level corruption in Miller et al (2001) A Culture of Corruption? Coping with Government in Postcommunist Europe, Budapest: Central European University Press. The data are also presented in a discussion paper, which can be found at http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/dp/pdf/Miller.pdf: Miller, W. et al (1998) Are The People Victims or Accomplices?, Budapest: Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative.
tion at work for their own ends as a result of historical factors, a moral crisis attributable to transition, an economic crisis attributable to transition or because doing so is a permanent part of the country’s culture (Table 1.10).

Table 1.10 Underlying causes of officials' use of position at work for their own ends in Russia by type of respondent (Q16)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>All respondents</th>
<th>1st Years</th>
<th>4th Years</th>
<th>Serving officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Product of economic crisis (transition)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product of moral crisis (transition)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent part of the country's culture</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product of the past</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Taken together, the overall responses which stressed a temporary situation such as a moral or economic crisis as the primary underlying cause came to 82 per cent. This would appear to indicate that respondents do not take an approach to corruption which stresses inevitability. Of the two possible responses which might indicate a longer-term problem, the idea of the salience of a permanent place in Russia's culture was slightly more popular than that of historical imperative. These are difficult concepts to separate, and this is probably reflected in the small difference (3%) in the numbers of respondents who chose these two options. However, 'A permanent part of the country's culture' makes explicit reference to a permanent problem, and so the 11 per cent of respondents who chose this option as the most important factor behind use of position at work for one's own ends are perhaps the most pessimistic.

First-years subscribed more strongly than either of the other two cohorts to economic crisis as a primary explanation. First-year respondents were mostly 15- to 17-year-olds at the time of the financial crisis of 1998, an age at which decisions about work and income begin to impinge on life, and this may have coloured their perceptions of the impact of economic instability on working life. Serving officers were slightly more likely to choose 'Permanent part of the country's culture'. This may be attributable to a difference in generational attitudes or a cynicism born of experience.
Respondents provided written answers if they felt that none of the options provided were appropriate. Some of these broadly matched, or elaborated on, those provided in the questionnaire; others mentioned more immediate problems and motivations, which will be addressed below (Tables 2.1 and 2.2). Several respondents mentioned corruption, indifference and ineffectiveness which they perceive to exist at state level: 'The state system is put together badly' (4-563); 'Fish rots from the head' (SO-1026) (a Russian proverb). Others gave responses which indicated that there was no reason to regard use of position by officials in Russia as necessarily deviant: ‘This has become a normal part of life’ (4-185); ‘Don’t make a problem out of it!’ (4-229); ‘This went on in the past, goes on now and will go on in the future. It all depends on upbringing’ (1-901).

Given such comments, and the observation that serving officers perceive that use of position at work for one's own ends is on the increase, it is useful to find out whether respondents (representing a particular group of Russian officials) perceive the phenomenon as one which is commonly acceptable amongst various other groups of officials in Russian society. Another rationale behind the question was to present respondents with a context for the problem within the police—in other words, in order to reassure respondents that the researchers were aware that there is a wider problem with corruption in Russian society. A list of professions was provided, which included traffic police, operational police and detectives, and respondents were asked to state whether they thought that members of these professions use their position at work for their own ends never, rarely, sometimes, often or very often.

Table 1.11 Perceived frequency of use of position at work for one's own ends by type of profession (Q20)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professions</th>
<th>Never/Rarely</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often/Very often</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local politicians</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal politicians</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic police</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local civil servants</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal civil servants</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID officers</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational police</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the 10 groups listed, 7 were considered to be corrupt 'often' or 'very often' by 50 per cent or more of respondents. Politicians were considered to be the worst offenders, followed by traffic police, lawyers, civil servants and journalists. Perhaps not surprisingly given the nature of the sample, operational police and criminal investigation detectives were considered the least likely of all the groups, with the exception of doctors, to transgress on a regular basis. Even so, between one-quarter and one-fifth still thought they did so 'often' or 'very often'.

Thus, the image which is sometimes presented by the Russian mass media of a Russian police force suffering from pandemic corruption does not appear to be reflected in the self-image of the force as far as operational police and detectives are concerned. By contrast, only politicians are perceived as more likely than traffic police to use their positions at work for their own ends. Respondents' opinions also reflect the wealth of anecdotal evidence about bribe-taking by traffic police in Russia, and it should be born in mind that media reports and anecdotal evidence have probably also had some effect on respondents' perceptions. However, students at the Training Institution are mostly destined for jobs within the ranks of the operational police or the detective branch of the force, and so their perspective on traffic is less likely to be clouded by their own membership of the group in question (Table 1.1).
2. MOTIVATION

We were interested in establishing the key motivational factors in using position at work for one's own ends; did respondents perceive the roots of corruption to lie primarily in working practices, pressure from colleagues or other groups, or economic difficulties?

2.1 Immediate and Underlying Motivations

We asked respondents to consider some of the main reasons that police officers sometimes use their position at work for their own ends, and to rank them from 1 to 10 (1 as the most important and 10 as the least important factor). Table 2.1 ranks the responses, while Table 2.2 shows a more detailed breakdown by type of respondent.

Table 2.1 Motivation for police using position at work for own ends (Q12)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>All respondents*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Because of low pay</td>
<td>2.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to pressure from above to achieve good clear-up rates</td>
<td>4.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because there are plenty of opportunities</td>
<td>5.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because senior officers set a bad example</td>
<td>5.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To get a conviction, when someone is guilty but there is no evidence</td>
<td>5.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because they see others do it</td>
<td>5.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to weak control by senior officers</td>
<td>6.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of pressure from organised crime groups</td>
<td>6.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obeying direct orders from above</td>
<td>6.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to peer pressure</td>
<td>7.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Mean rank scores where 1 equalled most important reason and 10 equalled least important reason

---

* Results from one-way ANOVA test.
Table 2.2 Motivation for police using position at work for own ends by type of respondent (Q12)\textsuperscript{19}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>All respondents</th>
<th>1st Years</th>
<th>4th Years</th>
<th>Serving officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean rank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of low pay</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because there are plenty of opportunities</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because senior officers set a bad example</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>4.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To get a conviction, when someone is guilty but there is no evidence</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>5.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to weak control by senior officers</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>6.41</td>
<td>5.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of pressure from organised crime groups</td>
<td>6.57</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>6.77</td>
<td>6.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\* Mean rank scores where 1 equalled most important reason and 6 equalled least important reason
\dagger Only those categories that are statistically significant are listed

'Low pay' was by a large measure the most important reason overall, and was even more important to serving officers than students. The mean ranks in Table 2.1 represent 50 per cent of students and 60 per cent of serving officers who rank this factor first. It is perhaps surprising that this figure was not higher given the indisputably low wages that police receive, the likelihood of a desire to highlight this fact to researchers (a desire whose strength does not necessarily match the strength of its explanatory power as a factor), and the relatively positive light which it casts on police motivation.

\textsuperscript{19} Results from one-way ANOVA test.
'Due to pressure from above to achieve good clear-up rates' was ranked second overall, demonstrating a certain frankness amongst respondents about the problems of bureaucracy and conformity in the police in Russia. Favarel-Garrigues\textsuperscript{20} has demonstrated that in Sverdlovsk and Yekaterinburg, local police agencies' performance is evaluated against federal averages for clear-up rates and number of registered offences. This leads to falsification of statistics, underestimation of crimes which are not currently prioritised, an over-emphasis on petty crimes which are normally easier to solve, and mis-categorisation of crimes to make them fit current priorities. Training Institution staff were certain that in the city where their institution is based, such targets are not specific, that is, officers are not asked to solve a specific number of particular types of crime within a certain period of time. However, they indicated that failure on the part of an individual officer to achieve what might be considered an appropriate clear-up rate would mean a certain failure to achieve promotion and a withdrawal of informal privileges for that officer.

It is interesting to contrast the third-place ranking of 'Because there are plenty of opportunities', with 'Peer pressure', which ranked last (tenth), indicating that an explanatory link between the two factors cannot be easily made: opportunistic corruption appears to be more important than a 'culture' of corruption, and opportunities themselves may not lead to peer pressure. The fourth-ranking response, 'Because senior officers set a bad example', is indicative of a relatively important role for management in encouraging the use of position at work, and is ranked more highly by serving officers (who have direct experience of working with senior ranks) than by students. However, the low ranking of 'Obeying direct orders from above' and 'Pressure from organised crime groups' suggests that influences on respondents do not often take the form of direct orders or threats which involve them in more serious corruption. In addition, the difference in attributed importance between these two responses and 'Pressure to achieve good clear-up rates' suggests that the latter factor is not simply a mechanism for blaming others; if it were, we would expect the former factors to rank more highly. It may be that pressure to achieve good clear-up rates is either led by, or leads to, pressure to get a conviction (mean scores for these two factors were found to have a significant statistical association). In general, direct pressure from any quarter appears to play a relatively insignificant role in encouraging corruption.

Differences in perceptions by year group may indicate a somewhat 'romanticised' view on the part of students of the factors which precipitate corruption, as noted in Table 2.4 above. Whilst the ranking of 'opportunity' in third place overall reinforces the idea of a corrupting working environment, the perceived significance of 'opportunity' was less for fourth- than first-years, and less again for serving officers. This suggests that the available on-the-job opportunities might be less frequent than perceived by students. The same pattern applies to pressure from organised crime groups; if we assume that serving officers' estimations of the importance of this factor are the most accurate, students appear to be overestimating the importance of these groups as a factor influencing corruption. First-years also attributed more importance to getting a conviction, as distinct from achieving impressive clear-up statistics, than fourth-years and serving officers. The overestimation of the role of particular problems is a factor which could be addressed through training which involves current serving officers returning to the Training Institution for seminar work with students. The opposite trend can be seen for 'low pay', which, unsurprisingly, becomes more important to respondents as they move from a student grant to living on what will be their living wage; serving officers ranked this option more highly than other groups.

Respondents provided written answers to this question if they considered that there were more important motivations than those provided in the list. However, these answers tended to indicate underlying causes rather than immediate motivations. These included ineffective laws, corruption in government and inefficacy of the entire Ministry of Interior system. Also mentioned were 'lack of social protection' (4-356), and 'the ban on working in a private capacity' (4-367). This final point should not be underestimated: Clarke recently concluded that 'informal secondary employment provides a significant source of income for many Russian families'.

How well prepared were serving officers for the reality in their working lives of the factors which impact on corruption? We asked serving officers to cast their minds back to the time when they had just graduated and begun working full time in the police, and to consider whether any of the motivational factors which they had rated for importance (Table 2.3) turned out to play a greater role than they had anticipated. Officers could choose as many options as they wished.

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Table 2.3 Factors playing a greater role than had been thought in encouraging use of position at work (Q13; serving officers only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Number*</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low pay</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plenty of opportunities</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer pressure</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure to achieve good clear-up rates</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure from organised crime groups</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To get a conviction (guilty but no evidence)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See others do it</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obeying direct orders from above</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak control by senior officers</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior officers set a bad example</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondents could choose more than one factor

Five of the ten factors were rated as playing a greater role than they had anticipated by over one-quarter of serving officers, from which it could be inferred that the problem is in itself larger than officers had anticipated during their education. Many of the factors which were considered to be currently important by all respondents (Table 2.2) were noted by serving officers to have played a greater role than they had expected.

However, 'Peer pressure' and 'Pressure from organised crime groups', which were ranked low on the list of current factors by students and serving officers alike, were each said by over one-quarter of serving officers to be more important than they had thought prior to beginning work. The most straightforward explanation is that expectations of peer pressure and of pressure from organised crime groups is simply extremely low. However, it is also possible that forms of low-level corruption are normalised to such an extent that both peer pressure and collusion with criminals are not perceived as 'pressure'.

