Interim Report for the

The Development of Crime Reduction Schemes for At-Risk Groups: Context-Specific Approaches for Transitional Societies project

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1 INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

In industrialised countries such as the UK and USA, burglary continues to be a major crime problem, dominating the crime statistics and accounting for a significant proportion of the criminal justice system’s budget. For instance, the figures for the UK are daunting, with nearly one million incidents being recorded in 1997/98.1 It is also a crime which impacts disproportionately on the poor and the disadvantaged – those who can least afford to lose their possessions or buy protection are more likely to become victims.2 Burglary has, unsurprisingly, also become a serious problem for countries in transition, such as Russia, where high-income differentials, unstable labour markets and demoralised police forces exist. According to internationally published data, for example, the number of burglaries officially recorded by the Russian militia more than doubled between 1995 and 1999 from 19,303 to 45,106.3 This is far lower, however, than the 300,000 burglaries reported by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) between January and October 2001 (an increase of 4 per cent on the previous year’s figures)4, or reports that domestic burglary affects one in every 200 households in Russia annually, which suggest that officially recorded burglaries represent only the very tip of the iceberg.5

This rise in burglary rates shown by police statistics is supported by survey data – most notably the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) – which has now been conducted on three occasions (with a fourth sweep currently being completed), encompassing 12 industrialised countries, 12 developing countries and 15 countries in transition.6 The last survey found that there was an increase in rates of burglary for Africa, Asia and Latin America. Methodological difficulties mean that such a comparison is more difficult for central and east European countries in transition, although data is available for Russia that show a nearly two fold increase in one-year victimisation rates between 1992 and 1996.7 The surveys have also shown that burglary is the crime that Russians most fear becoming a victim of, and yet very little detailed research has been conducted specifically on this offence in Russia.8

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4 Data from MVD web site: http://www.mvdinform.ru.
5 Information from the Extra-Departmental Guard Service (EDGS), a semi-autonomous organisation operating within the MVD and responsible for providing guard services to domestic, commercial and institutional clients on a fee-paying basis.
8 The 1996 International Crime Victim Survey revealed that 56% of respondents thought it likely or very likely that they would become the victim of burglary during the next 12 months. This was higher than in any of the other 10 countries in transition that participated in the survey. Zvekic, U. (1998b) Criminal Victimisation in Countries in Transition. Rome: UNICRI.
This is partly explained by the fact that, although crime victimisation has increased in many different areas, certain types of crime are much more likely than others to attract attention both in Russia and internationally. The mass media in Russia, for example, tends to focus on violent crimes, which shock the public and may contribute to high levels of fear of crime. International media interest also tends to focus on alarming crimes such as contract killings and other murders, as well as corruption, while the academic spotlight is more likely to fall on crimes with a global dimension, including money laundering and organised crime. Consequently, most research focuses on these ‘big issues’, while much less is known about everyday, high volume crimes, which arguably have a much greater impact on the Russian population. One of the aims of this project, therefore, is to bridge this information gap by investigating not only the extent of burglary, but also how the public and militia are responding to this growing problem.

In overall terms, the project has four clear objectives:

- To generate detailed information on the extent, nature and degree of reporting of burglary victimisation together with the police response in three Russian cities.
- From this knowledge base, to introduce and then subsequently evaluate context-specific burglary reduction initiatives derived from the experiences in the UK.
- To use this data to investigate whether the key theoretical developments in recognising, understanding and responding to repeat victimisation are equally valid for transitional societies as they are for more established countries.
- Based on the results of the research, to substantially revise the existing course on crime prevention taught to trainee and serving police officers at law institutes throughout Russia.

It can be broken down into three phases of activity:

- Phase I – the collection of data on the extent and nature of the problem of burglary.
- Phase II – the introduction of a series of context-specific burglary reduction programmes.
- Phase III – the evaluation of the impact of the schemes, completion of curriculum development and the dissemination of the findings.

This report focuses on the findings from Phase 1 of the project, which involved the collection of data on the extent and nature of the problem of burglary. Without a detailed ‘map’ of the extent of victimisation, the degree of reporting or non-reporting to the police, the attitudes of citizens to the way they are dealt with by the police and, more importantly, any gaps in expectations and reality, it would be impossible to select the most appropriate burglary reduction schemes and successfully adapt them to the local context.

This research uses data from three cities in the Russian Federation: Omsk, Smolensk and Volgograd. These cities were chosen for three reasons. Firstly, it was important that they are not Moscow or St Petersburg: even more than in other countries, the uniqueness of the capital or second city in Russia makes findings based upon studies conducted within them difficult to generalise across the country, or indeed to other countries. Russia effectively has two capitals, which tend to dominate both in terms of political and economic importance and, in the past, in terms of attracting overseas assistance. There is more justification in assumptions about the typicality of the three cities named above in terms of lifestyles and modes of thinking in urban Russia, and therefore more potential for successful generalisation of some of the research outputs. However, their differences will also prove useful.

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Secondly, the Scarman Centre has excellent links with the Academies in Omsk and Volgograd, and the Ministry of Interior recommended Smolensk Institute as a ‘flagship’ law institute with appropriate facilities and a dedicated academic staff.

Thirdly, a range of NGOs and experts in each of the cities have agreed to participate in the project.

**Smolensk:** Smolensk (population 356,000) is the capital of Smolensk Region (population 1,147,000) in European Russia. Around one third of the region’s population live in urban areas, while two-thirds live in rural areas. The region’s economy largely relies upon agricultural production, while the cities and towns are dependent on industrial production, including machine building, iron and steel, and chemicals.

**Omsk:** Omsk Region is located in Western Siberia and has around 2,170,000 inhabitants, approximately 1 million (46%) of whom live in the region’s capital, Omsk. The region’s economy is based on a mixture of industrial and agricultural production. Oil refining accounts for a large share of the region’s industrial output (43%). Economic recession during the 1990s led to severe industrial decline in the city, particularly in light industry, chemicals and oil.

**Volgograd:** Volgograd Region is in southeast European Russia and is one of Russia’s largest industrial centres. The city of Volgograd is a port on the Volga River and has a population of around one million. Heavy industry predominates – particularly shipyards, oil refineries, and steel mills.

**STRUCTURE OF REPORT**

The report is divided into a number of sections. Section 2 describes the methods used to conduct the research. In section 3, the fear of crime is examined, in particular the fear of burglary and its impact on people’s attitudes to home security. The extent of burglary is measured in section 4 of the report, which also considers which groups are most vulnerable to victimisation. The next 3 sections (5-7) focus on the experiences of burglary victims by detailing the nature of burglary (when and how burglaries occur; responsibility issues; contact with the offenders and the impact on victims); whether or not victims report burglaries to the militia, and what factors influence their decision; and what victims think of the militia’s response to reports of burglary and how they are treated by them. Sections 8-10 once again cover the whole sample (not just burglary victims), summarising various aspects of contact and co-operation with the militia, including: public perceptions of the militia and how well they do their job; levels of contact between the public and the militia and public perceptions of how they are treated by the militia; existing levels of co-operation between the public and militia and how willing the public are to help the militia in the future and, more generally, to participate in crime prevention schemes. Finally, the report provides a summary of the findings in section 11, followed by some broad conclusions and the recommendations for Phase II of the project.
2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

RESEARCH DESIGN

The aim of the first phase of the project was to comprehend the context within which burglary takes place. This information was needed to understand the true extent of the problem of burglary and which groups were most at risk. The results from Phase 1 would also be used to guide the next stage of the project in terms of selecting suitable burglary reduction initiatives for each city. In order to obtain the necessary data, two main sources of information were used: existing police statistics on crime were collected, and a survey of the public was conducted in each city.

Police Statistics

It is generally acknowledged that police (official) statistics are not necessarily a reliable source of information about crime and victimisation, as they do not capture unreported or unrecorded crime. This problem is compounded in many countries by the fact that statistics are manipulated at various levels to present a ‘better’ overall picture of crime, and although this practice is not confined to Russia, the scale of the problem is generally recognised to be more serious than in the West, with both anecdotal and survey evidence suggesting that not all crimes reported to the militia are recorded by them (although victims may be given the impression they are). The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs is now addressing the issue of non-registration of crimes by the militia: the Minister of Internal Affairs issued a decree in June 2001 ordering the militia to register all crimes reported to them by the public, and sanctions such as official reprimands and the threat of sackings from high official positions have since been introduced, highlighting the more serious approach being taken by the Ministry to tackle this problem. Although police statistics may not be a reliable source of data on crime rates, they are nonetheless useful in benchmarking rates of registered crime to be used for longitudinal comparisons. Police statistics are thus being collected throughout the life of the project to be used, in conjunction with survey data, to measure changes in crime levels.

Smolensk: According to regional data, against a general downward trend in crime rates at the national level, domestic burglaries fell in Smolensk Region by 20 per cent between 1995 and 2000, resulting in a reduction in the share of residential burglaries as a percentage of all property thefts from 24.6 per cent to 22.4 per cent during this period. During 2000, however, the level of domestic burglary hardly changed, and during the first two months of 2001, the militia recorded 12 per cent more burglaries than during the same period in 2000. Although these figures only cover the beginning of the year, this increase may prove significant since burglaries tend to peak in the summer months in Russia, and this recorded percentage change is greater even than the ‘pessimistic’ forecast made by the MVD Research Institute for 2001.

Omsk: According to local data, burglary is a serious problem in Omsk Region. In 2000, 5,792 domestic burglaries were recorded in the region as a whole, of which 4,134 (71.4%) were


11 The MVD Research Institute developed two sets of forecasts for 2001: one optimistic and one pessimistic. Both sets of forecasts were developed on the basis of the positive short-term crime trends experienced during 2000 and the negative long-term criminal processes that characterised the 1990s. They also take into account the 2 most likely scenarios of Russia’s socio-economic development during 2001 – also positive or negative. The optimistic forecast envisages a fall of 8% in the total number of registered crimes in 2001, including murders (5%), GBH (6%), robbery (8%), aggravated robbery (9%), and burglary (7%). The pessimistic forecast predicts a rise of around 6% in registered crime, including murders (around 9%), GBH (6%), robbery (11%), aggravated robbery (11%) and burglary (9%).
recorded in the city of Omsk. The local militia argue that certain features of cities make urban households more susceptible than rural households to burglary, including high population densities, the opportunity for offenders to leave the scene of the crime quickly (using their own or public transport), and the isolation of inhabitants living in high blocks of flats – the most typical form of housing in Russian cities. There are also likely to be higher levels of relative affluence in cities than in rural areas, providing greater incentives and/or opportunities for committing property crimes.

Volgograd: Burglary is also a major problem in the city of Volgograd, responsible for a substantial share of crime in some parts of the city. In parallel with the data from the other two cities, official statistics from Volgograd show that recorded burglaries fell between 1999 and 2000 by 13 per cent. This is explained by the heightened levels of public awareness that resulted from a series of bomb attacks in Russian cities in September 1999, which killed 300 people. The attacks led to compulsory 12-hour shifts for the Russian militia and prompted residents to set up neighbourhood patrols to guard residential areas around the clock, which reportedly had a more general crime prevention effect. However, once the threat of attacks receded, the neighbourhood patrols gradually disbanded, and crime rates have again begun to rise.

THE SURVEY

The survey was designed in agreement with the research teams in Russia. Initially, the general content of the questionnaire was discussed at a planning meeting held in Russia at the end of January 2001. The questionnaire was subsequently prepared in English and translated into Russian for piloting. As a result of the pilot study, changes were made to the structure and content of the questionnaire. The final research instrument was approved by all research partners in April 2001 (see Appendices).

The questionnaire covered a range of issues, including:
- Experiences of crime, including burglary.
- Experiences of repeat victimisation.
- The likelihood of reporting crime to the militia.
- Attitudes towards crime prevention and household security.
- Concerns about crime and the fear of crime, especially burglary.
- Experiences of dealing with the militia both generally and as a victim of crime.
- Expectations of the militia.
- Willingness to become involved in local crime prevention schemes.

The questionnaire was designed in such a way as to facilitate comparisons between this survey and other crime surveys such as the British Crime Survey (BCS), the International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS) and the Kharkiv Crime Survey (KCS). Such comparisons are made throughout the report.

The questionnaire was divided into two parts: all respondents were asked the same core set of general questions about their experiences of crime during the previous 12 months, their concerns about becoming a victim of crime, attitudes towards the militia, experiences of

12 These figures refer only to burglary with unlawful entry and do not include theft of property from a flat (without unlawful entry), or aggravated burglary/theft with entry (which are broken down in Russian statistics into ‘life-threatening’ or ‘non-life threatening’).

13 The Kharkiv Crime Survey was conducted as part of the ‘Introducing Context-Driven Community Policing in Ukraine’ project, directed by Adrian Beck at the Scarman Centre, University of Leicester. The project was funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth office’s ASSIST Challenge programme, and administered by the British Council in Kyiv, Ukraine. The Survey results were published in March 2001 in a report prepared by Adrian Beck and Yulia Chistyakova for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office entitled, ‘Crime and Policing in Ukraine: The Kharkiv Crime Survey 2000. Throughout the current report, this survey is referred to as the ‘KCS’.
contact with the militia, and measures they had taken to protect their property from burglary. More general demographic data (age, gender, employment status, education levels, income etc.) were also collected to facilitate data analysis. The second part of the questionnaire was designed along the lines of the victim forms used in the BCS. Respondents who said they had been the victim of burglary or attempted burglary were asked a series of specific questions about the incident, including when it happened, how it happened, the impact of the burglary on the victim, whether it was reported to the militia, and how the militia responded.

Sample Design

The survey was stratified, with three residential areas chosen in each of the three cities based upon high, medium and low recorded rates of burglary during the previous 12 months. The rates of burglary were based on existing police data. Some 1,500 people were interviewed in each city, providing a total sample of 4,500.

A combination of area and random sampling was used in each of the three districts within each city, whereby a number of streets were randomly selected and then homes were selected systematically (e.g. every 10th home) and visited by trained interviewers from the local law institute. As burglary is a household, rather than individual crime, the selection of a specific respondent at each address was not crucial. The sample was instead drawn to cover a cross-section of the population in each city in terms of age (one half of the respondents between the ages of 18 and 40 and the other half above the age of 40) and gender (roughly 50 per cent men and 50 per cent women) in order to capture a wide range of experiences of, and attitudes to various crime-related issues.

Data Collection

Interview training was provided in each city by those responsible for conducting the survey. Data were collected during May and June 2001. Respondents were encouraged to participate in the study with assurances that their responses were confidential and would only be used for the purposes of the research.

The research team in each city was responsible for inputting the data collected into a data file, which was then sent to Leicester University, where the data from all three cities were combined into a master data file for analysis. Data were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Missing data are not included in the results. Reported results are significant at the 95% confidence interval, unless otherwise stated (p<0.05).

Methodological Note About Income

Many surveys routinely ask respondents to indicate their income for the purposes of assessing whether their socio-economic background influences their experiences and attitudes. Asking people about their income is, however, a sensitive issue, particularly in Russia where a combination of factors may make respondents unable or unwilling to reveal how much they earn. In addition to the problem of the black economy, people often have more than one job, or, in recent years in particular, may be paid not in roubles, but in goods. Also significant is the fact that many families have allotments, the produce of which makes an important, but extremely difficult-to-quantify contribution to the household income. Moreover, for tax reasons, discretion, embarrassment or modesty, people are generally reluctant to reveal how much they earn. As a consequence of these problems, the survey did not seek to establish income levels in monetary terms, but instead asked respondents to describe their level of income by choosing a statement that most closely applied to them from the following options:

1. Not enough even for food.
2. Just enough for food, but nothing else.
3. Enough for food and clothing, but cannot afford anything else.
4. Have some savings and can afford durables now and then.
5. Have all that we need.

It is interesting to note that only 3 per cent of all respondents said they did not have enough even for food, 21 per cent said they had just enough for food, but nothing else, 47 per cent said they had enough for food and clothing but were unable to afford anything else, 24 per cent said they had some savings and could afford durables now and then, and just 5 per cent said they had all that they needed. Throughout the report, these categories are referred to as income groups 1 to 5.
3 FEAR OF CRIME

This section looks at the level of public concern revealed by the survey about crime rates in general, and about different types of crime. It considers which crime provokes the highest level of concern amongst respondents and which groups exhibit heightened levels of fear or concern about crime. Finally, it briefly considers how the fear of crime – in particular burglary – affects people’s behaviour in terms of household security.

3.1 ESTIMATING RATES OF CRIME

How do people estimate crime rates in their districts/cities? This information was important as it provides an indication of people’s perceptions of the crime rate where they live, which may not coincide with the real situation. Respondents were asked whether they thought the overall crime rate in their city was low, average or high. The results are summarised in Table 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
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<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Smolensk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Volgograd</td>
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<tr>
<td>All</td>
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<td>44</td>
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<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the total sample, 28 per cent estimated the crime rate in their local district as high, while 44 per cent said it was average and only 12 per cent thought it was low: 16 per cent were unable to reply. These estimates compare very unfavourably with the KCS: only 15 per cent of respondents in Kharkiv thought the crime rate in their area was high, while more than one-third of respondents (35%) thought it was low and 50 per cent – average.15

Respondents in Smolensk (32%) were more likely than their counterparts in Volgograd (30%) or Omsk (24%) to estimate a high crime rate. Correspondingly, respondents in Omsk (14%) were more likely to estimate a low crime rate than those in Volgograd (12%) or Smolensk (8%). These results show that there is some correlation between the actual level of crime and people’s perceptions of crime: as we shall see in Section 4, victimisation rates for burglary

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were higher in Smolensk than in the other two cities, as they were for most of the crimes asked about.\textsuperscript{16}

Certain demographic characteristics also influence people’s perceptions of crime rates: for example, women were more likely to estimate high rates of crime than men (30% compared with 26%). Not surprisingly, respondents who had experienced crime estimated higher rates of crime (36%) than respondents who had not been the victims of any crime (27%), which suggests that personal experiences of crime have a bearing on people’s perceptions of crime rates. Respondents between the ages of 30 and 39 were more likely to select high (31-35%) than people under the age of 30 (23%) or over the age of 60 (22%). Income was also significant: people in the top two income groups were less likely to consider crime to be high compared with respondents in the lower income groups. Correspondingly, respondents who said they had all that they needed were more than twice as likely as those who said they did not have enough even for food to say crime was low (23% against 9%).

The issue of trust was also significant: people who said they trusted the militia were more than twice as likely (21%) to say crime rates were low than people who did not trust the militia (8%). Conversely, respondents who did not trust the militia were most likely to estimate high rates of crime: 46 per cent said crime rates were high, compared with just 17 per cent of respondents who trusted the militia.

### 3.2 CONCERNS ABOUT CRIME IN GENERAL

Research in the UK has shown that the fear of crime can be very debilitating and ultimately have a serious impact on people’s quality of life, preventing them from leaving their homes at certain times of the day or night, or from visiting certain places.\textsuperscript{17} In order to establish the extent to which people in Russia are concerned about crime, respondents were asked to what extent they were worried about crime in general, and then about specific crimes. In both cases, they were given the same responses to choose from: ‘not worried’, ‘slightly worried’, ‘quite worried’ and ‘very worried’. Table 3.2 over the page shows how they responded.

In overall terms, three-fifths of respondents were either very worried (17%) or quite worried (44%) about crime in their district, while around one-third (31%) were slightly worried, and only 8 per cent said they were not worried at all. Comparing these results with the results obtained by the KCS, levels of concern about crime appear very high in Russia: only 7 per cent of respondents in Kharkiv were very worried, while 31 per cent were quite worried, 33 per cent only slightly worried, and 29 per cent not worried at all.\textsuperscript{18}

People in Omsk showed lower levels of concern about crime than their counterparts in Smolensk and Volgograd: 56 per cent of respondents in Omsk were either quite or very worried, compared with 64 per cent in both Smolensk and Volgograd. In contrast, respondents in Smolensk were least likely not to be concerned about crime: only 5 per cent were not at all concerned, compared with 9 per cent in Volgograd and 10 per cent in Omsk.

\textsuperscript{16} As detailed in the methodology section, respondents were not only asked about their experiences of burglary, but also about their general experiences of victimisation: the overall results, however, are not presented in this report, which focuses on the issue of burglary.


\textsuperscript{18} Beck and Chistyakova (2001) op.cit., p.22.
Associations were found between certain demographic and socio-economic factors and fear of crime. For example, women (65%) were more likely to be very or quite concerned about crime than men (57%), a finding shared by the KCS\textsuperscript{19} and the 2000 BCS.\textsuperscript{20} Higher levels of concern were found amongst respondents between the ages of 50 and 59 (73% were either quite or very worried) than other age groups, particularly 18-29 years olds (54%). As expected, victims of crime exhibited higher levels of concern about crime than non-victims.

High levels of fear were also reported by respondents who had lived in the area for more than 20 years (67% were ‘quite’ or ‘very worried’ about crime), compared with those who had lived locally for less than one year (45%). Age is a significant factor here, although people who have lived in the area over long periods of time are also in a position to compare the current situation with previous years.

Income was also a significant factor: higher levels of concern were found amongst respondents in the first three income groups (between 60% and 65% were quite or very worried about crime), than in the two higher groups (51% of respondents in the highest and 58% in the second highest income group). These figures mirror those found in relation to respondents’ assessment of crime rates.

Respondents were also asked how concerned they were about specific crimes. The results, which are presented in Figure 3.1 over the page, show how levels of concern vary across different crimes. They show that the crime people are most concerned about is burglary: almost two-thirds of all respondents (64%) said they were quite or very worried about it. The next highest levels of concern were found amongst car owners who were worried about thefts from (58%), or of (56%) their cars, theft from a dacha (52%) and theft from a garage (50%). The least concern was expressed about racketeering (29%) and extortion (24%).

In the KCS, in contrast, the highest levels of concern were found amongst car owners: 42 per cent were worried about having their cars stolen and 39 per cent about having something stolen from their cars. The next highest level of concern was shown about burglary: 38 per

\textsuperscript{19} ibid, p.23.
Public Attitudes to Crime and Policing in Russia

Report for the Department for International Development

3.2 WORRY ABOUT BURGLARY

In addition to a general question about fear of burglary, respondents were also asked how worried they were specifically about having their homes broken into and something stolen. Table 3.3 shows how people responded.

This question confirmed that levels of concern amongst respondents were very high: around two-thirds (67%) of respondents were ‘very’ (26%) or ‘quite’ (41%) worried about having their homes broken into and something stolen. For comparison, around one-third of all respondents in Kharkiv were very (25%) or quite (13%) worried about being burgled,22 while the corresponding figures from the 2000 BCS were 38 and 19 per cent.23

Respondents taking part in the 1996 ICVS were asked a slightly different question about burglary: how likely people thought it was that they would be burgled during the coming year. Respondents in Latin America were the most pessimistic (55% thought it very likely or likely), followed by countries in transition (40%). People in Asia were least pessimistic (21%). Amongst the countries in transition, respondents in Bulgaria were most fearful of burglary (67% thought it likely or very likely that they would be burgled in the near future), followed by Russia (55%), Yugoslavia (52%), Latvia (49%) and Ukraine (46%).24

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22 ibid., p.24.
23 Kershaw et al. (2000) op. cit., p.44.
24 Zvekic (1998b) op. cit., p.84.
TABLE 3.3 EXTENT OF WORRY ABOUT BURGLARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Not worried</th>
<th>Slightly worried</th>
<th>Quite worried</th>
<th>Very worried</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>City</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smolensk</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omsk</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volgograd</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Victimisation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non burglary victims</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary victims</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Residents in Smolensk and Volgograd expressed greater levels of fear than their counterparts in Omsk: 71 per cent in Smolensk were either quite or very worried, compared with 69 per cent in Volgograd and 60 per cent in Omsk.

There were differences in terms of respondents’ characteristics. For example, female respondents were more likely to be ‘very’ worried about burglary than male respondents (29% against 21%), although an equal proportion of both sexes were ‘quite worried’ about burglary – 41 per cent. Respondents between the ages of 30 and 59 were more likely to say they were quite or very worried about burglary than those below the age of 30 or over 60: around 73 per cent of respondents in the 30-59 age groups were ‘fairly’ or ‘very worried’, compared with 60 per cent of the under 30s and over 60s.

Not surprisingly, respondents who had already been the victim of burglary were particularly concerned about this crime: 83 per cent of burglary victims were either ‘quite’ or ‘very’ worried, compared with 66 per cent of non-victims. Respondents who had been the victim of any crime during the previous 12 months were also more likely to express high levels of concern about burglary – 75 per cent were fairly or very worried, compared with 65 per cent of respondents who had not been the victims of any crime during the previous 12 months.

Socio-economic factors were also significant: those in employment were more likely to be quite or very worried about being burgled (70%) than those out of work (55%). In terms of income, just over half (51%) of those who said they had all they need were quite or very worried about having their home broken into and something stolen, compared with between 64 per cent and 69 per cent of respondents in other income categories.

The type of accommodation respondents lived in also had a bearing on fear of burglary: those who lived in high blocks of flats were most likely to be quite or very worried about burglary (74%), followed by those who lived in low blocks of flats, or houses (both 67%), and hostels (65%). Amongst respondents who live in blocks of flats, the highest levels of concern about burglary were voiced by those living on the ground floor (70% were either fairly or very worried). Finally, respondents living in privately rented accommodation expressed less concern (55% were either fairly or very worried) than those living in their own homes (67%).
3.4 HOME SECURITY

Given the high levels of concern about burglary discussed above, we could expect people in Russia to have taken all possible steps to make their homes more secure. However, as noted by Zvekic, ‘a pattern that is consistently observed in all the countries in transition is that of a low use of crime prevention measures despite a relatively high level of perceived likelihood of burglary and fear of crime’. Respondents were asked whether they took any specific measures to protect their property and presented with a list of possibilities. The distribution of results is summarised in Table 3.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precautions</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Try not to leave home empty</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double door</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better locks</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make arrangements with neighbours</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own a dog</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bars on windows</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal door</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglar alarm</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry phone</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay for a guard</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Respondents were asked to mention all the measures they had taken

The results showed that the most popular method of burglary prevention was not to leave homes/flats empty, which 44 per cent of all respondents tried to do. This is very illustrative of how the fear of crime can affect people’s behaviour and ultimately their quality of life. As a means of protecting one’s home from burglars, this is neither a practical or desirable approach in the long-term. Moreover, as we shall see in Section 5, this is not necessarily an effective means of preventing burglaries from being committed.

Various target-hardening initiatives were also popular among respondents: 41 per cent had fitted a double door, 28 per cent – better locks, 15 per cent – bars on windows, while 14 per cent had installed a metal door at the entrance to their homes. However, only 8 per cent had installed a burglar alarm, 4 per cent had installed an entry phone and 3 per cent had employed a guard – all of which are relatively expensive options for most people. Less costly measures, such as making arrangements with neighbours (22%) and keeping a dog (21%) were quite popular. Only 5 per cent of respondents had insured their property, which is a relatively costly and not necessarily reliable option for most people, as discussed later in the report.

International comparisons show that people in different countries have different preferences when it comes to home security. The three most popular forms of security amongst

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26 The Russian militia promotes burglar alarms as the most effective method of crime prevention in the home, which is not surprising, given that the MVD has a virtual monopoly on the provision of such services through a self-financing branch called the Extra-Departmental Guarding Service (EDGS). The EDGS provides security services to individuals (and businesses) in return for a one-off alarm installation fee and a monthly payment, which varies according to the type of equipment installed and the amount of ‘insurance cover’ provided. Alarm systems operate using telephone lines or radio signals and are activated and deactivated by a phone call to the control centre by the home/business owner, who is given a code word. If an intruder triggers an alarm, an armed response unit is immediately dispatched to the house/flat/business premises. The organisation prides itself on a response rate of no more than 5 minutes.
respondents in the KCS, for example, were owing a dog (32%), trying not to leave homes empty (16%) and better locks (15%). The least popular were bars on windows, burglar alarms and insurance (all mentioned by only 2% of respondents).\textsuperscript{27} According to the 1996 ICVS, the most popular measures in Russia were making arrangements with neighbours (29%), (neighbourhood) watch schemes (18%), and dogs (16%).\textsuperscript{28} In contrast, respondents in England and Wales favoured double locks (75%), window locks (75%), security lights (50%), security chains (48%) and burglar alarms (26%).\textsuperscript{29} These different approaches to home security reflect not only individual preferences, but also different types of housing, and various supply and demand factors, such as the availability and cost of security measures.

The hierarchy of results was quite similar across all three cities, with only minor differences. Generally speaking, respondents in Volgograd were less likely than their counterparts in Omsk and Smolensk to have taken specific precautions to protect their property. In particular, very few had opted for insurance (only 1%) and Volgograd also had the lowest level of burglar alarms. Respondents in Smolensk, on the other hand, had the highest take up levels in most of the categories, apart from double doors (Omsk was 5% higher) and burglar alarms (Omsk came top with 12%). Smolensk residents were least likely of the three cities to have taken no specific measures to protect their homes, which may be a reflection of the higher levels of crime and fear of crime in the city.

In terms of respondents’ income, a noticeable association was that the higher the respondent rated his/her income, the more likely they were to have taken measures to protect their home. This was true for most of the security measures that cost money – i.e. installing double doors (50% of respondents in the highest income group compared with 18% in the lowest), better locks (38% compared with 16%), bars on windows (20% compared with 14%) or metal doors (20% compared with 7%). People in the two higher income categories were three times as likely to have a burglar alarm or insurance than respondents in the two lower income categories. In contrast, respondents in the lowest income group were more likely to try not to leave their homes empty (49% compared with 38% of people in the highest income group) and most likely not to have taken any precautions at all (31% compared with 13% of the highest income group). Respondents with lower incomes were also less likely to make arrangements with their neighbours (14%, compared with between 19% and 23% in the other income groups). These figures suggest that those most in need of protecting their homes – the poor – are the group least able to afford to implement security measures, a conclusion shared with other research conducted in similar areas.\textsuperscript{30}

In spite of the high levels of concern about burglary detailed earlier, 14 per cent of all respondents had taken no precautions to protect their property. Although this compares unfavourably with the 1 per cent of respondents in the 1996 ICVS Moscow sample who had taken no precautions, it is much lower than the 36 per cent of Ukrainian respondents in the 1996 ICVS sample,\textsuperscript{31} or the 40 per cent of respondents in the KCS who said they had taken no crime prevention measures.\textsuperscript{32}

We have seen that income is a significant factor in terms of taking appropriate measures to protect property, but what were the reasons given by respondents to explain why they had taken no precautions? Those who said they took no precautions to protect their property were asked why this was the case and given a list of possible reasons. The results are presented in Table 3.5.