We might infer from these data that students are not particularly well prepared during their education to face the key motivational factors which contribute to the problem of use of position at work for one's own ends. Training could play a
role, up to a point, in warning students about what lies ahead, particularly in terms of making them aware that there are fewer opportunities than they might suppose, and of the sanctions that may be imposed for becoming involved in corrupt behaviour. But given that the problems which serving officers perceived to be key included problems with senior colleagues, a system-led response might be more appropriate.

2.2 The Slippery Slope Theory

Did respondents subscribe to the idea of a 'slippery slope' which draws officers from the acceptance of occasional, relatively small gratuities towards accepting them more often or at greater value? Respondents' attitudes to the way corruption is perpetuated allow us to begin to understand whether they perceive corruption in absolute terms (as crossing a line) and whether, if so, the line to be crossed is a moral or a psychological one. This has implications for their attitudes to prevention: whether tolerance of minor acts which could potentially be defined as corrupt necessarily lead to worse corruption.

One of the difficulties inherent in attempting to test such an idea is identifying the appropriate level of gratuity to use as an example of the starting point at the 'top' of the slope. The argument that the smallest possible gratuity should be chosen would normally apply, because logical 'slippery slope' arguments operate on the basis that taking any gratuity is wrong, even if it is not worth punishing.

The example usually used in discussions of this question in the USA and UK is that of the 'free cup of coffee'. The coffee in question is generally much more likely to be made available free to police in Russian cities than in American or British cities, which raises doubts about whether respondents would see it as wrong at all. Instead, the example of a 'free meal in a restaurant' or 'free car service' has been used, following discussions with both the Training Institution and with a member of the Russian police studying at the University of Leicester22. Both provided advice on a choice of gratuity which would be perceived as relatively insignificant, but not necessarily expected as a matter of course.

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22 Grateful thanks to Sergei Kharitonov.
Table 2.4 Outcome of accepting a free meal in a restaurant or a free car service (Q10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>All respondents</th>
<th>1st Years</th>
<th>4th Years</th>
<th>Serving officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More likely to accept similar/of greater value in the future</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No more likely to accept similar/of greater value in the future</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Responses were almost evenly split, with 47 per cent of respondents answering that having accepted a gratuity once, police were more likely to do so in the future. Amongst fourth-year students only 41 per cent expected that accepting a gratuity increases the likelihood that more will be accepted in the future. This could be attributed to a certain confidence born of having completed a police officer’s training, but not yet having faced the real opportunities to accept gratuities which serving officers have experienced.

We then asked two different questions of those who recognised the 'slippery slope' scenario as in some way valid, and of those who did not (Tables 2.6 and 2.7). The first of these was answered only by respondents who saw the idea of a 'slippery slope' as feasible, asking them to choose a statement which came closest to describing the logic behind their thinking. There are at least two versions of the slippery slope argument. The first version hinges on the idea that accepting gratuities is wrong in and of itself, and therefore once that particular moral line has been crossed, even by accepting small gratuities, no moral grounds remain for not crossing again and for not crossing to a more serious extent. The second version is informed more by psychology than by ethics, and relies on the idea that it 'feels' easier to do something for a second time once it has already been done.

All three questions dealing with the 'slippery slope' and the following analysis draw on the summary and discussion of forms of slippery slope argument in Kleinig, J. (1996), The Ethics of Policing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kleinig bases his discussion on the work of James Rachels.
This was a difficult question for respondents to answer, and resulted in a very even split. Just over one-half of respondents agreed that impartiality could be said to have been sacrificed, whereas just under one-half thought that police simply find it easier to accept similar or more valuable gifts, without impartiality necessarily being the key issue.

The next question was answered only by respondents who did not see the idea of a ’slippery slope’ as feasible, asking them to choose a statement which came closest to describing their ideas about why police officers cease to accept gifts or services. Did they think that moral reasons or the fear of punitive sanctions play a more important role in stopping acceptance from becoming habitual?

Table 2.6 Statement which best explains why police stop accepting increasingly valuable gifts/services (Q11 part 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For moral reasons</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to risk of punishment</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Due to risk of public exposure</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was a strong majority opinion that moral reasons play a greater role; this option was chosen by 70 per cent of those who answered this question. A minority (18%) identified to a greater extent with the risks of punishment and an even smaller proportion highlighted the risks of public exposure. A low level of confidence in the power of public exposure to vilify seems to be indicated here, although it is worth
remembering that currently there are no high profile campaigns of 'naming and shaming' in the police in Russia, either by the police themselves or in the media.

Respondents could give a written answer to this question if they felt that none of the responses on offer explained why they chose option B (against the 'slippery slope' scenario) for the previous question. Some interesting responses were received: 'The pay is low, but it’s steady, if he [a police worker] finds something more, he can be left with nothing (there are a lot of grassers)' (4-537); 'Police know who they should have lunch with, who to take a present from and what kind of present, and what is sacrificed after this, and work out the extent of all this themselves' (4-362); 'It will be difficult to climb the career ladder, because of course your reputation will be stained' (1-746). All these responses suggest that although the constraints on corruption in the police in Russia are not always thorough or formal, informal constraints and risks exist and police are aware of them.

It is interesting to compare the data in Table 2.6 above with those in Table 2.7 below, which concerns itself with a similar question. Are there different reasons for ceasing to use position at work for one’s own ends and refraining from doing so in the first place? We asked respondents to identify the most important reason why police refrain from using position at work for their own ends. A list of five possible reasons was provided. Two of these directly reflected the fear of some form of penalisation (fear of punishment and fear of exposure) and two attempted to break down moral stance into discrete notions: 'Police should set a good example' and 'Police should be impartial' (Table 2.7).

Table 2.7 Most important reason why police refrain from using position at work for their own ends by type of respondent (Q14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>All respondents</th>
<th>1st Years</th>
<th>4th Years</th>
<th>Serving officers</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frightened of punishment</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believe police should stick to letter of law</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believe police should set a good example</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believe police should be impartial</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frightened of being exposed</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Almost one-half of respondents chose 'Frightened of being exposed' or 'Frightened of punishment'. We found a statistically significant association between respondents who chose the fear of some form of penalisation both here and in Table 2.6, indicating a group of respondents who are consistently more inclined to think that in the context of police corruption in Russia, fear is a greater motivator than moral issues or legal norms regardless of whether respondents are already involved in corruption. However, this group is not a majority. One of the practical points raised at the research seminar was the lack of available sanctions for corrupt earnings which fall short of prosecution, but the introduction of such sanctions would need to be carefully monitored in order to ensure that reasonable evidence is presented before their imposition. One option could be to review the existing internal sanctions within the disciplinary code of the police, including the nature of the terms of conditions accepted by new officers when they join the police. Certainly codes of conduct agreed by employees in other countries are more stringent, in that they rely less on a penal code to be able to take action against employees who behave in a deviant way.

Both 'impartiality' and 'setting a good example' can be issues on which the image of a police service depend to a large extent. Taking total responses for these two options together, 31 per cent of respondents thought that moral issues were paramount in encouraging police to refrain from corruption. 'Police should stick to the letter of the law', which was chosen by 22 per cent of respondents, reflects a more ambiguous stance, as it presents the problem of defining the ways in which legal consciousness in Russia is related to moral reasoning. Interestingly, three-quarters of respondents who said that moral reasons are most likely to explain why police officers stop taking gratuities at a certain point chose 'Police should stick to the letter of the law' in this question. This provides some evidence that in the context of this particular question, 'sticking to the letter of the law' may be perceived to represent a moral stance.

The relatively even split in the responses points to the importance of balance in the training agenda, clearly explained and strictly implemented sanctions as a prevention tactic, and ethics training which explores the role of the law and the role which morals have to play in its enforcement and interpretation. There may not be a place here for 'naming and shaming' given the relatively low number of respondents who perceived fear of exposure to be paramount. The importance

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24 It should be noted that the former question (Table 2.6) was answered only by respondents who had chosen the second option for Question 10 (Table 2.4).
attached to fear of exposure and of punishment rose for serving officers, while
the importance of setting a good example fell. This could suggest a need for post-
graduate refresher training to bring ethical issues back onto the agenda, but it
may be wise to use them in conjunction with punitive sanctions. Alternatively, it
could be that serving officers perceive they have more to lose (their jobs and pos-
sibly main sources of income) than students.

2.3 The Role of the Public

Did respondents perceive gifts to be largely a product of overt requests or hints by
the police, police unwillingness to help the public if no extra inducements are
offered, or the public taking the initiative in offering gifts? We asked respondents to
select the most common reason that people have for giving something to the police
when seeking their help.25

Table 2.8: Most common reason for giving something to the police if their help is needed (Q15)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People think police will do a better job</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People just want to give something</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police expect something</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police ask for something</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only 3 per cent of respondents thought that the police usually actually ask for some-
thing. Almost two-thirds of respondents thought that when a gift is given, it is the givers
who are most often attempting to improve the quality of service which they get from
the police. Some 7 per cent thought that the expectation was on the side of the police.

Shelley notes that during perestroika, ‘...overburdened militia investigators could
rarely provide [citizens with] assistance’.26 ‘People think police will do a better job'
does not necessarily mean that the goal of paying for police work is to ensure that

25 This question has been adapted from Miller, Grødeland and Koshechkina, op. cit.
it is done especially well or quickly. It is equally possible that the payment does not ensure 'going the extra mile', and that payments are made to ensure a reasonable level of service, or to ensure that the job is done at all.

However, a further one-quarter thought that rather than giving in the hope of receiving (even if the help which is sought is in fact the duty of the giver), people 'just want to give something'. This would appear either to indicate that a large number of respondents are laying the blame for the problem of bribery in the police at the door of the public, or that respondents consider a culture of giving as a gesture of thanks to be very widely practiced where the police are concerned. In terms of the former possibility, it may be that givers are thought to be seeking other benefits. These might include 'overlooking' incidents (as distinct from extra effort when help rather than other kinds of intervention are required); a 'quiet life' (especially for businesses and shops) in which police do not, for instance, drop in to check up on things from time to time; or storing up the idea of 'extra effort' as a kind of insurance against a time when it might be needed. There is inevitably a grey area between givers' expectations of specific benefits and their expectations of wider, less clearly defined rewards which would benefit from further work based on a qualitative approach.
3. ATTITUDES TOWARDS ACCEPTABILITY

We have seen above that respondents placed practical pressures and considerations high on the list of factors which motivate corruption. This section addresses respondents' ethical positions on corruption, and whether respondents perceive certain ethical positions to be problematic.

3.1 BOUNDARIES OF MORAL ACCEPTABILITY

One of the most problematic areas of enquiry into attitudes towards corruption is asking respondents to make a moral judgement on various actions which could be understood as corrupt. Attempts to construct a moral scale and apply it effectively are necessarily limited by the constraints of a written questionnaire format. This was one of the most sensitive questions in the questionnaire, and it should be remembered that respondents are likely to have somewhat understated the degree to which they find the scenarios we have presented morally acceptable.