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{27}] Beck and Chistyakova (2001) op.cit., p.33.
\item[\textsuperscript{28}] Zvekic (1998b) op. cit., p.86.
\item[\textsuperscript{29}] Kershaw et al. (2000) op. cit., p.71.
\item[\textsuperscript{30}] For example, Mawby found that those most able to afford extra security measures were least at risk of victimisation. Mawby, R. (2001) Burglary. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, p.92.
\item[\textsuperscript{31}] Zvekic (1998b) op. cit., p.86.
\item[\textsuperscript{32}] Beck and Chistyakova (2001) op.cit., p.33.
\end{itemize}
As suspected, the cost of adopting security measures was the most significant factor for those who had taken no specific steps to secure their property. The second most commonly given reason – that nothing would make a difference – reflects a sense of fatalism that burglars will get into homes if they want to, and it is therefore pointless to try to protect them. Fewer than one in four respondents (23%) who said they had taken no precautions specified that this was because they had no fear of burglary: this is equal to only 3 per cent of the total sample.

**TABLE 3.5 REASONS GIVEN BY RESPONDENTS FOR NOT TAKING PRECAUTIONS TO PROTECT THEIR PROPERTY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too expensive</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing would make a difference</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No fear of burglary</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is not a priority</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of information</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*As a percentage of respondents who took no precautions

Differences between the cities revealed that respondents in Smolensk and Volgograd were twice as likely as respondents in Omsk to say they took no measures because this was too expensive. One in four respondents in both Smolensk and Omsk took no precautions because they were had no fear of burglary, compared with one in five in Volgograd.

Comparing income groups once again, respondents in the higher income groups were least likely of all groups to say they had taken no precautions because of the expense involved (21% compared with 33%). Within the lowest income group respondents were most likely to say they had no fear of burglary (40% – perhaps because they feel they have little to lose?), as were respondents within the highest income group (45% – perhaps because they are more reassured that their properties are well protected?) One in five people in the lowest income group said that taking security precautions was not a priority for them, compared with one in 7 in the highest income group.

In terms of gender, it was significant that women were less likely than men to say no measures had been taken owing to a lack of fear about burglary (17% of women compared with 31% of men). Men, in contrast, were more likely to say this was not a priority (15% compared with 9% of women).

### 3.5 SUMMARY

There is evidently widespread concern throughout Russia about crime rates and crime in general. The highest levels of concern, however, are caused by the fear of burglary. Although research has shown that it is common for people to overestimate the risk of victimisation, this does not mean that people’s fears are not real or should not be addressed. If we look closely at the groups of people who are most concerned about burglary, there is a clear association between their fears and the risk of victimisation, both general and specific. For example, risks are higher in Smolensk than in Omsk or Volgograd, amongst the poor, victims of burglary and other crimes, and people living in tower blocks, so it is not surprising that levels of concern are higher within these groups.

These results suggest that more could be done to alleviate people’s fears by raising awareness of the real risk of victimisation and providing them with the necessary ‘tools’ (in terms of knowledge and support) to safeguard themselves against future victimisation. Burglary victims in particular could benefit from targeted assistance, since they were the group that exhibited the highest levels of concern.
Despite these high levels of concern, home security does not appear to be a priority for large numbers of people, amongst whom there is a lack of awareness of the enhanced protection offered by such precautions. Surveys such as the BCS, however, have shown that home security measures are effective in reducing the risk of burglary, a message that could be highlighted in Russia. Of course, there are tangible reasons why people do not prioritise home security, and having looked at who takes preventative measures, the evidence clearly suggests that those in higher income groups are more able to afford to adopt home security measures than those in the lower incomes groups. Paradoxically, as we shall see in the following section, which looks in detail at the extent of burglary victimisation, it is the poor who are most likely to be at risk. In this respect, it is important to develop crime prevention initiatives that target these groups, but cost participants little or nothing (apart from their time and commitment) e.g. approaches such as neighbourhood watch schemes.
4 THE EXTENT OF BURGLARY

This section of the report considers the extent of burglary by looking at the structure of burglaries in each city and at levels of victimisation from the point of view of incidence rates (the number of offences experienced per 100 people) and prevalence rates (the percentage victimised once or more during the preceding year). It also looks at the incidence of repeat victimisation and considers which factors influence the risk of burglary.

4.1 STRUCTURE OF BURGLARY

In order to establish the total number of burglaries experienced by respondents during the previous 12 months, respondents were asked whether they had been the victim of burglary, attempted burglary, aggravated burglary or attempted aggravated burglary. The results are presented in Table 4.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of burglary</th>
<th>Smolensk No.</th>
<th>Smolensk %</th>
<th>Omsk No.</th>
<th>Omsk %</th>
<th>Volgograd No.</th>
<th>Volgograd %</th>
<th>All No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With entry (successful)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated (successful)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted aggravated</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All burglaries</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of the survey show that incidences of all forms of burglary – with entry, attempted, aggravated and attempted aggravated – were more prevalent in Smolensk than Omsk and Volgograd. In two-thirds (67%) of all incidents of burglary, entry was gained by the burglar (68% in Smolensk, 67% in Omsk and 63% in Volgograd). For comparison, according to the 2000 BCS six in ten burglaries were successful in England and Wales, while four in ten were attempts.33

Aggravated burglaries (both with entry and attempts) accounted for 14 per cent of all burglaries. This type of burglary was more common in Smolensk (18% of all burglaries) than Omsk (12%) or Volgograd (11%).

Although these figures show that the total number of burglaries with entry was 40 per cent higher in Smolensk than in either Omsk or Volgograd, while twice as many cases of aggravated or attempted aggravated burglary were reported by respondents in Smolensk than Omsk, and more than four times as many aggravated burglaries in Smolensk than Volgograd, they do not show the risk of victimisation. Incidence rates – which show the number of crimes expressed by each 100 people in the sample – and prevalence rates – the percentage of respondents who had experienced a specific crime – provide a clearer picture of risk.

4.2 INCIDENCE RATES

Incidence rates provide a better gauge of burglary rates, as they allow for comparisons to be made between different populations. Table 4.2 shows the number of burglaries experienced during the previous year per 100 inhabitants in each city.

33 Kershaw et al. (2000) op.cit., p.17.
TABLE 4.2 NUMBER OF BURGLARIES EXPERIENCED DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR PER 100 INHABITANTS (INCIDENCE RATES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of burglary</th>
<th>Smolensk Per 100 people</th>
<th>Omsk Per 100 people</th>
<th>Volgograd Per 100 people</th>
<th>Total Per 100 people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burglary with entry</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted burglary</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated burglary</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted aggravated burglary</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All burglary and attempts</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey estimated that 7.6 burglaries were committed per 100 inhabitants, 5 of which were successful (entry was gained) and 2.6 – attempts. In Smolensk, a total of 10.2 burglaries were committed per 100 inhabitants – 7 with entry and 3.2 attempts. In Omsk, the corresponding figures were 4.8 with entry and 2.3 attempts, and in Volgograd 3.4 with entry and 2 attempts.

According to the 2000 ICVS, the incidence rates for burglary were 3.4 and 3.8 for attempts in England and Wales.\(^{34}\) This suggests that a higher proportion of burglaries are unsuccessful in England and Wales, compared with Russia, perhaps owing to the more widespread use of security devices, or more people being at home when burglars struck and therefore potentially able to stop them gaining entry.\(^{35}\)

### 4.3 PREVALENCE RATES

The prevalence rate is the percentage of households or individuals who have been the victim of crime at least once during a certain period of time. According to the authors of the ICVS, this is ‘a simple but robust indicator of overall proneness to crime’.\(^{36}\) Respondents were asked whether they had been the victims of any type of burglary during the previous twelve months. The results are presented in Table 4.3 below.

TABLE 4.3 PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO HAD BEEN VICTIMS ONCE OR MORE DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of burglary</th>
<th>Smolensk Per cent</th>
<th>Omsk Per cent</th>
<th>Volgograd Per cent</th>
<th>Total Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burglary with entry</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted burglary</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated burglary</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted aggravated burglary</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All burglary and attempts(^{37})</td>
<td><strong>6.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In overall terms, there was a 5.5 per cent risk of becoming the victim of any type of burglary or attempted burglary (4.5% for burglaries and 2% for attempts). We can compare these rates with data from the 1996 ICVS, which estimated rates of 2.5 for burglary and 4.0 for attempted burglary in Russia, compared with average prevalence rates for countries in transition of 3.6 for burglary and 3.5 for attempts.\(^{38}\) The ratio between successful burglaries and attempts in the current survey is therefore the reverse of the ICVS data: more than twice as many.

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35 According to the 2000 BCS, 51% of all burglaries and attempts in England and Wales occurred while a member of the household was at home. Kershaw et al. (2000), op.cit., page 76.


37 The prevalence rates for all burglaries do not equal the sum of the risks for all types of burglary, as some victims will have experienced both types during the year.

38 Zvekic (1998b) op.cit., p.33.
successful burglaries were reported as attempts. The risk of victimisation was highest in Smolensk (6.6%), followed by Omsk (5.4%), and lowest of all in Volgograd (4.4%).

4.4 MULTIPLE/REPEAT VICTIMISATION

While prevalence rates indicate the overall proneness or risk of victimisation, they do not measure how many times people have been the victim of crime. Research in the UK has shown that crime tends to be concentrated on relatively few victims, who experience the majority of crime. For example data on the distribution of crime victimisation in the first four British Crime Surveys reveal that, ‘for property offences, the 2 per cent of people who suffer the most property crime suffer 41 per cent of all such crime captured by the surveys’. Research on the geographical distribution of crime has also revealed that certain areas have high crime rates because of the repeat victimisation of the same people in those areas rather than because more people in those areas are victimised. Measuring the extent of repeat victimisation in this survey was thus important from the point of view of identifying victims of repeats and possibly directing support at those most at risk. Respondents were asked how many times they had been the victim of any type of burglary or attempted burglary during the previous 12 months. The results are presented in Table 4.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of burglary</th>
<th>Once</th>
<th>Twice</th>
<th>Three times or more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary with entry</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted burglary</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated burglary</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted aggravated burglary</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All burglary and attempts</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures indicate that around one in four burglary victims (24%) could expect to be victimised more than once during the year. This figure can be broken down into 21 per cent for burglary (both with entry and attempts) and 18 per cent for aggravated burglary victims. These rates of repeat victimisation are very similar to the Kharkiv results, which showed that 22 per cent of burglary and 15 per cent of aggravated burglary victims were victimised more than once. The 2000 BCS does not distinguish between burglaries and aggravated burglaries, but the overall incidence of repeat victimisation for all burglary victims was 20%, suggesting that rates of repeat victimisation were fairly consistent over the three surveys. Victims were most likely to suffer repeat victimisation in Smolensk (31% were victimised more than once), followed by Omsk (27%) and Volgograd (17%).

39 The 2000 BCS showed a much narrower gap between the ratio of burglaries and attempts (2.5% for burglary and 1.9% for attempts in England and Wales) while the 2000 ICVS reported rates of 2.8 for burglary and 2.8 for attempts in England and Wales.


42 The rate of repeat victimisation for all burglaries does not equal the sum of the rates for different types of burglary because some victims will have experienced more than one type of burglary during the year.

43 Beck and Chistyakova (2001) op. cit., p.11.

44 Kershaw et al. (2000) op cit., p.68.
4.5 RISK OF BURGLARY

Certain variables are routinely used in analysing the risk of victimisation, including, age, gender, income, and housing type. The BCS has consistently shown that the risk of burglary victimisation varies considerably across households with different characteristics and in different locations, and that the poor, the disadvantaged and inner city residents are most likely to experience burglary. Do certain characteristics of individual victims or households in Russia make them particularly attractive targets for burglars? Analysis of various factors showed that, when considering which type of person was most at risk of burglary, only two variables were significant to any extent: income and housing type.

Income

In overall terms, respondents who placed themselves in the two lower income categories (not enough even for food or just enough for food, but nothing else) were around twice as likely to have been burgled as those who said they had enough for food and clothing but nothing else, had some savings, or had all that they needed (Table 4.5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough even for food</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just enough for food, but nothing else</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enough for food and clothing, but nothing else</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some savings and can sometimes afford</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have all that we need</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These overall results were statistically significant, but a more detailed analysis by city reveals interesting differences between them. For example, although the differences between the various income groups were extremely pronounced in Omsk (where the results were statistically significant), they were almost non-existent in Volgograd. In sharp contrast to the results obtained in Omsk, respondents in Smolensk who said they had all they needed were more at risk of burglary than people in other income groups. However, neither Smolensk’s nor Volgograd’s results were statistically significant.

Looking in more detail at the different types of burglary also revealed interesting trends: those who said they had all they needed (the highest income group) were twice as likely to have been the victim of aggravated burglary as those who did not have enough even for food or just enough for food but nothing else. In terms of repeat victimisation, none of the respondents from the higher income group was victimised more than once, compared with between 15 and 25 per cent of respondents in the other income groups. Although neither of these results was statistically significant, this was probably as connected with the very low numerical base.

Housing Type

Surveys have shown that certain characteristics of property or premises may affect the risk of burglary. According to the BCS, for example, flats are more at risk of burglary in England and Wales than houses. In Russia, most of the urban population live in blocks of flats, which, according to the Russian militia, offer high population densities and good access (public transport networks) for potential burglars. Our survey showed that there were

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45 ibid., op. cit., p.19.
differences in the risk of burglary depending on housing type, and that these results were significant for the sample as a whole (Table 4.6). 47 Generally speaking, the highest risk of any type of burglary was found amongst people who lived in high blocks of flats (22.9%) followed by hostels (20.5%). 48 People living in hostels or high flats were almost six times more likely to be burgled than those who lived in houses or low level blocks of flats (up to 5 storeys).

People living in high flats and hostels were also most at risk of repeat victimisation: 6.3 per cent of people living in high flats and 5.9 per cent of people living in hostels were victimised more than once, compared with only 1 per cent who lived in smaller blocks of flats and less than 1 per cent living in houses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of housing</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House/part of house</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat or room in small block</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat in high block of flats</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostel</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.6 SUMMARY

The overall results summarised in this section present a composite picture of the extent of burglary in Russia during 1999-2000. They indicate higher rates of burglary with entry than surveys previously conducted in Russia have found. This may indicate that burglary rates are higher in cities outside Moscow (where the ICVS sample is drawn from), or that burglary rates have increased since the last ICVS was conducted in 1996.

In sharp contrast with the results of the last ICVS, the survey also found that successful burglaries are more prevalent than attempts. Once again, the specifics of Moscow may have influenced the ICVS results: more people may be at home in Moscow during attempted burglaries, or residents may enjoy greater protection from burglary (in terms of household security) than outside the capital city.

Certain groups of the population were seen to be more at risk of victimisation from burglary than others, in particular those with low incomes and those who live in blocks of flats and hostels. People on low incomes were not only more likely to suffer burglary, but also to experience repeat victimisation. Initiatives to combat burglary should therefore be targeted mainly at these groups with the aim of reducing their vulnerability.

47 When broken down by city, only Omsk’s results were statistically significant, while Smolensk’s and Volgograd’s were not.
48 Hostels are not inhabited only by students in Russia, but also by workers and professional people. The widespread use of hostels (which provide rooms for single people and families, with shared bathrooms and kitchens) dates back to the extreme housing shortages of the Soviet era. It was not uncommon then for young people to begin married life in hostels, where they waited for flats to become available or be built. Since it is a form of communal living, it is not surprising that burglary is widespread in this type of accommodation.
5 THE NATURE OF BURGLARY

This section examines the nature of burglary, including when burglaries occur, the point and method of entry, victim responsibility, contact with the offenders, and the impact upon victims. It is based on data collected from the second part of the survey – aimed specifically at the victims of any type of burglary or attempted burglary during the previous year. Respondents were asked to talk in more detail about last incident they had experienced. Not all burglary victims agreed to answer the second set of questions, as a result of which the data in this section is based on a sample of 248, rather than the total number of victims of (aggravated) burglary or attempted (aggravated) burglary (n=316).