For this reason, it was important to ensure that the examples on which respondents were to pass judgement were as relevant as possible to real-life situations which might be encountered by police officers in Russia. Scenarios were therefore chosen with the help of the Training Institution and of a Russian police officer visiting Leicester.
Table 3.1 Boundaries of moral acceptability (Q18)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Morally acceptable*</th>
<th>Morally unacceptable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speeding off duty, showing badge to get off</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting spouse's driving licence back without a fine (speeding offence)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using contacts to get an acquaintance released (from charges of drunken fighting)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepting a free computer after awarding a police tender</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planting drugs on known, active criminal</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking money from a lawyer for information</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking money from prostitutes, dealers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using contacts to get an acquaintance released (from burglary charges)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting a colleague caught selling bootleg vodka</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking a TV from the scene of a crime</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepting money from a criminal to let him/her go</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colluding with a gang who import stolen cars</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Categories are based upon combining together ‘morally acceptable’ with ‘morally acceptable most of the time’ and ‘morally acceptable under certain circumstances’ with ‘morally unacceptable’. 
Table 3.2 Boundaries of moral acceptability by type of respondent (Q18)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Morally acceptable*</th>
<th>Morally unacceptable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All 1st</td>
<td>4th Serving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting spouse’s driving licence back without a fine (speeding offence)</td>
<td>47 45 44 55</td>
<td>53 55 56 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accepting a free computer after awarding a police tender</td>
<td>31 37 24 32</td>
<td>69 63 76 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking money from a lawyer for information</td>
<td>14 20 8 14</td>
<td>86 80 92 86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking a TV from the scene of a crime</td>
<td>6 7 8 2</td>
<td>94 93 92 98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Only those categories that are statistically significant are listed
* Categories are based upon combining together ‘morally acceptable’ with ‘morally acceptable most of the time’ and ‘morally acceptable under certain circumstances’ with ‘morally unacceptable’.

The most acceptance amongst respondents was won by scenarios which involved no financial gain, and by actions which might appear ‘victimless’. Almost two-thirds thought that showing a police badge in order not to be fined for a speeding offence is morally acceptable, and almost one-half thought that getting a spouse’s driving licence back without penalty after a speeding offence is morally acceptable. These are acts that protect the officer from punishment after the fact of an infraction, or involve a company rather than an individual (accepting a free computer). Financial gain on the part of the offender (as opposed to gain on the part of the officer) and overt criminality may also reduce acceptance. However, levels of acceptance between 4 and 6 per cent were recorded for taking a TV from the scene of a crime, accepting money from a criminal to let him/her go and colluding with a gang importing stolen cars.
Scenarios in which the other actors may be perceived as corrupt did not encourage a majority of respondents to categorise them as morally acceptable; this aspect of the scenario appeared to be unimportant compared to the directly criminal nature of the act. Taking money from prostitutes and dealers, who may be perceived as a 'criminal underclass' with a steady income, was considered morally acceptable by only 14 per cent of respondents, as was taking money from a lawyer (a fellow actor within the criminal justice system) in return for information, which might help the client. However, planting drugs on a known, active criminal in order to secure a conviction was acceptable to 30 per cent of respondents; here, of course, there is an element not only of legitimisation but also of 'summary justice'.

The only scenario which serving officers were more inclined than students to consider morally acceptable was one of the least 'serious': getting a spouse's driving licence back without a fine. Conversely, the only scenario which serving officers were less inclined to consider morally acceptable was one of the most 'serious': taking a television from the scene of a crime. Thus, respondents' experiences as serving officers appear to increase their moral tolerance of low-level corruption, while decreasing their moral tolerance of serious corruption.

This question has indicated particular factors which we may take from the scenarios that appear to play a role in the level of moral acceptability: 'victimless' crime, financial gain for oneself, financial gain for a person seeking protection, legitimisation and overt criminality. They point to the formulation of training strategies which tailor their ethical content specifically to deal with typology, as well as with principle. Exploring these factors qualitatively would allow two further steps. Firstly, it would enable validation of the findings of this survey. Secondly, it would allow the researchers to ask respondents about the differences between the moral acceptability of such scenarios now in Russia (given the many difficulties faced by the police, which have been examined above) and in a hypothetical situation in which some of those difficulties have been removed. This would facilitate a move towards a more detailed and complex explanation of respondents' ethical stance towards the scenarios.

### 3.2 Gifts and Gratuities

Whether police should accept gifts and gratuities is often the subject of particularly emotive debate within police services and populations, since the arguments involved go to the heart of the problem of how to achieve and maintain police legitimacy. Questions of obligation are pitted against questions of gratitude and notions of appropriate rewards for service.
We presented respondents with a series of arguments often used in debates about whether the acceptance of small gratuities, as opposed to large ones which are clearly bribes, is 'corrupting, if not corrupt'. The questionnaire made clear that the gratuities are freely offered gifts or services from people who are not close friends or relatives. Respondents could choose as many options as they wished.

We have already noted (Section 2, above) the concept of the 'free cup of coffee', and the difficulty of choosing an example of a gratuity which in Russia would be perceived as relatively insignificant, but not necessarily expected as a matter of course. We have continued to use the example of 'a free meal in a restaurant or free car service' for this question.

Several of these statements were included with the potential role of blat in mind. Blat is a Russian word without a direct equivalent in the English language - it does not simply mean 'corruption'. Ledeneva's concise definition of the word blat is, 'the use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain goods and services in short supply and to find a way around formal procedures.' Another important feature of blat is the reciprocity of the relationships involved, although this did not necessarily work in a direct fashion, but could be managed through friends and acquaintances. Ledeneva has explored the tacit assumptions which inform blat about the way that needs can and should be satisfied in society. She debates the extent to which the personalisation of institutional relationships continues to play an important role in post-Soviet Russia, despite the fact that obtaining goods and services is not now as important as securing income, information and/or access to both. Did respondents hold positive attitudes to taking small gifts and gratuities which could be explained and/or justified by reference to a 'culture' or 'mentality' which perceives a system of favours positively?

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27 Kleinig, J. (1996) op cit. The statements in this question are based on pp. 172-173.
**Table 3.3 Agreement with statements for and against accepting gifts and gratuities (Q9)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument</th>
<th>Number*</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police can generally distinguish between a friendly gesture and a bribe.</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is only natural that people are grateful to police officers and wish to express this through gifts or services.</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police should have a relationship with the public and with colleagues that is motivated and directed solely by public duty.</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifts like a free meal in a restaurant or free car service are such a well established way of doing things that attempts to stop it won't work.</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifts or services as small as a free meal in a restaurant or a free car service aren't big enough to make the police feel that they owe something to the giver.</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even the smallest gift or free service creates a sense of obligation in most police officers.</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a company offered discounts on food to all police officers, this would be unacceptable.</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A police officer who refuses small gestures of thanks will be looked on as unfriendly and will not be confided in.</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondents could agree with more than one factor
Table 3.4 Agreement with statements for and against accepting gifts and gratuities by type of respondent (Q9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument</th>
<th>All respondents</th>
<th>1st Years</th>
<th>4th Years</th>
<th>Serving officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police can generally distinguish between a friendly gesture and a bribe.</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police should have a relationship with the public and with colleagues that is motivated and directed solely by public duty.</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifts or services as small as a free meal in a restaurant or a free car service aren't big enough to make the police feel that they owe something to the giver.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even the smallest gift or free service creates a sense of obligation in most police officers.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a company offered discounts on food to all police officers, this would be unacceptable.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A police officer who refuses small gestures of thanks will be looked on as unfriendly and will not be confided in.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Only those categories that are statistically significant are listed

The two statements with which the largest number of respondents were in agreement both related to gratitude and friendly gestures: 'Police can generally distinguish between a friendly gesture and a bribe' (62%) and 'It is only natural that people are grateful to police officers and wish to express this through gifts or services' (59%).

'Police should have a relationship with the public and with colleagues that is motivated and directed solely by public duty' was chosen by 45 per cent of respondents, indicating that obligation to particular citizens is not necessarily perceived as nega-
tive. Where a sense of obligation is thought to exist, that sense in itself is by no means always problematic for respondents: a clear majority agreed that 'It is only natural that people are grateful to police officers and wish to express this through gifts or services' (58%). Indeed, there was an association between the two statements, suggesting that small gifts are not necessarily perceived to lead to a sense of personal obligation.

However, a substantial minority of our respondents (38%) did not think that the police do this: they disagreed with the statement that 'Police can generally distinguish between a friendly gesture and a bribe'. In addition, there was no association between agreement that public duty should be the only motive in police-public relationships and agreement that police can distinguish a friendly gesture from a bribe. Thus, respondents who do not permit any other motivation than public duty are nevertheless not always sure that police are actually able to tell when their public duty is being compromised. Within an economic system which prominently features a well-developed, complex system of favours, people tend to make subtle distinctions between exchanges which will lead them to be obligated, and those after which this will not be the case. If in the Soviet and early post-Soviet past blat meant confidence in one’s own understanding of the semiotics of giving and taking, this appears no longer to be the case.

Respondents were by no means agreed about whether taking small gifts and services has become an inextricable part of police culture in Russia: two-thirds did not agree that 'Gifts like a free meal in a restaurant or free car service are such a well established way of doing things that attempts to stop it won't work'. The opportunity to agree with a statement which presented a clear opportunity for respondents to justify taking small gifts by referring to their professional effectiveness was taken by only 14 per cent of respondents ('A police officer who refuses small gestures of thanks will be looked on as unfriendly and will not be confided in').

One pair of statements appeared to cause confusion amongst respondents: 26 per cent of respondents agreed that 'Gifts or services such as a free meal or free car service aren't big enough to make the police feel that they owe something to the giver', yet only 25 per cent agreed that 'Even the smallest gift or free service creates a sense of obligation in most police officers'. This result is further complicated by the fact that 44 respondents agreed with both statements. One tentative interpretation of these contradictory results rests on the phrase 'most police officers'. It appears to have been easier for respondents to agree with the idea that most police officers do not feel obligated to givers of small gifts than to agree that this is the case for police
in general, which by implication includes the individual respondent. The idea of a company offering discounts on food to all police officers was found unacceptable by only 14 per cent of respondents.

First-years were more likely than other cohorts to agree that police run the risk of being considered unfriendly if they do not accept small gifts or services. It might be the case that they overestimate the extent to which friendliness and openness are the main methods by which police in Russia currently secure cooperation and information. This interpretation is supported by the fact that they are more likely than the other year groups to think that the police should have a relationship with the public and colleagues which is motivated and directed solely by public duty. First-years were also more confident that police are generally able to distinguish between a friendly gesture and a bribe; again, the most plausible immediate explanation for this difference would appear to be lack of experience.

3.3 Justifications

We were interested to find out whether any particular justifications for corrupt activities carried more weight than others, and for whom, hypothesising that respondents would tend to agree with more types of justification as their studies and careers exposed them to opportunity, pressure, example and need.

Respondents were asked to indicate all statements with which they agreed. Statements all began 'It is acceptable for a police officer to use their position at work for their own ends if...' and concluded with various justifications. Four of the statements dealt with the circumstances surrounding the use of position at work for one's own ends: the involvement of close friends or family, the knowledge of senior officers, frequency, and whether money is involved. Two of the statements dealt with results: the size of the favour, and whether criminals are left unpunished as a result.

Clearly, we cannot infer from agreement with a statement that use of position is justified regardless of any other circumstances. Our intention was not to formulate the logic of the question in this way, but rather to assess the resonance of various justifications. Table 3.5 outlines the responses, while Table 3.6 provides a more detailed breakdown by type of respondent.

**Table 3.5 Justifications for using position at work for own ends (Q7)**
* Respondents could choose more than one justification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>Number*</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only their very close family and friends are involved</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money isn't involved</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their superior officers are aware of it</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It doesn't happen very regularly</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The favours are not very large</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.6 Justifications for using position at work for own ends by type of respondent (Q7)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justification</th>
<th>All respondents</th>
<th>1st Years</th>
<th>4th Years</th>
<th>Serving officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only their very close family and friends are involved</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their superior officers are aware of it</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It doesn't happen very regularly</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The favours are not very large</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Only those categories that are statistically significant are listed

Overall, there appears to be a culture of acceptance amongst a significant minority of respondents; none of the justifications presented were accepted by less than 1 in 10 respondents. One-third of respondents accepted 'If their very close friends and family are involved', and just under one-third tacitly accepted a moral distinction between money and other forms of reward by accepting 'Money isn't involved'. Almost three-quarters of respondents who accepted 'If their very close friends and family are involved' also accepted 'If money isn't involved', supporting the possibility that blat continues to play a significant role in respondents' moral reasoning.
A significant minority of respondents agreed with the other three justifications: 'Superior officers are aware of it', 'It doesn't happen very regularly' and 'The favours are not very large'.

Since exposure to active policing introduces complex practical and moral situations to which the justifications we posit lend themselves, it is somewhat surprising that only one justification ('The favours are not very large') was accepted more by serving officers than by other year groups. There is a particularly sharp jump in acceptance (19%) between fourth-years and serving officers, pointing to low-level 'corrupt' relationships as a key feature of working police life. Despite this, serving officers are no less likely than the other cohorts to perceive money as a key factor in lowering the acceptability of accepting gifts or favours. We might assume that the economic hardship that serving officers face would make them somewhat less inclined to agree that taking money is morally worse than taking gifts or favours. But the distinction appears to be an enduring one. It is interesting to note that all of the justifications that were supported more by first-years than by other cohorts ('Their superior officers are aware of it', 'It doesn't happen very regularly' and 'Only very close friends and family are involved') concern circumstances rather than results, and this might be one indication that our cohorts reasoned differently about means and ends.

'It doesn't happen very regularly' and 'Only very close friends and family are involved' were supported by fewer fourth-years than first-years, but serving officer support nearly matched the level of the first-year respondents. It is possible that the educational process may successfully, if temporarily, alter students' perceptions of the validity of these two justifications. Closer investigation of both the informal and semi-formal curricula at the Training Institution would be required in order to make any further judgement about the soundness of this inference.

'Superior officers are aware of it' was accepted by 28 per cent of first-years, but by only 10 per cent of fourth-years and serving officers. It is interesting to note that the sharp drop in acceptance of this justification takes place between the first- and fourth-year results, rather than just for serving officers. It is possible that during the educational process, a substantial number of undergraduates lose their misconceptions about how many of their superior officers might be lenient as long as they also receive some benefits, or a share of the benefits. Again, this inference requires further verification through closer investigation of the curriculum.
Respondents' moral reasoning was broadly internally consistent: respondents who judged particular scenarios to be acceptable (especially those scenarios involving low-level corruption) tended to agree with justifications that could be cited in defence of those scenarios. For instance, respondents who thought that 'Only very close family and friends are involved' justified corrupt behaviour were more likely to consider that getting a spouse's licence back was morally acceptable, or morally acceptable most of the time. Interestingly, this consistency was also demonstrated with the two scenarios that describe getting a friend's relative off charges of drunken fighting and burglary, highlighting the likelihood that respondents have relationships which involve reciprocal favours with an 'extended' group of friends and relatives, rather than with a small, close group. However, this consistency did not apply in the case of protecting a colleague caught selling bootleg vodka; this may be attributable to the seriousness of the offence (since bootleg vodka can seriously harm or kill its consumers). Respondents who thought that 'Money isn't involved' justified corrupt behaviour were more likely to think that accepting money (in our scenarios, from a criminal and a lawyer) is morally acceptable always or most of the time, but not that taking money from prostitutes or drug dealers and criminal gangs is morally acceptable. Those who thought that 'The favours are not very large' justified corrupt behaviour were more likely to think that escaping a speeding offence, assisting a spouse to do so, and securing the release of an acquaintance held for drunken fighting, are morally acceptable all or most of the time, but not the more serious offence of securing the release of an acquaintance held for burglary.

However, the relationship between justifications for corrupt behaviour and arguments for and against accepting small gratuities (Table 3.3) was not so clear-cut. Significantly more first-years than respondents from other cohorts thought that 'police should have a relationship with the public and with colleagues that is motivated and directed solely by public duty', yet significantly more also thought that using position at work for one's own ends is acceptable if only close family and friends are involved, if superior officers are aware, and if it does not happen regularly.

We also asked respondents to indicate whether they had any other opinion to add regarding justifications for use of position at work for one's own ends; 265 respondents did so. The majority of these restricted themselves to stating that use of position at work for one's own ends is acceptable or unacceptable. Other answers reflected or elaborated on the statements in the questionnaire. However, several other factors were suggested as justifications or ameliorative factors:
Avoiding harm to various groups, including the police themselves: 'It's all right to use your position at work for yourself, but only if it doesn't harm other people' (1-597); 'It's acceptable if no harm is done to social relationships and the rights of other citizens and the state' (SO-1033); 'It's acceptable to use your position at work, if it doesn't harm the interests of the Organs of Internal Affairs and the interests of other citizens' (4-287).

Conscience and individual responsibility as arbiters: 'Everybody answers for their own actions themselves' (SO-1007); 'It's up to each person' (SO-1006); 'In accordance with how you see the world' (SO-15); 'The most important thing is to be true to your oath and the code of practice' (1-966).

Necessity and need, especially due to low pay: 'I don't think it's in any way unnatural if there is a real need to do it' (4-300); 'Use of position at work for one's own ends in the Organs of Internal Affairs is not acceptable, but if it has happened for financial reasons, the State is to blame. What are families supposed to eat?' (4-441); 'Of course it's unacceptable, but people always want to eat' (SO-1124); 'Sometimes police have to use their position at work for their own ends in order to protect their social and other rights, including those provided for by the Constitution of Russia' (4-356).

If there is a legal loophole: 'You can use it but only if it doesn't contradict the code of practice and other laws' (1-680); 'Everything which isn't forbidden by law is allowed' (4-229); 'If it's done in a positive way, for instance by using loopholes in the law, then it does good not only for the police, but also for other people' (4-267).

Doing good or attempting to be objectively fair to people or society: 'Only if it's not in your own personal interest' (1-741); 'It's acceptable only if it helps the people' (SO-1013).

To solve crime, catch or punish criminals: 'It's acceptable if it brings positive results in solving crimes' (SO-1117); 'If the criminal is to get the maximum severe punishment you need to use power' (1-841); 'If there is no other way to promote the law' (1-864).

These statements fall into coherent categories which may be further refined in order to form the basis for qualitative research. Section 7 of this report discusses the direction, aims, objectives and outputs of such research in more detail.
This section, finally, looks at the practical issues of investigation and punishment and respondents' opinions about the effectiveness of some of the options open to the Russian police.

4.1 Whistle-Blowing and Investigation

How often did respondents think that they might report incidents where someone at work was using his position for his own ends? Without specifying the incident, it is difficult to ask respondents to predict accurately what they might do. However, in general terms, we can outline the level of acceptance that reporting finds amongst respondents.

Table 4.1 Self-predicted response to discovering that a colleague is using his position at work for his own ends (Q21; serving officers only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ignore it</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Try to stop them myself</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report to senior officers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only 5 per cent of respondents said that they would report incidents of corruption to senior officers, despite the availability of an anonymous telephone number for the purpose. There was an almost even split in responses between those who said that they would ignore the incident, and those who thought that they would intervene themselves. No significant differences were found between the responses of serving officers and students; reluctance to report was universal.

These data indicate a structural barrier to change which, if not addressed directly, must be taken into account when considering training options. One interpretation which might be placed on the statistic of 5 per cent who are willing to report is that it broadly reflects our earlier finding (Table 3.1) that between 4 and 8 per cent of respondents are prepared to classify overtly criminal acts as morally unacceptable.
However, it seems likely that many of the 46 per cent of students who said that they would actively intervene were using this option as a way of avoiding the ‘hard choices’ presented by the other two options, one of which carries the stigma of a stukach (grass), and the other which might make the respondent an accessory.

There may well be more willingness to report should fear of reprisals be reduced. Training may help to foster the idea of seeking allies within the organisation, even if those allies are not those to whom such cases should officially be reported. More effective may be attempts to find acceptable forms of whistle-blowing, and to ensure that they are made structurally possible and receive support from at least some senior staff.

Who did respondents think should be officially responsible for dealing with corruption in the police? We asked them to choose between the status quo (specialist anti-corruption police within the MVD) and several other options: simply appointing people within the operational police, transferring responsibility fully to the procuracy, or training an independent bureau of lay people. We also provided the opportunity for respondents to add their own suggestions, should they think that another body should be responsible.

Table 4.2 Groups who should be responsible for investigating cases of corruption in the police by type of respondent (Q22)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>All respondents</th>
<th>1st Years</th>
<th>4th Years</th>
<th>Serving officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specialist anti-corruption police</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procuracy</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent bureau of trained lay people</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in the ranks of the operative police</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
<td>&lt; 1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only 6 per cent of respondents (8% of serving officers) thought that the operational police should have primary responsibility for investigating corruption, which would effectively be a step away from a practical control mechanism and as such demonstrates the attitude that corruption is very much an internal problem, rather than society’s problem. Almost one-half of respondents (46%) thought that the current arrangements (specialist anti-corruption police) were the most appropriate, although serving officers were
marginally less happy with this option. However, over one-quarter of respondents overall, and one-third of serving officers in particular, felt that responsibility should be transferred to the procuracy. This would avoid the current situation in which the 'police police the police', although the links between the police and the procuracy have also been historically close. Almost one-fifth of respondents supported the idea that an independent bureau of lay people should have responsibility for dealing with corruption, although again, serving officers were less enthusiastic than students. Once again, a relatively conservative reaction emerging from serving officers is noted.

Certainly, difficulties are faced by the anti-corruption squad which is currently responsible for investigating corruption. During this project's final research seminar at the Training Institution, a member of the anti-corruption squad mentioned the problem of staff becoming bored with routine checks on where police are and what they are doing, with some staff even telephoning those under observation in order to warn them to get back to what they are supposed to be doing. There was a clear sense that when checks were being carried out by senior officers, those under scrutiny knew exactly when they would occur and could adjust their behaviour accordingly.

Overall, respondents supported the status quo, but were willing to consider other options, including civilian oversight of the police. This kind of radical step would depart entirely from the historical legacy of the development of the police force as a body protecting the interests of the state, and the 19 per cent level of support for the notion of its implementation cannot therefore be considered low.

Respondents who answered 'other' made several interesting suggestions regarding different options. These included the FSB (ex-KGB), who currently become involved in corruption investigations only in cases which involve large organised groups, or when specialist technical equipment is required. Other suggestions were an international commission to fight corruption, a special commission that would report exclusively to the President of the Russian Federation, and a special commission within local government.

Other written responses, while they did not answer the question directly, gave some idea as to other factors which respondents felt would affect the way responsible persons or individuals should operate. 'Everyone is compromised' was one comment. Several respondents wanted to stress that the issue was, to them, a 'matter of conscience'. Others stressed the importance of collective effort. Some respondents also stated that they thought the government or the Duma should be responsible, which hints at the disillusionment reflected elsewhere in the data.
(for instance, written answers accompanying Table 1.10) with the way that the authorities have dealt with the issue.

4.2 Effectiveness

How effective did respondents consider various options for preventative measures to be? We provided respondents with a list of 11 courses of action, one of which represents the status quo, and asked them to assess their likely effectiveness. We did not include large-scale sackings of high-ranking officials; here we are more interested in measures which would affect all law enforcement personnel, and which might make a difference in more fundamental ways to the manner in which activities are conducted on a day-to-day basis. Table 4.3 outlines the responses, while Table 4.4 provides a more detailed breakdown by type of respondent.