5.1 WHEN BURGLARIES OCCUR

Time of Year

The results of the survey indicated that burglaries increased during the summer months – especially August and September, which together accounted for 23 per cent of all burglaries (32% in Smolensk, 21% in Omsk and 17% in Volgograd). However, rates were also high in February, March and April (Figure 5.1).

Local research suggests that burglaries tend to peak during the summer months because people are more likely not to be home for longer periods of time, particularly those with dachas or allotments, who spend a lot of time working their plots of land after work and during the weekends. The warmer weather also means that doors and windows are more likely to be left open, providing easy targets for burglars.

Time of Week

As Table 5.1 shows, more than three-quarters of all burglaries were committed during the week, when people tend to be out at work, leaving homes empty for long periods of time during the day.

49 It is traditional and widespread in Russia to have a family allotment or other plot of land on which to grow vegetables and fruit during the summer months to help supplement family incomes during the winter months.
TABLE 5.1 WHEN THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>During the week</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At the weekend</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In most cases (83%), burglaries occurred when no one was home, although this figure varied slightly between cities, from 76 per cent in Volgograd to 82 per cent in Omsk and 87 per cent in Smolensk. In 12 per cent of incidents, homes had been left empty for less than one hour, in 27 per cent for between 1 and 3 hours and in 47 per cent, between 3 and 24 hours. In only 14 per cent of all cases of burglary had premises been left unoccupied for more than 24 hours.

For comparison, according to the 2000 BCS, 29 per cent of all burglaries in England and Wales took place at the weekend and 71 per cent during the week. More than half (51%) of all burglaries occurred while someone was at home.\(^{50}\)

**Time of Day**

As shown in Figure 5.2 below, two-thirds of burglaries (65%) were committed during the morning or afternoon, but the peak time for burglaries was during the afternoon (between midday and 6pm). This was true for all three cities.

![FIGURE 5.2 TIME OF DAY OF BURGLARIES](image)

Comparing these results with the 2000 BCS, half (47%) of burglaries in England and Wales occurred during the morning or afternoon, while a slight majority occurred during the evening or night (53%). The peak times for burglaries are between 6pm and midnight (26%) and midday to 6pm (25%).\(^{51}\)

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\(^{50}\) Kershaw et al. (2000) op. cit., pp.75-76. This figure excludes ‘don’t knows’. Although 51% of victims were home during the burglary, 25% were not aware of what was happening, 4% were aware, but did not see the offender, while 22% were aware and did see the offenders.

\(^{51}\) Kershaw et al. (2000) op. cit., p.75.
5.2 POINT AND METHOD OF ENTRY

From the point of view of target hardening, it was important to establish how offenders gained access to properties. Table 5.2 shows that most burglars gain entry through the door of the targeted property, which is not surprising given that most people live in blocks of flats in Russian cities.

### TABLE 5.2 POINT OF ENTRY/ATTEMPTED ENTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point of entry</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Through the door</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through the window</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other way (roof/cellar etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3 below provides more detail on how burglars gain entry to homes via the door. It shows that the most popular methods of gaining access are to force or break the lock, or to break, cut or remove a panel of the door or beside the door, which together accounted for almost two-thirds (63%) of all cases of burglary where entry was gained via the door.

### TABLE 5.3 HOW ACCESS WAS GAINED THROUGH DOORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forced/broke the lock</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broke/cut/removed panel of door/beside door</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They had a key</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By false pretences</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Door was not locked</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pushed past the person who opened the door</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In more than one in five cases of burglary, however, the offender had easy access to the premises, either because the door was not locked (5%) or they had a key (17%). According to the Russian militia, the fact that such a high percentage of burglars had access to keys – especially in Smolensk – does not suggest that the offender was known to the householder in one way or another, but that they used skeleton keys or other lock-picking devices to gain entry to flats. Respondents in Volgograd were three times as likely as those in the other cities to say that the door had been open, which is consistent with the finding that in one-quarter of burglaries in the city, a member of the family was at home when the burglar struck.

A similar picture is painted by data on access via windows: the most popular method of access was using brute force to break the glass or to force window locks or catches, which together accounted for almost four-fifths (78%) of all incidents. However, in 17 per cent of cases, easy access was provided by householders who had either left windows open or not closed them securely (Table 5.4).
TABLE 5.4 HOW ACCESS WAS GAINED THROUGH WINDOWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Tried to) break/cut glass</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Tried to) force window lock/catch</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Window was open/could be pushed open</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>101%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once again, a significant number of households were burgled as a result of negligence on the part of the householder, especially in Omsk where more than one-quarter of cases were facilitated by an open window.

5.3 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BURGLARY

As we saw previously, in some cases victims facilitated burglaries by failing to take appropriate measures or steps to prevent them. In order to establish the extent of this problem, respondents were asked whether they believed anyone else, apart from the offender, was responsible for what happened. The results are summarised below in Table 5.5.

TABLE 5.5 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BURGLARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The offender alone</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The respondent</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other household member</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person responsible for guarding property</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than three in five (61%) burglary victims considered the offender alone to be responsible for the offence. Respondents in Volgograd were most likely to allocate all blame to the offender (78%), and least likely in Omsk, where slightly more than half (53%) of the respondents blamed the offender alone. It is interesting to note here that burglary victims in Russia were much more likely than victims in England and Wales to consider someone else apart from the offender responsible for the offence: only 19 per cent of respondents in England and Wales said someone else was responsible for the burglary in the 1998 BCS,\(^{52}\) while 40 per cent of respondents in the current survey believed that some responsibility lay with others, usually the respondent or another member of the household, who together ‘contributed’ to more than one-third (39%) of all burglaries. The ways in which they were believed to have been responsible are outlined in Table 5.6.

Respondents in all three cities were most likely to say they had been too naïve or trusting in relation to the offender, which had facilitated the offence: 44 per cent of all respondents, including more than half of those in Smolensk who thought they were in some way responsible for allowing the offence to take place, blamed their naïveté or excessive trust.

\(^{52}\) This figure peaked in 1982 at 25% – still lower than the corresponding figure in the current survey. Budd (1999) op. cit., p.23.
TABLE 5.6 WAYS IN WHICH OTHER PEOPLE WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR BURGLARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too naïve/trusting</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provoked offender</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed to lock door/window</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed to set burglar alarm</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed to hide something away</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed to close door/window</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed to lock something away</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>101</strong></td>
<td><strong>101</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the militia, one widely reported example of this involves householders allowing strangers or people with whom they are barely acquainted into their homes for one reason or another – usually the consumption of alcohol. It is not unheard of, for example, for people to invite relative strangers to their homes for drinking sessions, having met them while buying alcohol. Although the loss of property in such instances would not count as burglary in the UK, but as theft (no trespass), in Russia such cases do constitute burglary.

The next most likely response – mentioned by 13 per cent of respondents – was that they had provoked the offender in some way, possibly by flaunting new goods, although the survey did not go into detail on how exactly this was done. Most of the other reasons related to the respondents’ failure to secure their property and belongings in one way or another, which together accounted for more than one-third of all incidents. More than 42 per cent of respondents in Volgograd shouldered some of the responsibility for the offence as a result of their failure to lock a door or window (25%) or to close a door or window (17%).

There were differences between different demographic and socio-economic groups, some of which were significant and others not. Male respondents were more likely than female respondents to say that they had been too trusting or naïve (50% compared with 39%). Men were also more likely to say that they had provoked the offender, or failed to lock or bolt a door or window. Female respondents were more likely than men to say they had failed to set the burglar alarm, or to hide something away, but these results were not statistically significant.

Respondents in the 40-49 age group were almost twice as likely to have been too trusting or naïve than people in the 18-29 age group. Younger respondents were twice as likely as those in the 40-49 age group, and four times as likely as 30-39 years olds to have provoked offenders. Next to being too naïve or trusting, people in the 30-39 age group were most likely to have failed to set the burglar alarm, while respondents in the 40-49 were more likely to have failed to hide something away.

5.4 CONTACT WITH THE OFFENDER

In overall terms, 83 per cent of all burglaries occurred when no one was home, although this figure varied slightly between cities, from 76 per cent in Volgograd to 82 per cent in Omsk and 87 per cent in Smolensk. These figures show that even the form of burglary prevention most favoured by respondents – trying not to leave the property empty – is not always effective.

The Use of Force/Violence

In cases where victims were at home, they were able to say whether offenders were armed with any kind of weapon. Offenders were least likely to have weapons in Volgograd, followed
by Omsk, and most likely in Smolensk, where twice as many offenders as in Omsk or Volgograd were ‘armed’ in some way (Table 5.7).

**TABLE 5.7 POSSESSION OF WEAPONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fact that such a high percentage of offenders were not armed in any way (77%) may also suggest that some of them had not broken or forced their way in to the property, but were in fact invited in, as suggested previously. Amongst those who were armed in some way, the most likely weapons in their possession were knives (32%) and other stabbing implements such as screwdrivers (30%) or some sort of gun (24%). Violence or force was used against 28 per cent of respondents who were at home at the time of the burglary. Offenders were more likely to use violence in Smolensk (36% of victims experienced force or violence), followed by Omsk (27%) and Volgograd (21%). For comparison, a much lower level of violence was reported in the 2000 BCS – only 9%.\(^{53}\)

5.5 **IMPACT UPON VICTIMS**

**Stolen Property**

Overall, four in every five cases of burglary resulted in the loss of property (Table 5.8). For comparison, property was stolen in just two in five cases of burglary with entry in England and Wales in 1998.\(^{54}\) Burglary was most likely to lead to a loss of property in Volgograd (86% of burglary victims lost property), and Omsk (81%), and although less likely in Smolensk, three in four burglary victims nevertheless lost property.

**TABLE 5.8 WHETHER ANYTHING WAS STOLEN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Burglars in Russia have a preference for certain types of goods, as Table 5.9 below shows. The most commonly stolen items were jewellery, (mentioned by 40% of all burglary victims), closely followed by clothing (37%), cash (36%), televisions (35%), and video equipment (34%).

Jewellery is attractive to burglars given the ease with which it can be concealed or carried off and re-sold. ‘Clothes’ most likely refers to expensive items of clothing such as leather and fur coats and hats, which are not so much a luxury as a necessity in Russia, given the harsh winters experienced throughout the country. Such items of clothing are also highly prized by burglars for their re-sale value. Television, video and household electrical equipment is also relatively easy to ‘fence’, along with stereo equipment.

\(^{53}\) Kershaw et al. (2000) op. cit., p.21.
Items less likely to be stolen during the course of the burglary are found towards the bottom of the table. While few respondents reported the theft of video cameras and computer equipment, it should be noted that these items are relatively expensive and therefore relatively rare as yet in Russia.

### TABLE 5.9 ITEMS STOLEN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewellery</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothes</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video equipment</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household electrical goods</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereo/hifi equipment</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purse/wallet</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video camera</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer/equipment</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage of respondents who said they had lost these items as a result of burglary

There were slight differences between the cities, with cash more likely to be stolen in Omsk, while clothing came top in Volgograd and jewellery in Smolensk. As a result of the high cost of many of these items, the financial losses incurred from a single case of burglary can be very high. Very little of the losses are ever compensated for, for example, less than 5 per cent in Omsk in 2000 according to police data.

### Other Losses

In addition to stolen property, around two-thirds of burglary victims (61%) also experienced other material losses, mainly involving damage to their property, as summarised in Table 5.10.

### TABLE 5.10 EXTENT OF OTHER DAMAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of damage</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The door/window was damaged</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The door/window locks were damaged</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property inside the flat/house was damaged</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The outside of the property was damaged</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While no other damage to property was sustained in two-fifths (39%) of cases, in more than half of the incidents reported, damage was sustained to either windows or doors, or window or door locks. In a further 10 per cent of cases damage was sustained either inside or outside the property. No other damage was more likely to be incurred in Omsk (48%) and Volgograd (47%), than in Smolensk (28%). According to the 2000 BCS, additional damage to property was also sustained in 61 per cent of burglaries in England and Wales, but no details are available on the different types of damage incurred.55

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55 Kershaw et al. (2000) op. cit., p.22.
Insurance Cover

Very little of the property stolen as a result of burglary was covered by an insurance policy, as shown in Table 5.11. Only 8 per cent of burglary victims had insurance, compared with 54 per cent of victims in the 1998 BCS who said they had home contents insurance. The lowest rate of insurance cover was found in Volgograd, where just 2 per cent of burglary victims had insured their property against such an event. The highest rate of insurance cover was found in Omsk, where 15 per cent of those who experienced burglary had insurance – almost twice the rate of insurance cover amongst burglary victims in Smolensk.

**TABLE 5.11 EXTENT OF INSURANCE COVER FOR STOLEN PROPERTY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These low levels of insurance cover were not unexpected since, unlike in the West, insurance cover is neither widespread nor comprehensive in countries in transition. In the early 1990s, the lack of insurance cover in Russia was attributed to both the low level of personal property owned by the public and their lack of confidence in insurance companies. However, while these factors may continue to play a part in people’s reluctance to take out insurance, financial considerations are also likely to influence decisions.

Emotional Impact

In addition to its financial impact, burglary can have very serious emotional effects on victims, who may feel that their privacy has been invaded or their safety undermined. In order to establish how much impact burglary had on victims in Russia, respondents were asked whether the burglary had affected them ‘a little’, ‘a lot’, or ‘very much’. The results showed that generally speaking, burglary victims had quite strong reactions to the incident, with more than 83 per cent claiming they were affected ‘very much’ or ‘a lot’, compared with just 17 per cent who said they were affected only ‘a little’ (Table 5.12).

**TABLE 5.12 EXTENT TO WHICH VICTIMS WERE AFFECTED BY BURGLARY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For comparison, 29 per cent of burglary victims who took part in the 2000 BCS were affected very much, 30 per cent quite a lot, 28 per cent just a little, while 13 per cent were not affected.

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56 Budd (1999) op. cit., p.33.
57 Zvekic (1998b) op.cit., p87.
at all.59 Victims in Russia thus seem to be more severally affected by their experiences of burglary than UK victims, a finding shared by research in other Eastern Europe countries.60 Respondents in Volgograd were most likely to say they had been affected very much or a lot (92%), compared with 80 per cent in both Omsk and Smolensk. Consequently, fewer than one in ten said they had been affected only a little in Volgograd compared with around one in five respondents in Smolensk and Omsk. No associations were found in terms of respondents’ socio-economic or demographic backgrounds and the emotional impact of burglary.

In addition to their overall reaction to the burglary, respondents were also asked what specific reactions they had. More than four in five burglary victims had one or more specific emotional reactions after the incident, as summarised in Table 5.13.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reaction</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shock</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crying/tears</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty sleeping</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In overall terms, respondents were most likely to report feeling anger (46%), shock (39%) and fear (34%), the same three emotions identified most often by burglary victims in the 2000 BCS (anger – 68%; shock – 38%, fear – 33%).61 The emphasis was different in each city, with a majority of respondents saying they were angry in Volgograd (61%), afraid in Omsk (63%) and shocked in Smolensk (43%).