Table 4.3 Likely effectiveness of measures to prevent police using their position at work for one's own ends (Q23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Effective*</th>
<th>Not effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher salaries for police</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonus payments for outstanding work</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special internal affairs police for fighting corruption</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stricter penalties for people who attempt to bribe the police</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More discussion of ethics in training</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stricter controls and penalties for police</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New, stricter laws</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More openness</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better appeal and complaints procedures for citizens</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Display the rights of citizens on notices in all police stations</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An independent bureau for investigating corruption</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Categories are based upon combining together 'very effective' with 'quite effective' and 'not very effective' with 'not very effective at all'.
Table 4.4 Likely effectiveness of measures to prevent police using their position at work for personal ends by type of respondent (Q23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Effective*</th>
<th>Not effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Years</td>
<td>4th Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>Per cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher salaries for police</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonus payments for outstanding work</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stricter penalties for people</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stricter controls and penalties for police</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An independent bureau</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Display the rights of citizens</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Categories are based upon combining together 'very effective' with 'quite effective' and 'not very effective' with 'not very effective at all'.
† Only those categories that are statistically significant are listed.

Higher salaries were, predictably, supported by the vast majority (95%) of respondents, and bonuses for outstanding work, as the only other financial measure, ranked second with 91 per cent support.

While surviving on low pay without a supplementary income is a very problematic issue, pay raises would also be likely to improve the quality of recruits to the service, and it could be argued that a more committed and professional police is less likely to be comfortable with compromising effectiveness by getting involved with corruption.

It is not necessarily the case that support for bonus payments represents support for the introduction of performance criteria. In addition, when considering bonus payments as an option, it is possible that respondents make the tacit assumption that they themselves would be the recipients. A discussion of the intricacies of bonuses, especially in the context of performance-related pay systems, is likely to produce a different picture. However, its support here illustrates the point that financial measures are perceived as a top priority. Unfortunately, even if pay was to be restruc-
urred to provide for bonuses rather than simply adding larger payments to the current system of remuneration as 'extras', their effectiveness may be restricted by the fact that what bonus payments do exist are often withheld if clear-up rates are not high (see Section 2 above).

There was markedly less confidence (37%) in an independent bureau for investigating corruption than in the status quo, a separate police unit for dealing with corruption (63%). This reflects very closely the gap between support for the actual implementation of these two options (Table 4.2).

Penalties attracted a high level of support: 58 per cent of respondents thought that there should be stricter penalties for people who attempt to bribe the police. In the context of the ambivalent responses we received to our earlier question about accepting gifts and gratuities (Table 3.3) this seems to indicate a willingness to blame feelings of obligation on the public. Almost as many (54%) thought that there should be stricter controls and penalties for police—a substantial figure, but not one that indicates an overwhelming mandate. In addition, one-half of respondents thought that tightening up the laws on corruption would be helpful. Options that approach the problem from the point of view of cultural change also had a significant level of support. Over one-half of respondents thought that more ethics training would be effective; and responses to this option broadly tallied with responses to 'More openness' in terms of explaining police actions to citizens and the press, which 41 per cent of respondents overall felt would be effective. Approaching the problem by strengthening citizens' rights, or awareness of their rights, was considered to have a reasonable chance of success: 41 per cent of respondents thought that better appeal and complaints procedures for citizens would be effective, and 38 per cent that displaying citizens' rights at all police stations would be effective.

For the majority of options (see Table 4.3) serving officers, as for previous questions, were overall less optimistic than students about the chances of effective action (the exception being rates of pay). Nevertheless, none of the options presented to respondents attracted a very low estimation of their likely effectiveness, and no one strategy was preferred to the exclusion of others (although financial considerations are overwhelmingly considered to have the most power). Respondents appear to be lending support to a three-pronged strategy informed by structural change, punitive measures and legal changes, and training. Measures to fight corruption must also take account of the punishments, which are meted out to those who become involved.
4.3 Punishment

Five scenarios were taken from an earlier question, which asked about their moral acceptability (Table 3.1), and respondents were asked to say which of four punitive categories they should fall into. Disciplinary action involves a verbal or written warning, but can also mean withdrawal of privileges, a block on promotion, or demotion. Administrative responsibility for one’s actions might, in the worst of cases, lead to a maximum of 15 days in prison; in the vast majority of cases, it means a fine. Criminal responsibility extends the range of sanctions to include longer terms in prison, as well as carrying a stigma not necessarily associated with administrative offences. Punishment for both administrative and criminal responsibility often includes elements of the warnings and sanctions associated with disciplinary action. Here, two aspects of respondents’ answers interested us: consistency with their assessments of the moral seriousness of the scenarios, and consistency with the likely ways that they would officially be dealt with in the police, should they actually take place (their likely mode of punishment is another matter, which is addressed below).

Table 4.5 Appropriate punishment for incidents involving use of position at work for one’s own ends (Q24)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Nothing</th>
<th>Disciplinary action</th>
<th>Administrative responsibility</th>
<th>Criminal responsibility</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accepting money from a criminal to let him/her go</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking money from a lawyer for information</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planting drugs on known, active criminal</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using contacts to get an acquaintance charges released (from of drunken fighting)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeding off duty, showing badge to get off</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Respondents did not demonstrate clear support for strict punitive measures. 'Accepting money from a criminal to let him/her go' is indisputably a criminal offence, and 78 per cent of respondents agreed that it should be such; but 1 in 10 thought that responsibility should be administrative, 8 per cent disciplinary, and 5 per cent that it should attract no sanctions at all. 'Taking money from a lawyer for information', would under most circumstances be a criminal offence, but this was considered appropriate by only 38 per cent of respondents. 'Planting drugs on a criminal' is also clearly a criminal offence, but only just under one-third of respondents considered this appropriate.

'Using contacts to get an acquaintance released (from charges of drunken fighting)' would be a criminal offence under many circumstances, but might conceivably be classified as an administrative offence. Almost one-half of respondents thought that it should be reclassified as warranting only disciplinary action, and only 9 per cent perceived it as warranting the status of a criminal offence. 'Speeding off duty and showing your badge to get off' is officially punishable administratively; just over one-half of respondents thought that there should be no sanctions attached to this scenario, and only 3 per cent thought that it should carry criminal responsibility. There is consistency with Table 3.1 (moral acceptability) for each of the scenarios: only for 'Accepting money from a criminal to let him go' was it not possible to check this consistency for statistical significance, since relatively small numbers of respondents were involved. Respondents who judged actions to be morally acceptable generally thought that disciplinary action should be light. The close match between respondents' views on punishment and their views on moral seriousness could be indicative of a consistent moral stance towards these particular scenarios.

The consistency and extremity of these data would appear to underline the need to achieve structural change as well as relying on training measures. It is by no means clear that the kinds of punishment which should officially be meted out by the police to those who become involved in corruption are actually put into practice. Ongoing or individual incidents can be ignored, and punishments can be waived even when particular incidents come conclusively to light. In particular, it is worth noting that the use of contacts to release those who are being held on criminal charges and the use of the police badge to escape responsibility for one's actions are likely to seriously undermine public confidence and trust in the police. However, since it has been noted that serving officers find a stable job attractive (Table 1.4), there is potential for clearly delineating transgressions that are likely to lead to dismissal.
5. DISCUSSION

This research was undertaken at a time of considerable economic hardship for those police officers whose incomes are not supplemented by secondary employment. 'In-service' benefits such as free public transport are under threat, with recruitment and retention proving a major cause for concern. Data from our survey confirmed that police work is perceived within the police as becoming more problematic, showing that 9 in 10 respondents felt that police work had become harder in the last few years (Table 1.6). Under these circumstances, corruption can appear to provide both short- and long-term solutions to some of the organisational and individual problems faced by individual police officers.

The purpose of this discussion is to draw together some of the primary themes which have emerged from the data:

• Use of position for one's own ends: the extent of the problem.
• Relationship with the public: the impact of corruption on police-public relations.
• Training and education: attitudes towards existing courses and their role in generating awareness of the problem.
• The slippery slope: factors which motivate officers to become corrupt.
• Preventing corruption: effective ways of tackling the problem.

5.1 Use of Position for One's Own Ends

Our survey suggests that the incidence of corruption within the police and within society is growing. Three-quarters of respondents thought that the problem has worsened in the last few years, with the majority perceiving the problem as a product of transitional economic crisis, rather than identifying cultural attitudes as paramount. Respondents also placed police transgressions within a broader picture of corruption amongst a wide range of professional groups within Russian society. When asked to gauge the frequency with which various groups used their position for personal gain, of the 10 groups listed, 7 were considered to be corrupt 'often' or 'very often' by 50 per cent or more of respondents. Politicians were considered to be the worst offenders, followed by traffic police, lawyers, civil servants and journalists. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the nature of the sample, operational police and criminal investigation detectives were considered the least likely of all the
groups, with the exception of doctors, to transgress on a regular basis. Even so, between one-quarter and one-fifth still thought they did so 'often' or 'very often'. The endemic nature of the problem was further confirmed when respondents were asked to decide on the moral acceptability of a range of activities. At the lowest level of transgression, using a police badge to get off a charge of speeding, getting a spouse's licence back without a fine and even using contacts to get an acquaintance released when charged with drunken fighting were deemed acceptable by a significant percentage of respondents. Even more overtly illegal acts such as taking money from prostitutes and dealers or taking money from a lawyer for information received support from 14 per cent of the sample. These findings were further confirmed when respondents were asked to consider what the appropriate punishment should be for some of these activities. More than one-half thought that using their badge to get off a speeding offence should receive no punishment whatsoever, while planting drugs on a known, active criminal and using contacts to get an acquaintance released from charges of drunken fighting were considered by a significant minority of respondents not sufficiently serious to warrant any sanction.

Clearly all of the evidence is circumstantial when trying to gauge the extent of the problem of corruption within the police, but taken together, it provides powerful data on just how widespread and deeply rooted the problem is perceived to be. It is important to remember that acceptability does not necessarily indicate direct involvement. On the other hand, given that officers consider certain groups of police to be acting corruptly often or very often, and given the high level of ambiguity about the morality of certain activities, relatively firm conclusions can be drawn about the actuality of the problem. While police corruption is nothing new, and some commentators think it is getting much worse (Gilinskiy, 2000), what is interesting about this particular data is that it charts acceptability alongside motivational factors. This sort of data is particularly useful when looking at potential remedial work such as training or changes to organisational culture and ethics.

5.2 Relationship with the Public

The survey also highlighted concerns about the relationship between the police and the public. Policing models in most western countries espouse the importance of a good relationship with the population it is tasked to police. For instance, in the UK, reliance upon public support and the provision of a service geared to the needs of the local community are seen as the bedrock of the policing philosophy. Most respondents to our survey thought that the relationship between the police and the
public had deteriorated in the last few years, with only a small minority thinking it had got better. When asked specifically about the erosion of trust between the police and the public, 40 per cent chose the use of personal position by police officers as an explanatory factor. This was ranked below problems of bureaucracy, lack of respect on the part of citizens and biased reporting by the media, but still accounts for a significant minority who perceive that corruption undermines the relationship between the police and the public.

It is interesting to compare these findings with data that showed relatively high levels of moral acceptance of low-level corruption carried out by some police officers, such as showing their badges to avoid speeding tickets. The police officers and students who took part in this survey did not make a link between the way such behaviour may be construed by the public (police officers being seen to be above the law or bending laws to suit themselves) and an ongoing lack of trust or willingness either to report crime or to co-operate to any great extent. Police may be 'blind' to (or not concerned about) the broader, negative impact which such activities have on the level of trust the public have in them. If the public see or hear about an off duty police officer using his badge to get his wife's licence back, then it is not unreasonable for them to suppose that the very same officer is willing to become involved in other forms of corruption - the tip of the iceberg of dubious activity carried out to benefit the individual and not the community.

5.3 Training and Education

The survey asked a series of questions about what the three cohorts of respondents thought about the training they had received and its appropriateness in addressing the issue of corruption. By the time students had received four years of training they felt that their teachers had been the main source of information about the unacceptability of the use of position for one's own ends (as opposed to other senior ranking figures or their peers). Of more concern was the significant minority of 15 per cent overall (10 per cent of first-years, 13 per cent of fourth-years and 22 per cent of officers) who claimed that no one had explained the undesirability of such actions.

Cross-tabulation of results from Q19c and Q18 a-m inclusive produced no statistically significant results.
There is considerable recognition in many countries that one of the most effective means of generating awareness on this type of issue within an educational environment is through involving students in problem-solving activities. Such an approach was missing from the classroom approach of the training institution from which the student sample was drawn; just 14 per cent said such an approach had been adopted often as part of the educational process. The remaining 86 per cent of respondents thought that it had happened rarely or never. The overall visibility of the issue was higher, perhaps due to speaking to students directly and informally about the problem (67% said that teachers had raised the issue). However, a further question, which asked about the extent to which training touching on the unacceptability of corrupt behaviour was found by serving officers to be sufficient, confirmed that improvements could be made in this area. Given that virtually one-half of those taking part in the survey (including two cohorts currently receiving education) state that the amount of information they receive is either not entirely sufficient or insufficient, we can recommend that future developments are needed to address this issue.

More positively, there is recognition from those currently studying of the overall quality of the education they are receiving. It was highlighted as the most important reason for entering the police, although serving officers remembered this as a less important reason for joining, citing usefulness to society as a stronger motivation. A connected issue is the appropriateness of the training on offer and whether it is sufficiently tailored to the needs of police officers rather than to those who would simply like to receive a more generalised law-based education in order to work as lawyers or legal assistants.

5.4 Motivation and Attitudes to Acceptability

Serving officers' motivations for behaving corruptly were a key focus of this project. We were particularly interested in knowing more about why police officers become involved in corruption; what influences do peers, superiors, the working environment and the overall economic conditions in which students and officers find themselves have? We have already noted that the majority of respondents think that the main underlying cause of corruption is economic, and in terms of more immediate stimuli this was also the case; low pay was cited as the most important factor, with serving officers highlighting this particularly.
Respondents pointed to pressure from senior officers to achieve good clear-up rates as the next most important reason. This procedural issue is likely to have a significant impact upon officers and the likelihood that they will behave corruptly. Such an inflexible reliance on one indicator of the success of police work, one which appears to take little account of the difficulty of solving certain types of crime, nor the inevitable variety in types of offending in different areas, can only lead to the falsification of statistics and the prioritisation of those crimes which are the easiest to solve. In addition, if planting drugs on a suspected criminal enables an officer to claim that a crime has been solved, and in doing so ensures that the chance of promotion is not lost, then such behaviour can be understood as an overlap between self interest and institutional priorities. Over-emphasis on clear-up rates can also lead to a culture within which any member of the public wanting to report a crime is seen as someone bringing a burden for a particular officer rather than a problem with which they require help.

It was also interesting to note the emphasis placed upon senior officers setting a bad example. Clearly, if lower ranks see others in higher positions than themselves behaving corruptly, then this will to some extent neutralise the behaviour. The juxtaposition of respondents' high ranking of this factor and of a similar ranking for 'Because there are plenty of opportunities', suggests that serious questions need to be asked about how rank and file officers are managed and controlled by senior officers. This evidence would suggest that some senior officers are not only overtly corrupt themselves, but also have insufficient control over what their subordinates are doing. There are clear indications here for the training of senior officers and the control over their behaviour. Discussions at the research seminar highlighted the opinion of some participants that police discretion is one factor which directly leads to corrupt behaviour, but limitations on the discretion of officers, and especially senior officers, may have serious ramifications for the police's ability to remain flexible and to scale reactions sensitively.

The factors of 'peer pressure' and of 'direct orders from superior officers' were least likely to be identified by respondents for why some behave corruptly. It would appear that while some senior officers may be behaving corruptly, they seldom ask their subordinates to act corruptly on their behalf. Likewise, there is little evidence of coercive corruption - corrupt officers would seem to work on their own or with other like-minded individuals rather than pressuring or forcing other officers to become involved.
Overall, a substantial number of respondents demonstrated attitudes that are compatible with and/or encourage some forms of corruption. The arguments for accepting small gifts and gratuities were not entirely controversial, in that they might encourage or be compatible with corrupt acts, but are not, in themselves, endorsements of those acts. However, the majority of the justifications for corrupt behaviour which were presented to respondents met with substantial acceptance (not less than 1 in 10 respondents); these were unequivocal statements of the acceptability of the use of position at work for one's own ends under certain circumstances.

In this section, it is mostly the answers of first-year respondents which differ significantly from those of the other cohorts; the status of newcomer to the police, and also lack of pressure from the need to pay rent and support a family, seems to distinguish respondents' views more distinctly than police work experience. In addition, most respondents appear to draw a line which is related to the seriousness of the offence, and not just to the benefits they receive. However, neither cohorts nor individual respondents always have internally consistent attitudes towards the acceptability of certain forms of corruption, although this does not preclude further investigation and analysis of the inconsistencies themselves. Trainers should therefore not assume that a tendency for a year group to hold particular views necessarily means that those views are internally consistent at an individual level.

## 5.5 Preventing Corruption

A direct approach to the issue of prevention (asking the respondents themselves about the most important reason why police officers might refrain from using their position at work for their own ends) resulted in a fairly even split between fear of punishment, fear of exposure and issues grounded in ethics (impartiality and the notion of a positive example). Serving officers were more likely to think that the fear of punishment is the primary driving force behind refraining from deviation, with 4 in 10 thinking that this was the most important reason.

Only 1 in 20 officers said that they would report a colleague found behaving corruptly. Over-one half said that they would ignore it. Whilst there is plenty of evidence of such attitudes in other professions, codes of silence within the police tend to be particularly deeply rooted.\(^{a}\) Naturally, few like to be put themselves in a position

where they are responsible for disciplining others, particularly within such a strong work culture as that of the police, but mechanisms do exist to facilitate such actions. The use of 'whistleblower' protection schemes and anonymous telephone lines can, given the right structural support and clarity of purpose, facilitate the reporting of deviant behaviour. Again, this is dependent upon rank and file officers recognising the damage that corrupt practices are having within the police and more broadly on the way that they are perceived by other groups within society, and this returns us to the need to back up structural recommendations for change with training.

When respondents were asked who they thought were the most appropriate to investigate cases of corruption, there was an overall consensus for the status quo: specialist anti-corruption police. There was some support for taking the responsibility away from the police (to the prosecutor’s office or an independent bureau of trained lay people), a theme not unusual in other police forces where there are ongoing concerns about the police investigating themselves. Indeed, taken together these two options attracted the largest proportion of responses (47%).

More specifically, when respondents were then asked what the effectiveness might be of a range of measures, perhaps not surprisingly, increased pay was the most important. It is certainly the case that the impact of low salaries paid to police officers cannot be ignored within the context of corruption: when a police officer is faced with a basic salary that does not enable him or her to provide the minimum requirements for his or her family, then it is understandable that the police officer may seek other ways to supplement his or her income. This is not to condone these actions, but merely to appreciate the difficulties of the current context. Respondents further highlighted the role of wages and financial rewards in helping to prevent corruption by ranking 'bonus payments for outstanding work' as the second most important factor.

The rest of the options chosen by respondents broadly fell under four headings: stricter penalties for those offering and receiving bribes; support for detection, principally through special internal police or an independent bureau for investigating corruption; improved training, especially focusing on ethics; and a better appeal and complaints procedure for the public. All of these received considerable support from respondents, although serving officers were slightly more sceptical about those options that did not focus on improved pay. Again, this is not unusual within the data set and highlights the tendency for serving officers to be more pessimistic about every aspect of the problem. The workplace and exposure to the prevailing police culture, practices and procedures appear to affect the atti-
tudes of officers. Indeed, it would be surprising if this was not the case, but it is important to highlight as a factor due to the serious implications for any possible remedial action. For instance, if training modules are to be developed to deal with corruption, then courses designed specifically for serving officers are required. They need to be focused on the practicalities of the job and the experiences they encounter. In addition, there needs to be training for those who are responsible for managing the police - their role appears to be vital not only in setting standards, but also in monitoring behaviour.

For students, clearly there is a lack of overt discussion and emphasis on the need for ethical, non-corrupt behaviour within the police. Classroom teaching on the subject of corruption is subsumed within existing courses, with too few students recognising it for what it is or is supposed to be. While the potential of the informal and semi-formal training provided by tutors is great, its profile could be raised substantially.

The data suggest that there is a worsening problem to tackle rather than a pattern of improvement to be supported, and that the state of the police’s relationship with the public is being affected. Long- and short-term motivations appear to be primarily economic, but bureaucracy and opportunism also play a large role, indicating a more complex cultural problem, compounded by the fact that opportunities for corruption in the police will always be rife. The challenge now is to address this situation without having to limit the police’s powers of discretion.

Researching corruption is problematic, and doubly so when a powerful group such as the police are the subject of the research. It is further complicated by cultural issues, and by the rapid change and significant economic problems which Russia is undergoing. This report has begun to identify some of the key issues, offer data which can inform further work, and describe the boundaries of tolerance for certain activities and behaviour. If corruption is a ‘state of mind’[^32], then information about attitudes to corruption will be essential to practical efforts to implement reform.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

Consistent elements in our data have indicated a number of issues in police training and working practices in Russia which could be considered in order to raise awareness of corruption as a problem and begin to address some of the factors which encourage it. One issue which we are not in a position to address is large-scale personnel restructuring; this is dependent to such an extent on top-level political will that it has been omitted from consideration.

6.1 Review of Training Provision

A central aim of this research study was to try to gauge the extent to which the educational process and then the working environment impacted upon the attitudes of students and serving officers.

• Explicit inclusion of practical, realistic incidents and existing problems with corruption within the current provision for courses on ethics, morals and law. In particular, a greater use of scenarios for all students.

• Greater emphasis within these courses on the damaging impact of corruption on the relationship between the police and the public. Use could be made of the data collected as part of this study and others to highlight the negative impact corrupt practices have upon the police/public relationship. Short refresher courses could be developed to remind serving officers of the consequences of becoming involved in corrupt practices and the impact it has on public confidence in the police.

• Consideration of an annual 'anti-corruption week' within the Training Institution focusing on its impact and the consequences of involvement. This event could be strongly linked with the informal education programme which already exists, and would aim to reinforce anti-corruption values.

• The informal/semi-formal education programme should place increased emphasis on awareness of the consequences of becoming involved in corrupt practices.

33 Recent Russian studies which have looked at this aspect of corruption include Gilinskiy (2000) and Avrutin (1998) op. cit.
practices. Sanctions should be made entirely explicit, along with clear explanations of the adverse consequences for police-public relations and more broadly for inward investment into Russia. This would be important primarily for serving police officers, although students would also benefit.

• The development of specialist short courses for senior police managers on effective performance monitoring.

• Staff training and development in order to put the above measure into effect.

6.2 Levels of Pay for Police Officers

This study, together with others that have been carried out in related areas, all confirm that the low levels of pay for most ranks of police officers have a detrimental impact upon their levels of performance, morale and ability to function effectively and efficiently. There is little doubt that poor pay is directly associated with a police officer's likelihood to become involved in corrupt practices.