Analysis between groups showed that different victims were affected differently: for example, although men and women had quite similar emotional reactions to burglary, more women than men experienced fear (45% compared with 37%) and cried (24% against 19%). Younger people were slightly more likely to feel shocked (56%) than angry (52%), while for all other age groups, anger was the most likely response.

Although the emotional impact of burglary was evidently severe, very few burglary victims sought, or were offered help from any particular group or organisation following the burglary. Table 5.14 shows that a majority of burglary victims did not seek or were not offered help from anyone (48%), but that when they did seek help, they primarily turned to their families and friends (40%), and much less frequently to the militia (12%).

59 Kershaw et al. (2000) op. cit., p.78. These figures are for all burglary: the corresponding figures for burglary with entry were 36%, 33%, 21%, and 11%, i.e. still lower than the figures for the current study.
60 For example, Mawby found that respondents in Eastern Europe were more likely to report being affected ‘very much’ than respondents in the UK (Mawby, 2001, op. cit., p.38).
61 Kershaw et al. (2000) op. cit., p.66.
TABLE 5.14 SOURCES OF HELP SOUGHT OR OFFERED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of help</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All Per cent*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No-one</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family/friends/relatives/neighbours</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim support organisations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage of burglary victims who chose this response

The fact that respondents were not offered, or did not seek help does not necessarily imply that some sort of assistance was not required by victims, but more probably that it was not readily, if at all, available. Respondents were therefore also asked which type of support or advice they wanted immediately following the incident from a list of possible responses: the results are presented in Table 5.15.

TABLE 5.15 TYPES OF SUPPORT VICTIMS WANTED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of support</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All Per cent*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information from the militia</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection from further victimisation/harassment</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advice on security/crime prevention</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical help</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal advice</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help with reporting/dealing with the militia</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Someone to talk to/moral support</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help with insurance/compensation</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None/don’t want support</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage of burglary victims who chose this response

As we can see, only one in ten burglary victims said they did not want any help or support, which confirms the hypothesis that victims are not getting the level of support or assistance they require. Respondents were most likely to request support and advice from the militia – both in the form of information (38%) and protection from further victimisation and harassment (37%). However, there was also a definite level of demand for more general information on crime prevention and security, and for practical, legal and emotional support. Some respondents also wanted help dealing with the militia, which once again suggests that there is some aspect of this that victims do not feel comfortable with. Generally speaking, there is clearly a high level of unmet need in the area of victim support in Russia – whether provided by the militia or other agencies – in terms of both quantity and quality of services provided.

The Impact of Burglary on Security Consciousness

Given the financial and emotional impact of burglary, we could expect that burglary victims would improve their home security arrangements following burglaries. In order to establish the extent to which this may be the case, respondents were asked whether they took any specific measures to avoid becoming a victim of burglary again. The results showed that three-quarters (75%) of victims had taken specific steps following burglaries to avoid becoming a victim again. However, there were differences between the cities: respondents in Omsk were most likely to have taken specific steps (86%) compared with Volgograd (75%)

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62 The category ‘Other’ includes doctor/hospital/psychiatrist/psychologist (2%); social services (2%); employers (2%); school/education department (1%); trade unions (1%).
and Smolensk (69%). The survey did not expand on the reasons why 25 per cent of respondents had not adopted any specific measures, but the reasons are likely to fall into the same categories identified previously in Table 3.5 (Page 20), i.e. too expensive, nothing would make a difference etc.

While victims in Omsk were most likely to have taken specific measures to protect themselves from repeat victimisation, the survey results revealed that they were more prone to repeat victimisation than their counterparts in Smolensk and Volgograd: 25 per cent of burglary victims had been victimised more than once in Omsk, compared with 17 per cent in Smolensk and 12 per cent in Volgograd.63

Although the over 60s appeared the least likely to have taken specific measures – only 50 per cent of them had – this was not statistically significant. The unemployed (64%) were less likely than those in employment (77%) or not economically active (74%) to take measures, but this was also not significant. People living in privately rented accommodation were twice as likely not to have taken any precautions as those living in flats/houses owned by themselves (36% of the former had taken no precautions, compared with 18% of the latter).

Being the victim of other crimes makes people more security conscious: almost four in five respondents (79%) who had been the victim of other crimes during the previous 12 months had taken specific measures to avoid becoming the victim of burglary again, compared with fewer than half (48%) of the respondents who had not been the victim of other crimes during the previous 12 months.

There was also a significant association between victims’ level of education and the likelihood of implementing security measures following burglary: the higher the level of education, the more likely respondents were to have taken measures following burglary (only 33% of those with primary or incomplete secondary education compared with 83% of respondents with higher/further education).

5.6 SUMMARY

The results in this section show that, although the experience of burglary differs in the details, the overall effects are likely to be very similar in terms of the financial and emotional impact. Financially, burglary has arguably more of an impact in Russia than in the West because insurance is not widespread, making it much more difficult for people to replace stolen property. Emotionally, victims are profoundly affected by their experiences, but their needs in terms of dealing with the aftermath of burglary are not currently catered for in Russia, whether in terms of coping with the loss of property or obtaining practical, legal or emotional support. Demand clearly exists for such services, which could help to alleviate some of the more non-tangible effects of burglary for the victim.

The fact that victims also said they needed help to deal with the militia suggests that people find some aspect of this difficult or perplexing, which may be connected with their perceptions of the militia or to previous experiences of the militia’s treatment of victims. Whatever the causes, there is evidently a need to improve communication between the two groups. There is clearly an overlap between the types of support victims most want – information, protection from further victimisation, and crime prevention advice. Although much of this could come from the militia, there is also scope here for bringing in external specialised assistance to provide more focused support, especially in terms of victims’ emotional well being.

63 These figures differ from the ones given in section 4 because they include only those victims who agreed to participate in the second part of the survey for burglary victims, which was not all the respondents who said they had been victimised during the previous year.
6 REPORTING INCIDENTS OF BURGLARY TO THE MILITIA

This section looks at reporting rates and what motivates victims of burglaries to report burglaries to the police. Throughout the world, the police rely on the public to report crimes to them. Reporting behaviour, however, is not uniform around the world, but varies between countries and crimes. On the whole, burglary tends to be a well reported crime: according to the 1996 ICVS, for example, 62 per cent of all burglaries were reported to the police, compared to 39 per cent of robberies and 28 per cent of assaults. 64 Although reporting rates for domestic burglary tend to be higher in Western than Eastern Europe, rates in Eastern Europe increased from 51 per cent in 1992 to 68 per cent in 1996. 65 In Russia, however, reporting rates for burglary with entry increased only slightly during this period from 61 per cent in 1992 (the second highest after Slovenia of the 7 ‘transition’ countries that participated in the 1992 survey) to 63 per cent in 1996, 66 while just over one-third of attempted burglaries were reported to the militia in 1996. 67 These figures suggest that victims in Moscow did not report at least one in three burglaries and two in three attempted burglaries to the militia, but is this situation the same outside the capital city?

6.1 EXTENT OF REPORTING

In overall terms, the survey results showed that the two crimes most likely to have been reported by respondents were burglary (86% of respondents said they reported the incident to the militia) and aggravated burglary (83%). Respondents who said they had been victims of burglary were also asked whether or not the militia had come to know about the incident. The results show that the militia came to know about the incident in 85 per cent of cases (Table 6.1). The militia were most likely to find out about burglaries in one way or another in Omsk (89%), followed by Smolensk (84%) and Volgograd (81%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These rates are surprisingly high – much higher than corresponding rates in the KCS and the ICVS. For example, the reporting rate in Kharkiv was 40 per cent for burglary and 85 per cent for aggravated burglary, compared with the ICVS rate of 50 per cent for Ukraine and 62.5 per cent in Russia. 68 One possible explanation for the high rates found by the present study is the fact that a much higher percentage of burglaries reported by victims were successful (i.e. with entry) than attempted, making victims more prepared to report incidents to the militia.

64 Zvekic (1998b) op. cit., p. 66. These figures combine the rates for 1989, 1992 and 1996.
66 Zvekic (1996) op.cit., p.49.
67 Timoshenko (1998) op. cit.
68 Zvekic (1998b) op. cit., p.67.
However, it may also be that reporting trends are changing since a recent study conducted in Moscow found that respondents had reported burglaries to the militia in 69 per cent of cases.\textsuperscript{69}

In more than four-fifths of cases the respondent or someone else in the household was responsible for informing the militia about the incident (Table 6.2). A further 14 per cent were reported by someone else. The militia was present at the scene of the crime in very few cases – only 3 per cent of the total.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 6.2 HOW THE MILITIA CAME TO KNOW ABOUT INCIDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia told by respondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia told by another person in household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia told by other person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia were there</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia found out from another source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were slight variations between the cities, but on the whole the victim or a member of their household was most likely to have informed the militia. The militia were at the scene of the crime only in Omsk, while in Smolensk and Volgograd, this was never the case.

Table 6.3 shows that respondents preferred to inform the militia of burglary by telephone (59%), followed by writing to them (27%) or going to the station (11%). Respondents in Smolensk were most likely to contact the militia by telephone, as were respondents in Volgograd, while respondents in Omsk were more likely to inform them in writing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 6.3 MEANS OF COMMUNICATION USED TO INFORM MILITIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By letter (in writing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In person at station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Someone else reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These differences may result from individual preferences, or the characteristics of victims/towns. For example, fewer burglaries were reported in Omsk by telephone, possibly because fewer people have telephones. There were, however, no statistically significant associations between victims’ demographic or socio-economic characteristics and how they reported crimes to the militia.

### 6.2 REASONS FOR NOT REPORTING BURGLARY

Respondents who did not report burglaries to the militia were asked why they had decided not to do so. The results are presented in Table 6.4 below. As can be seen, the main reason given by respondents who chose not to report incidents was that they considered it pointless to do so, an opinion shared by exactly half of all those who did not report burglaries to the militia. Around one-third (31%) of all victims chose not to report offences because insignificant

damage had been done, while one-fifth did not report because the attempted break-in was unsuccessful; 17 per cent of victims believed that the break-in was, to some extent, their own fault and therefore did not report the crime, while 14 per cent had dealt with the matter themselves.

**TABLE 6.4 REASONS WHY THE MILITIA DID NOT BECOME AWARE OF THE INCIDENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is useless to report</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insignificant damage</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempt at offence was unsuccessful</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It was, to some extent, my fault</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deal with matter myself</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private/personal/family matter</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afraid of bureaucratic delays</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation received from offender</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not trust the militia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons70</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage of respondents who chose this option: respondents could choose up to three responses

Owing to the small numerical base (n=36), a more detailed analysis of demographic or socio-economic characteristics would not have produced meaningful results. We can, however, compare these general results with other survey results. The most common reason given by respondents in the Kharkiv Crime Survey for not reporting burglaries was also that it was useless to report, although this was mentioned by fewer than one-third of the respondents in Kharkiv, compared with 50 per cent of all respondents in the current survey.71 The next most common response in Kharkiv was ‘reported to other authorities’, which was mentioned by 29% of respondents, but by none of the respondents in the current survey.72

The 1996 ICVS covered broadly similar, though differently worded, categories. It reported that the main reasons given by respondents in countries in transition for not reporting burglaries were because the police could or would do nothing (45%), the burglary was not serious enough (27%), and that they solved the crime themselves (13%).73 The main reasons given by respondents in Moscow for not reporting burglary with entry in the 1996 ICVS were that the militia could do nothing (34% of all respondents), it was inappropriate to report the crime to the militia (22%), the offence was not sufficiently serious to warrant reporting (20%), or the victim had solved the crime without the help of the police (13%).74 Finally, according to the 2000 British Crime Survey, the most common reasons given for not reporting burglaries in England and Wales were too trivial/no loss (40%), the police couldn’t do anything (30%), and it was a private matter/dealt with it ourselves (26%).75

These results point to a general lack of public confidence or trust in the militia/police and their willingness or ability to solve burglary-related crimes, whether the respondents are in Ukraine, Russia or England and Wales.

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70 Other reasons included the fear of reprisal by offender, inconvenience and advice from people close to the victim, which were each mentioned by 3% of all victims who chose not to report burglaries to the militia.
72 ibid., p.17.
73 Zvekic (1998b) op. cit., p.73.
75 Kershaw et al. (2000) op.cit., p.65.
6.3 REASONS FOR REPORTING BURGLARY

Respondents who said they had reported incidents to the militia were asked the main reason why they did so. The results (Table 6.5) show that the most common reason given for reporting burglaries was to recover stolen property, which was mentioned by 42 per cent of all respondents. Around one in four respondents (24%) believed that all crimes should be reported, in other words, they reported the crime out of a sense of civic duty. Many fewer victims reported the crime in the hope of avoiding a repetition of the crime to themselves or other people, or to obtain assistance. However, this does not mean that these reasons were unimportant, but only that the respondents’ priorities lay elsewhere in this instance.

**TABLE 6.5 MAIN REASONS WHY THE INCIDENT WAS REPORTED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the hope that property would be recovered</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All crimes should be reported/right thing to do</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious/major/upsetting crime</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the hope that offenders would be caught/punished</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To avoid a repetition of the crime to oneself</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To avoid a repetition of the crime to other people</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needed assistance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were noticeable differences between groups in terms of their demographic and socio-economic characteristics, but they were not statistically significant. For example, all age groups gave priority to getting property back, ranging from 31 per cent of 30-39 year olds to 78 per cent of the over 60s. Around one third of 30-59 year olds considered it their civic duty to report the crime, compared with only 15 per cent of 18-29 year olds and just 11 per cent of the over 60s. Twice as many 18-29 year olds as 30-39 and 50-59 year olds reported crimes in the hope that the offenders would be caught and punished. In terms of educational background, respondents with only primary or incomplete secondary education were around three times as likely as respondents with secondary and higher education to say they reported the incident in the hope that the offenders would be caught and punished.

Although most sub groups were particularly interested in getting back their stolen property, the most likely response given by one group – those who said they had all they need in terms of income – bucked this trend: exactly half of the respondents in this group said they reported offences because they were serious, major or upsetting, compared with 38 per cent who said it was in the hope that property would be recovered. This was the only instance where the option of recovering property was not given priority, but, although an interesting difference, it was not statistically significant.

International comparisons show that recovering property is the main priority of burglary victims in countries in transition (57.5%), Asia (82.2%), Africa (72.6%) and Latin America (53.2%), but not so high a priority in the New World (17.4%) or Western Europe (31.2%). In countries in transition, the next most commonly given reasons after recovering property are so that the offender is caught and punished (51.4%), because all crimes should be reported (37.4%), and in the hope of avoiding the crime being repeated (27%). The 1996 ICVS reported that in Russia more than half of respondents gave priority to recovering property, followed by ‘it was the right thing to do/all crimes should be reported’ (49.6%), in the hope that the offender was caught and punished (47.4%) and they needed assistance (36.8%).

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76 ibid., p.70.
77 Timoshenko (1998) op.cit., p.474. Respondents were allowed to choose more than one answer, hence the higher percentages.
1998 BCS also asked victims why they reported burglaries to the police: the most commonly
given reasons were that crimes should be reported (51%) and to punish or catch the offender
(45%). Fewer than one in four respondents (23%) said they reported the crime because it was
serious, while 22 per cent said it was for insurance reasons.78

6.4 INSURANCE AND REPORTING

In the Western world, insurance is largely considered to be the main motivation behind the
decision to report burglaries to the police.79 According to the 1996 ICVS, for example, 43.2
per cent of respondents in Western Europe reported burglaries to the police for insurance
reasons, compared with 26.2 per cent in Latin America, 22.8 per cent in the New World, 15.0
per cent in countries in transition, 13.1 per cent in Africa and just 4.4 per cent in Asia.80

In the current survey, respondents were also offered the option of replying ‘for the purposes
of an insurance claim’ when asked why they chose to report burglaries to the militia.
However, although 8 per cent of burglary victims were insured, no one said they reported the
burglary to the militia for insurance purposes. It would therefore appear that insurance is not
one of the factors that motivate people in Russia to report crimes to the militia, even if they
are insured. The priority of burglary victims throughout the world, however, is the same – to
recover stolen property – whether directly (via the police) or indirectly (via insurance). If
victims report crimes to the militia, there is some chance – however small – that they may get
some of their property back.

6.5 SUMMARY

The reporting rates found by the survey were unexpectedly high, more on a par with Western,
than Eastern European rates. However, different factors may have played a part here: it is
possible, for example, that the results were affected by the fact that not all respondents who
said they had been the victim of burglaries subsequently answered the second set of questions
for burglary victims, which may have skewed the results. Secondly, some victims who said
they reported burglaries to the militia may not have done so, but may have told the
interviewer what they thought they wanted to hear. It is also possible that some victims
thought the burglary had been reported by another member of the household, when in fact it
had not.

However, it may also be the case that more people are genuinely reporting burglaries to the
militia for very plausible reasons: for example, it was suggested by the militia in Volgograd
that people are now more likely to report burglaries because financial hardship has made it
increasingly unlikely that they will be able to replace stolen property, most of which, as we
have seen, is not insured. In the absence of a reliable insurance system, the return of stolen
property is crucial, but anecdotal evidence suggests that, although burglary is a significant
problem in Russia, recovering stolen goods is not high on the list of the militia’s priorities.
This would appear to be reflected in the fact that surveys repeatedly conclude that victims fail
to report incidents to the militia because they do not believe the latter will be, or are capable
of doing anything to recover stolen goods, a finding shared by the current research. While it is
ultimately the job of the militia to deal with this problem, their work could be facilitated by an
active programme of property marking, to improve the chances of identifying and returning
stolen goods to their owners. Greater effectiveness in this area would doubtless lead to higher
levels of public satisfaction and confidence in the militia, which could more generally have
beneficial consequences for future cooperation between the public and the militia.

78 Budd (1999) op.cit., p.69.
79 See, for example, Mawby (2001) op. cit., p.42.
80 Zvekic (1998b) op. cit., p.70.
7 THE MILITIA'S RESPONSE

When a member of the public contacts the militia to report a burglary, it is anticipated that certain procedures will be followed, most of which are routine. For example, it is expected that the militia will visit the crime scene and investigate any losses experienced by the victim/household. Guidelines for the Russian militia specify that an ‘investigating group’ of 5 people should respond to burglaries: an investigator from the Public Prosecutor’s Office, an inspector from the Criminal Investigation Department, the local beat officer, a criminal law expert and a dog handler, but this is not automatic and will depend on many factors, including the seriousness of the incident and the availability of resources.

To a great extent, public satisfaction is conditioned by how effectively and efficiently the militia is seen to respond to reports of crime (the time-lapse between reporting a crime and meeting the militia, where the meeting takes place, etc.). In addition to this, victims are also interested in how they perform these tasks (the amount of interest shown by the militia, how they treat the victim and so on). This section analyses how the militia dealt with burglaries and the extent to which respondents were satisfied with the militia’s handling of their cases.

7.1 MILITIA PROCEDURES

Face-to-Face Contact

Table 7.1 shows that in 85 per cent of cases, the victim had face-to-face contact with a police officer to discuss the incident (68% with the victim directly and 16% with another member of the household).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, the respondent</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, someone else in the household</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, no face-to-face contact</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/can’t remember</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only 12 per cent of victims had no face-to-face contact with the militia regarding the incident, while 4 per cent could not remember or didn’t know. Levels of contact were very similar across the three cities, with 82 per cent in Smolensk, 85 per cent in Volgograd and 86 per cent in Omsk reporting at least one family member having contact with the militia to discuss the incident.

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81 Research in the UK on victim satisfaction found that there were 6 main aspects of satisfaction: how quickly the police reached the victims’ dwellings, how long the police spend there, the way the officers treat the victim, the number of different visits made by police personnel, how well the victim is kept informed of progress, whether or not the victims’ property is recovered and the outcome of the investigation: Coupe, T. and Griffiths, M. (1999) ‘The Influence of Police Actions on Victim Satisfaction in Burglary Investigations’. International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 27, pp. 413-431.
Location of Meetings with the Militia

Around two-thirds (67%) of meetings with the militia took place at the home of the victim, i.e. the scene of the crime, which suggests that the militia did not visit one in three homes where burglaries had taken place (Table 7.2).

**TABLE 7.2 MILITIA VISITS TO THE SCENE OF THE INCIDENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although an average of one-third of all homes where burglaries had taken place were not visited by the militia, this figure was much higher in Volgograd, where more than two-fifths of burglaries did not warrant a visit to the scene of the incident for one reason or another. From the point of view of investigating incidents, these statistics appear very high.

How Long Victims Waited for the Militia

When it came to waiting for the militia to attend the matter, 44 per cent of burglary victims waited for less than one hour, while a further 45 per cent waited between 1 and 6 hours (Table 7.3). More than one in ten respondents, therefore, had to wait more than 6 hours, including half of those who waited more than 12 hours. These results do not compare favourably with information received from the militia, who reported an average response rate of only 15 minutes. Residents in Omsk enjoyed the speediest reaction from the militia, with 56 per cent of victims waiting less than one hour for the militia to respond, compared with 42 per cent in Smolensk and 36 per cent in Volgograd.

**TABLE 7.3 LENGTH OF TIME RESPONDENTS WAITED FOR MILITIA TO ATTEND**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of time</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 hour</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 1 and 6 hours</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 6 and 12 hours</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 12 hours</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were also asked whether they thought the amount of time they had to wait was reasonable or not (Table 7.4). In overall terms, around two-thirds (63%) of respondents considered they had waited a ‘reasonable’ time for the militia to respond, while one-third (37%) thought they had to wait an ‘unreasonable’ length of time. Almost three in four respondents (72%) in Volgograd said they had waited a ‘reasonable’ amount of time compared with three in five (60%) in both Omsk and Smolensk. Given that in around 90 per cent of cases in all three towns the militia responded within 6 hours, this would suggest that people’s expectations of how long the militia should take to respond differed between the cities, and that expectations were higher amongst respondents in Smolensk and Omsk than in Volgograd.
TABLE 7.4 WHETHER THE LENGTH OF TIME RESPONDENTS HAD TO WAIT SEEMED REASONABLE OR NOT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enquiries About Losses

The survey showed that, while the militia routinely enquired about the material losses suffered by households, they did not show as much interest in any physical injuries received by victims during burglaries.

TABLE 7.5 WHETHER THE MILITIA ASKED FOR DETAILS OF MATERIAL LOSSES OR PERSONAL INJURIES SUFFERED BY HOUSEHOLD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Material losses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal injuries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.5 shows that, in 88 per cent of burglary cases the militia asked for details of the material losses experienced by families, while they asked for details of the personal injuries suffered by household members during the course of the burglary in slightly fewer than half of all cases. These results suggest that the militia see burglary purely as a property crime, whereas, as we saw previously, the loss of property is only one aspect of burglary, which may also have a profound emotional impact on victims. Whilst it is not necessarily the job of the militia to deal with the emotional impact of crime, they could certainly be more aware of this and be encouraged to offer an appropriate response.

Providing Contact Details

Generally speaking, the militia were not forthcoming with information either regarding the incident in question, or about general crime prevention measures. According to the survey, only half of those who reported a burglary to the militia were given contact details for the crime desk or the officer responsible for investigating the incident (Table 7.6). This figure varied a little across the three towns, from a ‘low’ of 46 per cent of respondents in Smolensk to a ‘high’ of 54 per cent in Omsk.

TABLE 7.6 WHETHER THE MILITIA PROVIDED CONTACT DETAILS FOR THE OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CASE OR THE ‘CRIME DESK’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Offering Crime Prevention Advice

Given the nature of burglary, the risk of repeat victimisation, and the role of the militia, it is astonishing to see that more than two-thirds of all burglary victims (71%) said they had not been given any crime prevention advice from the militia (Table 7.7). Respondents in Omsk were most likely to have been offered such advice (41%), while less than a quarter of victims in Smolensk (23%) and Volgograd (24%) received crime prevention advice from the militia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A general question asked of all respondents supported this view that the militia play a small role in providing information to the public about crime in general, and crime prevention in particular. When respondents were asked from which sources they obtained information on crime and crime prevention measures, only one in ten mentioned the militia (Table 7.9). Respondents were most likely to have received information from the militia in Omsk (16%) compared with 9 per cent in Smolensk and only 4 per cent in Volgograd. Television was the main source of information in all three cities (mentioned by 83% of all respondents), followed by newspapers (60%) and radio (53%). Almost two-thirds of respondents in Smolensk received information on crime and crime prevention from friends or other people, but this source was less important in Omsk and Volgograd. Victims of crime also provided information for around one third (30%) of respondents in Smolensk, but a much lower percentage in the other two cities, perhaps reflecting higher crime and victimisation rates in the city.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends/word of mouth</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From victims of crime</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage of all respondents

These results suggest that the militia are doing very little in terms of providing information to the public in terms of actual crime rates in the cities or crime prevention advice. If the public mainly obtains information from the mass media, which habitually sensationalises crime, it is not surprising that levels of fear are extremely high. More worrying, however, is the lack of advice provided to victims of burglary: this suggests that the Russian militia is currently a reactive force, which sees its main job as one of registering and detecting – but not preventing – crimes. However, given the inherent difficulties facing the militia in detecting crimes, especially burglaries, prevention is becoming increasingly important.
7.2 LEVELS OF SATISFACTION WITH THE MILITIA’S RESPONSE

Degree of Interest Shown

In overall terms, slightly more than half of all respondents (53%) believed that the militia had shown ‘insufficient interest’ in their case (Table 7.9).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 7.9 AMOUNT OF INTEREST SHOWN BY THE MILITIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufficient interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The highest levels of satisfaction were shown by respondents in Volgograd, where 58 per cent believed that the militia showed sufficient interest, compared with 47 per cent in Omsk and 41 per cent in Smolensk. Correspondingly, respondents in Smolensk showed the lowest level of satisfaction.

Degree of Effort Made

Only one third of respondents believed that the militia had put sufficient effort into dealing with the incident, which meant that two-thirds were critical of the amount of effort put in by the militia (Table 7.10). Respondents in Omsk (40%) were most likely to consider that the militia had put sufficient effort in to their cases, while only one in four respondents in Smolensk thought so.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 7.10 AMOUNT OF EFFORT PUT INTO THE CASE BY THE MILITIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufficient effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results are a damning indictment of victims’ perceptions of how they are treated by the militia and suggest an overwhelming lack of interest in the plight of burglary victims.

Keeping Victims Informed

On the whole, respondents did not consider that they were kept well informed by the militia (Table 7.11).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 7.11 HOW WELL VICTIMS WERE KEPT INFORMED BY THE MILITIA ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THEIR INVESTIGATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very well/well enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very well/badly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia have not investigated yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Only around one in four respondents (26%) believed that they were ‘very well’ or ‘well enough’ informed about matters related to the burglary, compared with over half (54%) who considered they had been ‘badly’ or ‘not very well’ informed. One in five respondents (20%) were still waiting for the militia to investigate the incident. Respondents in Omsk were most likely to consider they had been ‘very well’ or ‘well enough’ informed (33%), while residents in Smolensk were the least likely to think so (21%).

**Sympathy and Helpfulness**

Fewer than one-third of all respondents believed the militia were sufficiently sympathetic and helpful to victims of crime, while 46 per cent thought they were sufficiently sympathetic, but not helpful (Table 7.12). Around one in four respondents (23%) thought the militia neither sympathetic nor helpful. Respondents in Omsk (42%) were more likely than their counterparts in Smolensk (26%) and Volgograd (24%) to say the militia were sufficiently sympathetic and helpful. People in Smolensk (28%) were twice as likely as respondents in Omsk (14%) to consider the militia not sufficiently sympathetic or helpful.

**TABLE 7.12 WHETHER THE MILITIA ARE SUFFICIENTLY SYMPATHETIC AND HELPFUL TO VICTIMS OF CRIME**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, sufficiently sympathetic and helpful</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, sufficiently sympathetic, but not helpful</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, neither sufficiently sympathetic or helpful</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In respect of this question, only one variable was found to be significant: previous victimisation. Victims of (any) crime were less critical of the militia than non-victims: 33 per cent of respondents who had been victims said the militia were sufficiently sympathetic and helpful than non-victims, compared with 15 per cent of non-victims. Conversely, only 20 per cent of victims said the militia were neither helpful nor sympathetic, compared with 43 per cent of non-victims. This was surprising, since elsewhere in the survey, contact with the militia as a victim of crime had usually had the opposite effect of making people more critical of the police. It also indicates, however, the extent to which they general public have negative perceptions of the militia, even when they have had no direct contact with them.

**Detecting and Clearing Crimes**

In addition to the way in which they are treated, and how their case is handled, victims are also interested in whether the crime is solved. Internationally, detection and clear-up rates for property crimes tend to be lower than for other types of crime, such as crimes against the person. For example, detection rates for burglary fell to 12 per cent in England and Wales during 1999/2000, but in Russia they were comparatively higher – 47 per cent at the national level. This does not necessarily mean that the Russian militia are better at detecting and solving crimes reported to them; they may be more selective in the type and number of crimes they decide to register and investigate, which would serve to enhance clear up rates.  

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82 A crime is **detected** when it is reported and officially recorded by the militia (in the journal of recorded information). A preliminary investigation is then made to determine whether or not to proceed with the case (depends on crime/evidence etc.). A crime is considered **cleared-up** when the militia’s investigation into the crime is completed and the case is either: a) Suspended (приустановлено) – a temporary move because, for example, the perpetrator’s identity is known, but their whereabouts is not; the perpetrator is medically unfit to go to trial; or the perpetrator is not known, but there is a possibility that further evidence will be found and the case will continue: b) Dismissed (прекращено) – once and for all: c) Transferred to the prosecutor’s office/court system.
According to the survey results, more than half of the burglaries reported to the militia (54%) were cleared-up insofar as the militia knew, or found out who was responsible (Table 7.13). Detection rates were highest in Volgograd (66%), followed by Omsk (59%) and lowest in Smolensk (44%). Around one third of incidents had not been detected, while 5 per cent were ‘pending’ and 8 per cent of respondents did not know whether their cases had been solved (which may suggest either a lack of information from the militia or a lack of interest on the part of the victim).

**TABLE 7.13 WHETHER THE MILITIA FOUND OUT OR KNEW WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BURGLARY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not yet</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to data from the militia in each city, clear-up rates were 50 per cent in Omsk, 54 per cent in Smolensk and even higher in Volgograd. However, the statistics show a very close association between crimes investigated and crimes cleared, suggesting that the militia are more likely to record and investigate crimes they believe they can clear up.