• A radical review of the pay structure for Russian police officers is required.

6.3 Review of Performance Indicators

The Ministry of Interior's current over-reliance on one-dimensional quantitative indicators for measuring the performance of the police, and its imposition of federal targets for apprehending offenders and reducing crime, puts pressure both on the agency as a whole (in terms of the public's perception of their efficiency) and on individual officers to manipulate statistics, misclassify crimes and employ illegal means to secure arrests.

• Research on the feasibility of developing a new set of performance indicators for measuring police 'effectiveness' that take account of a broader range of factors as well as rates of crime and clearance rates, such as:
  › Use of force, incidence of brutality, discourtesy and corruption
  › Levels of public satisfaction
  › Response times
  › Measures of trust and confidence in the police
  › Views of victims on treatment by the police
6.4 Encouraging Reporting

There is undoubtedly a code of silence operating within the police whereby those who witness or become aware of the corrupt practices of other officers are disinclined to report their actions to the appropriate authorities. While this is not unusual within police forces and other organisations throughout the world, there is a genuine need to consider as many methods as possible to make reporting easier, anonymous and above all, an accepted part of the role of a Russian police officer. However, the development of such strategies is highly dependent upon a clearer understanding of the current barriers to reporting, both in terms of organisational culture, individual attitudes and structural impediments. Strategies might include:

- Creation of 'dedicated officer' posts trained to take reports of public interest disclosure matters
- Indication that it is not necessarily wrong to raise matters concerning corruption externally

6.5 Review of Internal Disciplinary Procedures and Investigation

Discussions at the research seminar held at the end of this project confirmed the difficulties of securing convictions against officers who are known to be corrupt. The current internal mechanisms for disciplining staff are too rigid and reliant upon state law.

- Review of existing internal sanctions within the disciplinary code of the police, including the nature of the terms and conditions accepted by new officers when they join the police.
- Review of the code of practice to define explicitly behaviour which 'may bring the organisation into disrepute' and the sanctions which can be applied.
7. RESEARCH AGENDA

This research has begun to address respondents' opinions of the validity of justifications for corrupt behaviour, and of the validity of arguments for defining behaviour as morally acceptable. In doing so, it has indicated several areas in which educational, preventative and punitive action might be usefully employed in order to target police corruption in Russia. If foreign governments and agencies are to offer assistance to the Russian police in developing counter-measures to deal with the problem of corruption, they will need to build on this research by obtaining a more detailed picture of the criteria and reasoning that police employ when drawing boundaries of both moral and de facto acceptability of corrupt behaviour.

Quantitative research is effective in establishing priority areas and critical issues, but it does not go far enough to make the next step to explicit, explanatory links between ethical frameworks and attitudes to corruption. Questions inevitably arise when attempting to interpret quantitative data. For instance, can perceived lack of integrity in the information that is provided (or the perceived intent of statements), as well as reference to memory or visibility of statements, explain the fact that many respondents say 'no-one' explains the unacceptability of using position at work for one's own ends? Why, when peer pressure is ranked last amongst ten factors which could motivate turning to corruption, did a sizeable percentage of respondents find themselves surprised by its importance once they began work as serving officers? Training, punitive action and preventative measures vary enormously; although quantitative research can indicate a need for such measures, it cannot describe attitudes with sufficient subtlety to predict how differences in implementation might affect police reactions.

Such information would be best obtained using qualitative research methodologies, such as semi-structured interviews and vignettes, which are able to address social meanings and promote conclusions which are grounded in such meanings. Use of semi-structured interviews would permit officers, students and staff at the Training Institution to speak in their own words. They allow the interviewer to adapt the interview to access respondents' insights, special knowledge and experience. Similarly, vignettes allow the interviewer and respondent to 'discuss norms and beliefs in a situated way which accepts the complexities normally surrounding them'.

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Obtaining qualitative data on attitudes to corruption would have two fundamental purposes. Firstly, it would serve to validate the survey data currently available, by including questions put in the survey as a starting point for discussion. For instance, questions may be asked about the effectiveness and appropriateness of current sanctions, training and preventative measures. At an interview, there will be greater scope than in a questionnaire to discuss, for example, what respondents mean when they say that they think a particular measure would be 'effective': against which forms of corruption? Under what conditions? Where punishment is concerned, does 'effectiveness' include an element of retributive justice, and is this valued as highly as its preventative value?

Secondly, qualitative data which give an indication of which practices are popularly perceived as legitimate and which are not will be able to inform the starting points, approach and emphasis on which anti-corruption initiatives should focus. Research which investigates the relationships between ethical frameworks and cultural attitudes, economic imperative and organisational inflexibility/dysfunction allows us to ask to what extent normative moral judgements about 'corruption' are rooted in problems of transition and what tacit value judgements officers' ethical reasoning might reflect. It also allows us to reflect on the implications for discourse on ethical relativism and a 'culture of corruption' in the Russian police, and inform a wider debate on several levels: Do the data support the idea of corruption as a cause or a symptom of economic breakdown in Russia? Are programmes of 'ethics training' likely to be effective in countries and organisations which have yet to make structural changes to combat corruption?

Although this is potentially a broad field of enquiry, it can be narrowed to focus on those particular behaviours, justifications and ethical standpoints which are most likely to lead to police use of position at work for their own ends: i.e., those which are most likely to be targeted by anti-corruption initiatives, which seek to alter or eradicate them. Educational, preventative and punitive measures will differ in the ways in which they seek to influence where the boundaries of acceptable behaviour are drawn, and their proponents will therefore need different information about the way in which beliefs and attitudes are structured.
APPENDIX 1: CURRICULUM REVIEW

The curriculum review examined both formal and informal anti-corruption educational initiatives at the Training Institution.

Taught Courses

Professional Ethics

This course deals with philosophical and legal issues, mostly in lecture format, rather than considering specific issues and case study work. It provides a broadly theoretical discussion of the relationship between responsibility for achieving successes in police work and moral responsibility:

- Ethics: the science of morals and morality
- Fundamentals of ethical thought
- Morals and morality as tenets of personal and social action
- Law and morality
- Realisation of moral norms in the work of Organs of Interior Affairs
- Seminar: Content and form of moral demands in law enforcement work
- Ethical bases of the work of Organs of Internal Affairs
- Freedom and responsibility in the work of the Organs of Internal Affairs
- Work ethics and etiquette of the Organs of Internal Affairs
- Seminar: Fundamental problems of professional ethics

This is in itself important as part of a broad humanities education, but is limited in terms of enabling students to make connections between moral and legal-philosophical arguments and real-life problems with corruption. The latter elements of this course (the last 5 items on the list) have potential for development beyond theory to lead onto a more practical discussion; however, the two seminars currently provided for would allow insufficient time to explore the issues at stake thoroughly, and to allow students' thinking to develop over time.

Other Taught Courses

Staff teaching other courses are expected to make connections between legal norms and norms of behaviour and ethical and moral issues relevant to corruption. Staff
confirmed that they themselves are keen to make these connections wherever possible; however, they preferred to emphasise points about the acceptability or unacceptability of particular issues without making links to real-life situations which might be faced by students.

The following courses are deemed by the Training Institution to touch on issues relevant to corruption:

- Social psychology
- Criminology
- Civil law, company law, municipal law, criminal law
- Law enforcement bodies in Russia
- Management in the Organs of Internal Affairs (OVD)
- Administration in the OVD
- Economic theory
- Governmental legal regulation of company activity
- Government and the banking system during transition in Russia (theoretical and legal aspects)
- Serious violent crime and its prevention (sociological and criminological aspects)
- Forensics in the fight against crime
- Computer crime: definition, tendencies and preventative measures

This may be perceived as a positive integration of anti-corruption education into the mainstream. However, this interpretation depends on a reasonably high and explicit profile for anti-corruption messages within each subject area. If this does not happen, then spreading anti-corruption education throughout the curriculum rather than addressing it separately has the potential to detract from the strength of the message.

Informal/Semi-Formal Education

Students at the Training Institution have a heavy workload; within four years they are expected to complete a law degree as well as learning practical policing. In state universities, it normally takes five years to complete a first degree. The strong emphasis on informal education, where staff are required to pick out opportunities for discussion with students, provides a realistic opportunity for dialogue without imposing further demands on the curriculum, and may provide a firm basis for strengthening attitudes towards anti-corruption measures.
Teaching staff have specific responsibilities for informal education outside teaching hours, entering into dialogue with students in order to discuss corruption on a more practical level. Conversations with staff confirmed that they saw informal education as important not only for instilling working discipline (such as neat appearance), but also for developing professionalism in a broader sense amongst students.

**Staff and Student Input**

As part of the evaluation, interviews were held with a small group of students from the Training Institution, and with senior staff, at the conclusion of the project.

The student group were all in their second year of study and were from different regions of the Russian Federation. Whilst it was a small group and therefore not necessarily representative of all students at the Training Institution, it did allow for gathering supplementary information through a less structured process than formal questionnaires.

Despite their relative youth, the intellectual abilities of the students were impressive. They had clearly formed views on why corruption was dysfunctional, for example: 'it reduces the effectiveness of police work;' 'it devalues our democracy'. Secondly, they were committed to working in the criminal justice system, and all affirmed that the reputation of the Training Institution—throughout the Russian Federation—was excellent. These two reasons had led them to making a positive choice to apply for a place at the Training Institution. The Training Institution has a very large student body, most of whom enter soon after leaving secondary school. The student body therefore constitutes a very substantial pool of young people from which many of the future leaders of the Russian police service will be drawn. In the current situation, where substantial numbers of mid-ranking officers have left the police service, it can be anticipated that many of the graduates of the Training Institution will benefit from accelerated promotion. Interestingly, these students did not see corruption as a problem which had been created by particular cultural attitudes, but very much as a practical issue which creates problems for organisations worldwide.

After 18 months of training, the students said that there had been no formal mention of corruption in lectures or seminars during their education so far. In more informal conversations, staff presented the problem of corruption as something which is an important issue for future consideration; they acknowledged its existence, but offered no assessment of how large a problem it is, or how it might be
possible to deal with it. However, students mentioned that there is a considerable informal network of discussion outside classes which covers many problematic areas of police work, including corruption.

The group of staff were relatively senior in rank. They were able, therefore, to take an overview of, and to influence the educational process at the Training Institution where a curriculum review process is underway. One aspect of this process which may be of major interest is the value placed by staff on the above-mentioned discussions with students outside the formal classroom environment. This is an essential part of training at the Institution, and its procedures and goals are part of the broader curriculum review, providing a window of opportunity for changes to be made. The staff were not convinced of the effectiveness of specific anti-corruption teaching in the formal classroom setting, preferring to integrate formal teaching on the subject into courses such as ethics and criminology.

Clearly, there is a potential openness to discussion and debate amongst both students and staff. Developing informal/semi-formal education further may open up a strong potential platform for attempting to shape attitudes and counter the acquisition of less positive attitudes and values towards corruption. However, both staff and students confirmed that there is currently very little dialogue between them which openly acknowledges or discusses positive attitudes to corruption.
APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE

[The Training Institution] and Leicester University (Britain) are carrying out a survey about police attitudes to the use of position at work for personal ends. We would like to ask you to take part in this research, the results of which may help to develop specific proposals for helping you to serve the police better.

THANK YOU FOR AGREEING TO TAKE PART IN THIS SURVEY!

Please read all the questions carefully and think through your answers.

The survey is ANONYMOUS. Please do not indicate your name.

Please take only your own personal opinion into account when answering the questions and do not miss any questions out (including the most straightforward questions).