The fact that the militia found out or came to know who was responsible for the burglary does not mean that stolen property was recovered. Although respondents were not asked this questions directly, anecdotal evidence suggests that very little stolen property is every recovered by the militia, and even where it is, there are problems associated with identifying to whom it belongs. It is not surprising, therefore, that levels of satisfaction with the militia are not high: the 1996 ICVS found that two-thirds of burglary victims in Russia (67%) were not satisfied with the police response, claiming that ‘the police didn’t find the offender’, ‘did not recover the property’, or ‘did not do enough’.

**Overall Satisfaction**

In terms of overall satisfaction, fewer than one in three respondents (27%) were ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ satisfied with the way the militia handled the matter, compared with 70 per cent who were a ‘little’ or ‘very’ dissatisfied, while 3 per cent said it was too early to judge (Table 7.14).

**TABLE 7.14 OVERALL SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY THE MILITIA HANDLED THE MATTER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How well</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fairly or very satisfied</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little or very dissatisfied</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too early to say</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

83 Precise data was not forthcoming, but anecdotal evidence suggested clear-up rates were around 70%.
84 Zvekic (1998a) op. cit., p.54.
Respondents in Omsk (36%) were more likely to be ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ satisfied than their counterparts in the other two cities (22% in Volgograd and 23% in Smolensk). No associations were found between levels of satisfaction and victims’ characteristics.

Comparing these results with international data, it is clear that victims in the current study were very more critical than victims in other areas of the world, apart from Latin America: according to the 1996 ICVS, only 25 per cent of burglary victims in Latin America were satisfied with the police service in response to a complaint, compared with 29 per cent in Africa, 38 per cent in countries in transition, 42 per cent in Asia, 68 per cent in Western Europe and 72 per cent in the New World.85

7.3 SUMMARY

Having reviewed how the militia deal with burglary victims, on the surface it would appear that they are more or less following procedures when responding to burglary by, for example meeting victims face to face, in their own homes, and within a ‘reasonable’ period of time. However, with regard to the way in which the militia carries out these procedures, their performance as judged by burglary victims leaves a lot to be desired. The majority of respondents felt that the militia had not met their expectations when dealing with their cases in terms of showing enough interest, putting in enough effort, keeping victims informed or being helpful and sympathetic. This lack of ‘service’ on the part of the militia, coupled with poor performance in terms of solving crimes (from the point of view of the victims) and the failure to recover stolen property are to blame for the high levels of dissatisfaction expressed by the respondents.

The evidence here suggests that the militia are continuing to prioritise quantitative indicators, rather than the needs of victims. This is not surprising, since this is how they are trained to work, and until very recently, their performance was measured using the same indicators. However, at the end of June 2001, the MVD announced that militia performance will now be measured both quantitatively and qualitatively – i.e. not only on the number of crimes they detect, but also on the basis of the quality of service they provide to the public. There is thus scope to seize the initiative by developing training for the militia to sensitise them to the needs of the victim and encourage them to offer a more appropriate response. Many of the problems addressed in this section could be remedied by the introduction of more victim-, rather than crime-oriented and sensitive policing. Relatively small changes, such as providing officers responsible for investigating incidents with contact cards to give to crime victims, could help to reassure victims that their cases were being investigated by the militia, as well as giving them the opportunity to chase up information about their cases.

The results in this section also highlighted the lack of importance attached to crime prevention, both generally and in relation to burglary victims to try to prevent repeat victimisation. As well as giving greater priority to the preventative role of the police, there is also scope for more general information campaigns to raise awareness among the general public and burglary victims, of how they can protect themselves and their property from victimisation. Given that the public obtains most information from television, this is likely to be one of the most useful forums for spreading the crime prevention message.

8 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITIA

Whereas the previous section focused on burglary victims’ perceptions of how the militia performed their jobs in relation to them, this section looks at how the respondents on the whole perceived the militia and their work. Questions were asked about the core tasks of the militia, how well they appeared to do their job, and also about whether the public trusted the militia.

8.1 CORE TASKS OF THE MILITIA

Respondents were asked what they considered to be the core tasks of the militia from a list presented to them. They were able to choose up to three responses. The results are summarised in Table 8.1 and have been ranked according to the percentage of respondents who chose each option.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tasks of the militia</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control over drug addicts/alcoholics</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing safety on the streets and other public places</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of dwellings and property of citizens</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of squatters</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with young people</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain public order in communities and in blocks of flats</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic control/safety of vehicles</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resolve disputes between neighbours and within families</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Respondents were able to choose up to 3 options

The task mentioned by most respondents was control over drug addicts and alcoholics, which was selected by more than 60 per cent of all respondents. This reflects concerns in Russian society generally that this is a key problem facing the country at the moment – the rise of drug addiction and growing levels of alcohol abuse, particularly amongst young people. Although alcohol abuse is a long-standing problem in Russia, it has intensified over recent years to become much more of a visible problem. For example, when asked which types of anti-social behaviour they encountered in their local areas, a majority of respondents said they quite often or constantly encountered drinking and drug taking in the streets (53%) and underage drinkers (42%). When respondents were also asked to identify the main causes of crime in their local districts, more than half (56%) said drugs and alcohol, which was the most prevalent response, followed by poverty (44%), and unemployment (40%). Similarly, when asked how worried they were about certain groups of people in their area, a majority said they were quite or very worried about people using drugs (59%), people selling drugs (47%) and drunks (45%). It is not surprising, given these findings, that people associate crime with these groups in particular, a charge that is partly supported by official statistics: according to the MVD, 20 per cent of the crimes investigated by the militia between January and October 2001 were committed by people under the influence of alcohol, and 13 per cent under the influence of drugs.\[86\]

The second most frequently given response was providing safety on the streets and in other public places, which was selected by exactly half of all respondents. Three tasks – protection

\[86\] Statistics from the MVD web site: http://www.mvdinform.ru.
of dwellings and property of citizens, the removal of squatters, and work with young people – were selected by around three-fifths (40%-43%) of all respondents, while maintaining public order on the streets, traffic control and resolving disputes between neighbours and families were selected much less frequently.

Comparisons with the Kharkiv Crime Survey show that protection of citizens’ dwellings and property was given priority by respondents in Ukraine (51%), followed by providing safety on the streets and other public places (50%) and control in Kharkiv over drug addicts and alcoholics (40%). These differences suggest that respondents were more concerned about the militia’s role in protecting private property as opposed to public space, while the current survey found the reverse in Russia.

In terms of differences between the cities, respondents in Omsk (70%) and Volgograd (59%) selected control over drug addicts and alcoholics more than any other task, while the most frequently given answer in Smolensk was providing safety on the streets and other public places (62%). It is interesting to note that in both Smolensk and Omsk, respondents gave greater priority to safety on the streets, while in Volgograd the protection of dwellings and property of citizens was the second most popular response (46%) after control over drug addicts and alcoholics (59%).

There was little difference between how men and women, or victims and non-victims, perceived the main tasks of the militia. The protection of citizens’ dwellings and property was not a priority issue amongst the more prosperous respondents: only 35 per cent of respondents in the top income group mentioned this task compared with 46 per cent of the lowest income group, suggesting that the former are more able to protect their own property. Amongst older respondents, the protection of dwellings and property was the most popular choice, alongside control over drugs and alcohol, both of which were mentioned by 49 per cent of the over 60s.

8.2 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MILITIA

Having asked people what they thought were the main tasks of the militia, the survey then enquired about how effective people thought the militia were at doing their job. Respondents were asked whether the militia did a very good, good, bad, very bad, or average job. The results are presented in Table 8.2, which provides a breakdown not only by city, but also by age, gender and victimisation. In overall terms, fewer than one in five respondents (17%) positively assessed the work of the militia: only 1 per cent thought the militia were very good at doing their job, while 16 per cent thought they were good. Just over half of all respondents (53%) said the militia were neither good nor bad at doing their job, while around (30%) were critical of their work.

Comparing these results with other surveys, it is clear that levels of satisfaction with the militia in Russia are lower than in other countries. Generally speaking, levels of satisfaction with police work tend to be higher in Western Europe than in countries in transition: 54 per cent of respondents in Western Europe say the police do a good job in controlling crime locally, compared with 23 per cent in the countries in transition. According to the BCS, public satisfaction with the police in England and Wales is consistently high: 78 per cent of respondents in the 2000 BCS positively assessed their work. The 1996 ICVS reported that 16 per cent of respondents in Ukraine and only 10 per cent in Russia thought the police did a good job, compared with 38 per cent in Ukraine and 48 per cent in Russia who thought they did not do a good job. However, both the KCS and the current survey found higher levels of

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87 Beck and Chistyakova (2001), op. cit., p.35.
88 The highest levels of satisfaction were found in the New World (76%) and Asia (58%). Zvekic (1998b) op. cit., p.76.
90 Zvekic (1998b) op. cit., p.78.
satisfaction with the police: 35 per cent of respondents in Kharkiv said the militia did a very good or good job, while 17 per cent of respondents in the current survey thought this was the case.

### TABLE 8.2 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MILITIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Very good</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Neither good nor bad</th>
<th>Bad</th>
<th>Very bad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smolensk</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omsk</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volgograd</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victimisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-victims</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents in the three cities rated the work of the local militia differently. Although around half of the respondents in all three cities did not have strong feelings about the militia’s work, twice as many respondents in Omsk and Volgograd as in Smolensk believed the militia worked well in their cities. Respondents in Smolensk (where 35% selected bad or very bad) and Volgograd (31%) were more critical of the militia’s performance than in Omsk (22%).

Men (22%) were more likely to assess the work of the militia positively than women (15%), who were correspondingly more critical of the militia’s work (30% compared with 28%). Non-victims of crime were more likely to be positive about the militia’s effectiveness (18%), than victims (13%), who were conversely more likely to be critical (39%) than non-victims (28%) about the militia’s work. This further supports the hypothesis that people who come into contact with the militia as victims of crime are unlikely to receive an acceptable level of service or be treated as they would expect, which generates high levels of dissatisfaction.

Not surprisingly, people who trust the militia are much less critical of their performance than those who do not: more than half (54%) of those who definitely trust the police thought they did a good or very good job, compared with only 7 per cent of those who definitely do not trust them. Conversely, only 10 per cent of respondents who definitely trust the militia were critical of their work, compared with 64 per cent of those who definitely do not trust them.

Respondents in the 3 lower income groups (not enough for food, just enough for food, enough for food and clothing, but nothing else) were more critical of the militia than respondents in the two higher income groups (have some savings, have all that we need). This may be connected with earlier findings which showed that respondents in the lower income groups were more likely to estimate high crime rates than those in the higher income groups, and of course to the general finding that the poor are more at risk of victimisation.

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91 Beck and Chistyakova (2001), op. cit., p.36.
8.3 LEVELS OF TRUST

Public trust in the militia is necessary for co-operation between the two groups, which could facilitate the successful implementation of crime reduction initiatives. Respondents were asked whether they trusted the militia and given the option to respond ‘definitely’, ‘probably’, ‘probably not’, ‘definitely not’, or ‘don’t know’. The results are summarised in Table 8.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Per cent</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, definitely</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably yes</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably not</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely not</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost half (45%) of all respondents had some degree of trust in the militia (12% said ‘definitely’ and 33% ‘probably yes’), but two-fifths (39%) said they probably or definitely did not trust the militia, and 16 per cent were unsure. Comparisons with the KCS show that a similar proportion of respondents said they trusted the police in Ukraine (43%), the majority of whom (27%) said they definitely trusted them, compared with 16 per cent who said ‘probably’. Conversely, fewer respondents said they did not trust the police (31% in total), and a higher percentage were undecided (26%).

In the current study, trust varied significantly between the cities, with around half of the respondents in Omsk (53%) and Volgograd (48%) saying they ‘probably’ or ‘definitely’ trusted the militia, compared with around one-third in Smolensk (34%). Conversely, almost half (49%) of respondents in Smolensk said they probably or definitely didn’t trust the local militia, compared with fewer than one-third in Omsk (30%) and slightly more than one-third in Volgograd (36%).

Attitudes also differed between men and women: 51 per cent of men said they definitely or probably trusted the militia, compared with 40 per cent of women. Conversely, 40 per cent of women said they definitely or probably did not trust the militia, compared with 36 per cent of men. Those over the age of 50 were most likely to say they trusted the militia (44% of 50-59 year olds and 53% of over the 60s, compared with 36% of 18-29 year olds). Respondents between the ages of 30 and 39 were least likely to trust the militia (44% either probably or definitely did not trust them).

Non-victims of crime exhibited greater levels of trust in the militia than victims: 46 per cent of the former either definitely or probably trusted the militia, compared with 40 per cent of the latter. Some 46 per cent of victims probably or definitely did not trust the militia, compared with 37 per cent of non-victims. Once again, we see that contact with the militia tarnishes public perceptions of their work: this suggests that it is not just the historic legacy of the militia’s role shaping public perceptions, but the harsh reality of contact with them, especially poor service delivery.

Respondents in the two higher income groups (have some savings – 47%; have all that we need – 58%) had greater trust in the militia than those in the two lower groups (not enough even for food – 42%; just enough for food – 40%). Once again, this is probably connected

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92 ibid., p.42.
with their perceptions of the militia’s effectiveness, which in turn is influenced by perceptions of crime levels.

8.4 CONTROLLING CRIME

One other question asked during the survey provides a more indirect indication of what the public think of the militia’s performance. Respondents were also asked what measures could contribute to a reduction in the level of crime in their districts? The results are summarised in Table 8.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 8.4 MEASURES THAT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF CRIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved employment prospects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More efficient policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More things for young people to do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harsher sentences for offenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better street lighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved militia co-operation with local people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved militia presence on the streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater co-operation between neighbours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More information being provided about crime prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The use of alarms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Respondents could choose up to 3 responses

The most popular response was improved employment prospects (selected by 48% of all respondents), closely followed by more efficient policing (46%). Almost one in four (23%) respondents suggested that improved militia co-operation with local people could contribute to a reduction in crime levels, while one in five (20%) said that improved militia presence on the streets could help.

Comparisons between the cities show that half of the respondents in Volgograd believed that more efficient policing could contribute to a reduction in the level of crime in the city, compared with 46 per cent in Smolensk and 39 per cent in Omsk. Respondents in Smolensk were more likely to say that improved militia co-operation with local people could help (29%), compared with 24 per cent in Omsk and 17 per cent on Volgograd. Some 23 per cent of respondents in Omsk, 22 per cent in Smolensk and 17 per cent in Volgograd thought that improved militia presence on the streets could contribute to a reduction in the level of crime.

8.5 SUMMARY

These results in this section confirm that the Russian public is highly critical of the overall performance of the militia: fewer than one in five think the militia do a good or very good job, compared with almost twice as many who consider they do a bad or very bad job. The public evidently does not believe the militia are doing all they can to combat crime, and there is significant room for improvement in their performance both in terms of preventing and responding to crime. The results also suggested, however, that the public’s perceptions of the militia in terms of the service it provides may be determined as much by subjective (e.g., depending on the extent to which they trust the militia) as objective (e.g., depending on their experiences of crime) factors. In order to gain the public’s confidence, however, the militia will have to address some of the key issues identified from the survey, in particular, providing a more effective service in terms of preventing and clearing up crimes and a more sensitive approach to victims of crime.
9 CONTACT WITH THE MILITIA

Throughout the world, the police do not operate in a vacuum but are dependent to a great extent on the level of contact they have with the public. This section considers various aspects of contact with the militia in Russia, whether initiated by the militia or the public, including the frequency of contact and reasons for contact.