1. In your opinion, in the last few years the work of the police has ... (please tick one option):

   a. Become harder  
   b. Become easier  
   c. Stayed the same  
   d. Don’t know

2. In the last few years would you say that the relationship between the police and the public has become better, stayed more or less the same or got worse? Please tick only one option:

   a. Has become better  
   b. Stayed the same  
   c. Got worse
3. Why did you choose to enter the police force?
Please read the list of reasons below, and then number your answers from 1-6 where 1 indicates the most important reason and 6 the least important reason (in order of rank).

a  As a police officer you get respect from the public  

b  The police receive good legal education  

c  As a police officer you have power in society  

d  Police work is interesting  

e  Police work involves being useful to society  

f  Police have a stable job  

4. The unacceptability of the use of position at work for personal ends is explained to you during your education...

a  By teachers  

b  By officers senior to you  

c  By comrades  

d  Not at all  

5. During your studies, are you given problem-solving tasks concerning the use of position at work...

a  Often  

b  Rarely  

c  Never  

6. Is the information which you receive during your studies sufficient in order to deal with the problems of the use of position at work for personal ends?

a  Sufficient  

b  Not entirely sufficient  

c  Insufficient
The next few questions are about whether it is acceptable for a police officer to use their position at work to get things done for themselves, friends, acquaintances and family.

There are various arguments for and against the use of position at work for personal ends and here we would like find out what you think of them.

7. Please put a tick in the boxes beside ALL the statements which you agree with.

a. It is acceptable for a police officer to use their position at work for their own ends if they don’t let criminals go unpunished as a result.

b. It is acceptable for a police officer to use their position at work for their own ends if money isn’t involved.

c. It is acceptable for a police officer to use their position at work for their own ends if the favours are insignificant.

d. It is acceptable for a police officer to use their position at work for their own ends if it doesn’t happen very regularly.

e. It is acceptable for a police officer to use their position at work for their own ends if only their very close family and friends are involved.

f. It is acceptable for a police officer to use their position at work for their own ends if their superior officers are aware of it.

g. My opinion about the use of position at work for personal ends is:

............................................................................................................................................................................

............................................................................................................................................................................

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Please check that you have ticked all the statements which you agree with for this question.
8. Do you think that the use by police officers of their position to get things done for themselves, friends, acquaintances and family has: (tick one option)

a. increased in the last few years [✓]
b. decreased in the last few years
c. Stayed the same

The next few questions are about small gifts of services which are sometimes offered to the police by citizens. For instance, a free meal in a restaurant or a free car service.

Please remember that they are not about extortion - they are about accepting things that are freely offered by relative strangers.

9. Please put a tick by ALL those statements below which you agree with.

a. It is only natural that people are grateful to police officers and wish to express this through gifts or services [✓]
b. Even the smallest gift or free service creates a sense of obligation in most police officers
c. If a company offered discounts on food to all police officers, this would be unacceptable
d. A police officer who refuses small gestures of thanks will be looked on as unfriendly and will not be confided in
e. Gifts like a free meal in a restaurant or free car service are such a well established way of doing things that attempts to stop it won't work
f. Police can generally distinguish between a friendly gesture and a bribe
g. Gifts or services as small as a free meal in a restaurant or a free car service aren't big enough to make the police feel that they owe something to the giver
h. Most police would not be compromised by a free meal in a restaurant or free car service, but some weak or inexperienced police officers might be drawn into further relationships of this kind.

i. Police should have a relationship with the public and with colleagues that is motivated and directed solely by public duty.

j. Since weak or inexperienced police officers may feel obliged to a giver, it is better that no police accept any gifts or services.

k. Since weak or inexperienced police may get used to receiving gifts or free services, it is better that no police accept any gifts or services.

Please check that you have ticked ALL the statements which you agree with for this question.

10. Once a police officer has accepted a free meal in a restaurant or a free car service, are they:

A. More likely to accept similar or more valuable gifts in the future

B. No more likely to accept similar or more valuable gifts in the future

11. If you chose A, please put a tick by the statement which explains why you chose it. If neither of the following are close to your own view, please state your view in the space provided. IF YOU CHOSE B, PLEASE DO NOT ANSWER THIS PART OF THE QUESTION.

a. Once a police officer has accepted something, even just a free meal in a good restaurant, they have sacrificed their impartiality at work.

b. Often when police officers have accepted one free meal or service they somehow find it easier to accept similar or more valuable gifts in the future.
c  Neither of the above really explain why I chose A. I chose it because:

..............................................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................

If you chose B, please put a tick by the statement which explains why you chose it. If neither of the following are close to your own view, please state your view in the space provided. IF YOU CHOSE A, PLEASE DO NOT ANSWER THIS PART OF THE QUESTION.

When a police officer stops taking more and more valuable gifts or services, it is usually because:

a  they have reached a point beyond which they are not prepared to go for moral reasons

b  they have reached a point beyond which they are not prepared to go because of the growing risk that what they are doing may become public knowledge

c  they have reached a point beyond which they are not prepared to go because of the growing risk that they may be found out and punished

d  Neither of the above really explain why I chose B. I chose it because:

..............................................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................................
12. Why do you think some police officers use their position at work for their own ends? Please rank the following factors IN RANK ORDER from 1 to 10, with 1 being the most important and 10 the least important. Please write the appropriate number in the boxes provided.

- a. Because there are plenty of opportunities
- b. To get a conviction, when someone is guilty but there is no evidence
- c. Because they see others do it
- d. Because of low pay
- e. Due to pressure from above to achieve good crime solving figures
- f. Due to weak control by senior officers
- g. Because senior officers set a bad example
- h. Obeying direct orders from above
- i. Due to peer pressure
- j. Because of pressure from organised crime groups
- k. If you think that there is a more important reason why police officers use their position at work for personal ends, please write it here:

13. Please think back to when you had just graduated and began working as a police officer. Did you discover that any of the factors below actually played a greater role in encouraging the use of position at work for personal ends than you had previously thought?

Please place a tick by ALL those which played a greater role than you had thought while you were a student.

- a. Because there are plenty of opportunities
- b. To get a conviction, when someone is clearly guilty but there is no evidence
- c. Because they see others do it
- d. Because of low pay
- e. Due to pressure from above to achieve good crime solving figures
- f. Due to weak control by senior officers
- g. Due to peer pressure
- h. Obeying direct orders from above
- i. Because senior officers set a bad example
- j. Because of pressure from organised crime groups

Please check that you have ticked ALL the statements which you agree with for this question.
14. What do you think is the most important reason why police officers refrain from using their position at work for their own ends? Please tick one answer only.

a. They are frightened of being exposed
b. They are frightened of punishment
c. They believe that the police should be impartial
d. They believe that the police should stick to the letter of the law
e. They believe that the police should set a good example

15. Why do people sometimes give something to the police if they need their help to solve a problem? Is it usually because: (please tick one answer only)

a. The police officer asks for something
b. Police officers expect something
c. People just want to give something
d. They think the police will make extra effort for them

16. Which of these comes closest to your view? In Russia the use of position by officials including the police for their own ends is (please tick one answer only)

a. A product of the past
b. A product of moral crisis in a country in transition
c. A product of economic crisis in a country in transition
d. A permanent part of the country's culture
e. None of the above. My opinion on this matter is: .................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................
17. Which comes nearest to your view? At the moment in Russia, some police officers use their position at work for their own ends because it is the only way: (please tick one answer only).

a. To provide sufficient goods for themselves and their families (because of low pay) ☑️

b. To provide themselves and their families with what they need to attain a better life ☐

c. That police officers can get rewarded for doing difficult work ☐

d. None of the above, my opinion is:

The following questions are about to what extent certain police actions are acceptable.

18. To what extent do you yourself consider the activities in the table below morally acceptable or unacceptable for a police officer? Please write the number corresponding to your answer in the table below.

1. Morally acceptable
2. Morally acceptable most of the time
3. Morally unacceptable except under certain circumstances
4. Morally unacceptable
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Police action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
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<tr>
<td>b</td>
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<tr>
<td>c</td>
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<tr>
<td>d</td>
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<td>m</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
19. Which of the factors below do you think CURRENTLY reduce the trust of the police by the public? Please tick all that you agree with.

- Low level of professionalism
- Indifference, lack of respect for citizens
- Use of position for personal ends
- Bureaucracy, procrastination
- Biased reporting of OVD work by the mass media

If you think there is a more important reason than those listed above please state it here:

20. In your opinion, how often do people use their position at work for their own personal ends? Please put ticks in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Very often</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a Local politicians</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b Traffic police</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c Federal politicians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d Uniformed ('operational') police</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e Journalists</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>f Police detectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>g Lawyers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>h Local civil servants</td>
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<tr>
<td>i Doctors</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j Federal civil servants</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
21. If you discovered that one of your colleagues was using their position at work for their own ends, would you: (Please tick one answer).

- a  Report to a senior officer
- b  Ignore it
- c  Try to stop them (myself)

22. Who should be responsible for investigating cases of corruption in the police? Please tick one answer.

- a  People in the ranks of the operative police
- b  An independent bureau of lay people, trained specifically for the purpose
- c  Procuracy
- d  Specialist anti-corruption police
- e  Other (please specify)

23. In your opinion, to what extent would the following measures be effective in preventing officers using their position at work for their own ends? Please write the number corresponding to your answer in the table.

1. Very effective
2. Quite effective
3. Not very effective
4. Not effective at all

How effective? (1-4)

- a  Higher salaries for police
- b  Bonus payments for outstanding work
- c  Better appeal and complaints procedures for citizens
- d  Display the rights of citizens on notices in all police stations
- e  More openness - require officials to explain their actions to citizens and the press
- f  Stricter controls and penalties for police
- g  Stricter penalties for people who attempt to bribe the police
- h  An independent bureau for investigating corruption
- i  Special internal affairs police for fighting corruption
- j  More discussion of ethics in training
- k  New, stricter laws
24. For each of the following, what should the punishment be?  
Please write your answer in the table below.

1. Nothing  
2. Disciplinary action  
3. Administrative responsibility  
4. Criminal responsibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Punishment (1-4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Accepting money from a criminal to let them go</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Receiving a significant financial reward for providing information to a lawyer to enable the client to get a lesser sentence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Planting drugs on a known active criminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Asking a detective to get your friend’s close relative, who has been held for starting a fight whilst drunk, released from custody</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Speeding off duty and showing a police badge in order not to be fined</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. Some information about you (THIS INFORMATION WILL NOT IDENTIFY YOU):

a. Age (please give your age at your last birthday): .................

b. Sex

Male [ ]  
Female [ ]

c. Have you got parents, brothers or sisters who have ever worked in the police?

Yes [ ]  
No [ ]

d. Where do your parents live? Please tick one answer only:

in a town or city [ ]
in a village [ ]
in the countryside [ ]

e. For how many years have you served in the police?

Less than 3 years [ ]
3 to 6 years [ ]
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING PART.
PLEASE PUT YOUR
COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE
IN THE BOX ON THE TABLE.
The Scarman Centre, University of Leicester,

The Centre was established in 1988 to undertake research, teaching and professional training in the study of public disorder, crime and punishment, policing, crime prevention and security management. It currently offers a number of postgraduate courses taught at Leicester and by distance learning, that cover these areas. In addition, staff are actively engaged in a wide range of research projects, including police reform in Eastern Europe, race and ethnic relations, inner city issues, problems of money laundering, and the policing of domestic violence.

Scarman Centre, University of Leicester
128 Regent Road
Leicester LE1 7PA
United Kingdom

Consitutional and Legal Policy Institute (COLPI)

Nádor u. 11
1051 Budapest, Hungary
(tel) + 36 1 327 3102
(fax) + 36 1 327 3103
(web) http://www.osi.hu/colpi