9.1 CONTACT INITIATED BY THE PUBLIC

Frequency of Contact

Respondents were asked whether they had contacted the militia during the previous 12 months. Only 13 per cent of respondents had contacted the militia, a figure that varied from 10 per cent in Volgograd to 14 per cent in Smolensk and 15 per cent in Omsk. These levels of contact were very similar to those found in Ukraine: according to the KCS, 12 per cent of respondents had contacted at least one militia agency during the previous 12 months. However, both of these levels of contact were significantly lower than comparable rates for England and Wales: according to the 2000 BCS, 35 per cent of respondents had contacted the police during the previous 14 months.

Men and women were equally likely to have contacted the militia. Not surprisingly, victims of crime (during the previous 12 months) were six times more likely than non-victims to have contacted the militia. However, the data showed that only 41 per cent of victims of crime had contacted the militia, indicating that more than half of victims of any crime during the previous 12 months had not contacted the militia to report it.

Reasons for Contact

The main reasons why people contacted the militia are summarised in Table 9.1 below, and have been ranked according to the percentage of respondents who chose each reason. People were most likely to contact the militia to report a crime of which they (47%) or someone else (16%) had been the victim, or to report a disturbance, noise or nuisance (12%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Per cent*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To report a crime of which you were a victim</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To report crime of which someone else was a victim</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To report any type of disturbance, noise or nuisance</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To report a traffic accident or medical emergency</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To report that you had lost something (including animals)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To report other suspicious circumstances/people</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To report a missing person</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To ask for directions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Of respondents who contacted the militia

93 ibid., op. cit., p.45.
94 Sims (2000) op. cit., p.3.
These findings match those of the KCS, which showed that, generally speaking, members of the public contact the militia only when they have to.\textsuperscript{95}

**Perceptions of Treatment**

Respondents who had contacted the militia during the last year were also asked how they were treated by the militia. Respondents were given 5 options to choose from, as summarised in Table 9.2.

**TABLE 9.2 RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF HOW THE MILITIA TREATED THEM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per cent</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With attention and sympathy</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With some attention</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With indifference</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With irritation</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With hostility</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>&lt;1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Just over one in six respondents (16\%) thought they had been treated with attention and sympathy by the militia, while more than one-third (38\%) said they were treated with some attention. A similar proportion of respondents (36\%) thought they had been treated with indifference, while only 1 in 10 respondents said they had met with irritation (8\%) or hostility (2\%). Summarising these results, more than half of all the respondents – 54 per cent – felt they had been treated at least with some attention and/or sympathy, and, consequently, 46 per cent had received an indifferent, irritated or hostile reaction from the militia – hardly the response people would hope for, particularly given the finding that around two-thirds of those respondents who had contacted the police were reporting a crime of which they or a member of their family were the victim (see Table 9.1).

Comparing these results with those of the KCS, Ukrainian respondents more positively assessed how they were treated by the militia: 63 per cent said they were treated with at least some attention and sympathy, compared with 37 per cent who were treated with indifference, irritation or hostility.\textsuperscript{96}

Respondents in Omsk were much more likely than their counterparts in Volgograd and Smolensk to consider they were treated with some attention and/or sympathy by the militia: almost two-thirds (64\%) in Omsk, compared with 51 per cent in Volgograd and 47 per cent in Smolensk chose these two options. Conversely, around half of the respondents in Volgograd and Smolensk had been treated indifferently, or with irritation or hostility, compared with one in three in Omsk.

There were no differences in the responses from men and women or among the different age groups. There was, however, an association between trust and people’s perceptions of how they were treated by the militia: respondents who implicitly trusted the militia were almost three times as likely to say they were treated with attention and sympathy as those who definitely did not trust the militia. More than half of the respondents who said they probably or definitely did not trust the militia said they were treated with indifference, compared with just 10\% of respondents who said they definitely trusted the militia.

Once again these results suggest that there is great scope for improving the service provided by the militia to the general public, by training them to be more sensitive to the needs of

\textsuperscript{95} Beck and Chistyakova (2001), op. cit., p.46.

\textsuperscript{96} ibid., p.46.
victims and treating them accordingly. People who have been victimised deserve at the very least a sympathetic response from the militia, and not an, at best indifferent, and at worst, hostile response, which amounts to secondary victimisation at the hands of the police.97

9.2 CONTACT INITIATED BY THE MILITIA

This section looks at militia contact with the public, in particular the frequency and type of contact initiated by the militia.

Frequency of Contact

Respondents were asked whether they had been contacted by the militia for any reason during the previous 12 months. Around one in five (19%) of respondents had been contacted for one reason or another, which was higher than the Kharkiv Crime Survey (6%),98 but lower than the 2000 BCS (26%).99

People were most likely to have been contacted by the militia in Omsk, where more than one in four (27%) respondents had been contacted during the previous year – a similar level of contact found in England and Wales – followed by Smolensk (19%) and Volgograd (10%).

Respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 were almost three times as likely as those over 60 to have been contacted by the militia during the previous 12 months (23% of the former compared with just 8% of the latter). Around one in four respondents (24-26%) in the top two income groups were contacted by the militia, compared with fewer than one in five (16%-17%) in the three lower income groups. Not surprisingly, victims of crime (30%) were almost twice as likely to have been contacted by the militia than non-victims of crime (17%).

Type of Contact

Those who had been contacted by the militia were asked why the militia had contacted them. The results are summarised in Table 9.3 below according to the percentage of respondents who selected each reason.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To ask for information</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To ask to be a witness</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To investigate other noise or disturbance</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To return missing property or animals</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To deal with ringing burglar alarm</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During a cordon</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To make an arrest</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To search a house</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

97 Mawby uses the term ‘secondary victimisation’ to describe how burglary victims in Eastern Europe were treated by insurance companies when they tried to make insurance claims, but the term could easily be applied to the militia’s unsympathetic treatment of victims in Russia. Mawby (2001) op. cit., p.44.

98 This figure has been taken from the Kharkiv data and not the report.

99 Sims (2000) op. cit. p.3.
The militia were most likely to contact the public to request information (34%) or to request that they be a witness (28%)\footnote{There are two types of witness in Russia; a witness to a crime (svidetel’) and a witness at an official search, also known as an ‘attesting witness’ (ponyatoi). The former corresponds to the British concept of a witness, while the latter is called upon by the militia to be present during searches etc, to ensure that procedures are followed. The category ‘to be a witness’ covers both these concepts.}. In one in ten cases, the militia contacted the public to investigate a noise or other disturbance, and one in twelve cases to return missing property or animals, or to deal with a ringing burglar alarm. It was much more rare for the militia to contact the public to make an arrest (3%) or search a house (2%).

\section*{9.3 SUMMARY}

Generally speaking, there is little positive interaction between the militia and the public, which doubtless contributes to the lack of trust expressed by the public in the previous section. Where there is interaction, the public is as likely to meet indifference as attention from the militia, contributing to the high levels of dissatisfaction reported earlier. In this respect, fostering more positive contact between the militia and the public could help to improve levels of trust between the two, provided both sides are willing to develop co-operation. The next section looks at existing levels of co-operation and whether the public is willing to become more involved with the militia in Russia.
10 MILITIA-PUBLIC CO-OPERATION

This section of the report investigates past, present and possible future co-operation between the militia and the public. This is important from the point of view of understanding which factors may be significant when it comes to developing new forms of co-operation between the militia and the public. In addition to questions about previous assistance to the militia, respondents were also asked whether they thought greater co-operation was necessary and whether they were willing to be involved.

10.1 HELPING THE MILITIA IN THE PAST

Respondents were asked whether they had ‘helped’ (as in provided information to) the militia during the past 12 months, or at any time prior to this. A straightforward ‘yes’ or ‘no’ was solicited. The results of both questions are summarised in Table 10.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of time</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>During the past 12 months</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At any point prior to this</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the Past 12 Months

Overall, almost one in five (18%) respondents had helped the militia at some point during the previous 12 months, which was twice the rate found in Ukraine by the KCS.101 There were significant differences between the cities: respondents in Omsk were most likely to have helped the militia: 27 per cent had, compared with 16 per cent in Smolensk and 11 per cent in Volgograd.

No differences were found between men and women, who were equally likely to have helped the militia during the previous year. Age, however, was a significant factor: respondents between the ages of 18 and 20 were twice as likely to have helped the militia as the over 60s. Not surprisingly, victims of crime (28%) were more likely to have helped the militia than non-victims (16%). Income was also an important factor: respondents in the top income group were more than twice as likely to have helped the militia during the previous 12 months than respondents in the lowest income group (29% against 14%). Respondents who said they definitely or probably trusted the militia were twice as likely to have helped the militia than those who probably or definitely did not trust them (26% against 12%).

Prior to the Last 12 Months

More than one-third (36%) of respondents had helped the militia at some point in their lives prior to the last 12 months. This was slightly higher than the 31 per cent of respondents in Ukraine who had helped the militia at any point prior to the last 12 months.102

Once again, respondents in Omsk were most likely to have helped the militia (44%), compared with 36 per cent in Smolensk and 28 per cent in Volgograd. Men were more likely than women to have helped the militia over the long-term: 40 per cent compared with 33 per cent of women. Victims of crime were more likely to have helped the militia than non-victims.

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102 ibid., p.50.
(41% against 35%), but this was not statistically significant. People between the ages of 40 and 59 were most likely to say they had helped the militia over the longer term. Income was again significant, with respondents in the higher two income groups having helped the militia more than those in the three lower groups in the past. Finally, 44 per cent of respondents who said they definitely trusted the militia had helped them in the past, compared with 27 per cent of those who definitely did not trust the militia.

10.2 IMPORTANCE OF CO-OPERATION

People may have helped the militia in one way or another in the past for various reasons, but how much significance do they attach to co-operating with them in general? Respondents were asked whether it was necessary to establish closer links between the militia and the public and given the options: yes, probably, probably not, definitely not, or don’t know (Table 10.2).

**TABLE 10.2 IMPORTANCE OF CO-OPERATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, definitely</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably yes</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably not</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely not</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Around three in four respondents (74%) definitely or probably thought it necessary to establish closer links between residents and the local militia, compared with one in ten whom definitely or probably did not think this necessary, and 16 per cent who were undecided. These results are encouraging in that they suggest a majority of people recognise that closer links could be forged between the militia and the public. Comparisons with the KCS show that people in Russia are more willing to establish closer links: 60 per cent of respondents in Kharkiv said yes or probably yes, compared with 18 per cent who were categorically against, and 22 per cent who were undecided. Respondents in Omsk (78%) and Smolensk (77%) were most likely to say that closer links were necessary to one extent or another, but more than two-thirds of respondents in Volgograd (69%) were also in favour. The fact that one in five respondents in Volgograd were undecided suggests that there is some room for them to be persuaded of the benefits of closer co-operation with the militia. Income was the only statistically significant factor in whether respondents thought closer links were necessary: half of respondents (50%) in the highest income group thought it was definitely necessary, compared with 37% in the lowest.

10.3 HELPING THE MILITIA IN THE FUTURE

While people may recognise the importance of co-operation, this does not necessarily mean they are prepared to co-operate themselves. Respondents were therefore also asked directly whether they were willing to help the militia in the future, and whether their readiness to help was unconditional. The results are detailed in Table 10.3. A slight majority of respondents (44%) said they were willing to help the militia in the future unconditionally, while 38 per cent said they were ready to help under certain conditions. Almost one in five respondents – 18 per cent in total – categorically rejected co-operation with the militia under any circumstances.

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103 ibid., p.52.
TABLE 10.3 READINESS TO HELP THE MILITIA IN THE FUTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Readiness</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, under certain circumstances</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures compare favourably with KCS data: fewer than one-third (30%) of respondents in Ukraine were ready to help the militia in the future unconditionally, while 44 per cent attached conditions to future help and 26 per cent rejected it outright.\(^\text{104}\)

There were significant differences between the cities: twice as many respondents in Volgograd (27%) as in Smolensk (13%) and Omsk (14%) said they would not co-operate with the militia under any circumstances.

Although victims of crime were slightly less likely to reject co-operation with the militia, they were more likely than non-victims to attach conditions (43% compared with 37% of non-victims). Women were also more likely than men to attach conditions (40% compared with 36%), and less likely to reject future help (17% against 19%).

Within age groups, there was greater willingness to help the militia amongst those aged 30-39 and the over 60s (46% and 47% were unconditionally willing to help), but the over 60s were also most likely to state categorically that they would not work with the militia (27%). Young people (18-29) were the least likely group of respondents to reject helping the militia in the future (only 15% said no), but the most likely to attach conditions to their co-operation (43%, compared with between 26% of the over 60s and 38% of the 40-49 year olds).

Groups less likely to help the militia were the unemployed (30% said no), those who definitely do not trust the militia (28%), and respondents in the two lower income groups (22%). Not surprisingly, the highest levels of willingness to help the militia in the future were found amongst those who definitely or probably trust the militia (62% and 51% respectively said they would help unconditionally).

Respondents who said they were willing to help under certain conditions were asked what these conditions were from a list of possible replies. The results are presented in Table 10.4.

TABLE 10.4 CONDITIONS FOR CO-OPERATION WITH THE MILITIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only if organised properly and will achieve good results</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only if they contact me</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I think it is the right thing to do</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only if the militia change for the better and meet my expectations</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only if other people do not know</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only if I will be paid or rewarded in some other way</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The survey showed that respondents were most interested in the successful outcome of co-operation with the militia: 29 per cent said they would co-operate only if this was organised properly and achieved good results. Around one-quarter of respondents (26%) took a less

\(^{104}\) ibid., p.56.
proactive stance, saying they would co-operate only if contacted by the militia, while 22 per cent would co-operate only if they thought it was the right thing to do. Just 2 per cent of respondents said they would be willing to co-operate only if they were paid or rewarded in some other way. In contrast, the most common conditions attached to co-operation with the militia in Ukraine were ‘only if I think it’s the right thing to do’ (36%), followed by ‘only if they contact me’ (33%) and ‘only if it is organised properly’ (25%). More respondents than in Russia said they would co-operate only if they were paid or rewarded in some way (6%).

The current survey revealed differences between age groups: respondents between the ages of 30 and 39, 50 and 59, and the over 60s were more likely to choose ‘only if they contact me’ than any other option. The unemployed, meanwhile, were most likely to select, ‘only if I think it is the right thing to do’. This was also the most frequent response amongst those who said they did not have enough money for food and those who said they had all that they needed. As we saw above, only 2 per cent of all respondents said they would be willing to help if they were paid for their efforts: it is interesting to note that 8 per cent of those who said they did not have enough money for food chose this option, compared with no respondents who said they had all they needed in terms of income.

10.4 WILLINGNESS TO MEET BEAT OFFICERS

The Beat Inspectors’ Unit is in charge of community policing. The territory under the control of a police station is divided into separate ‘beats’ and each inspector has to work with the people living within their beat. Beat officers (uchastkovye) are responsible for maintaining contact with, and checking on families and individuals at risk and adults who have been convicted in the past or who received non-custodial sanctions. They also participate in clearing up crimes under the guidance of investigators. In recent years, the Beat Inspectors’ Unit has experienced shortages as new recruits preferred to choose militia jobs that are perceived to be more interesting or ‘exciting’ – for example, in forensics or CID. However, the MVD recently reported that this situation is changing and that more people are now applying to join the beat officers unit. On a day-to-day basis, beat officers are the representatives of the militia that the public are most likely to come into contact with, and thus serve as a link between the militia and the public. So how frequent was contact between the public and the beat officers? Respondents were asked whether the local beat officer had visited them at home during the past 12 months (Table 10.5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results showed that 17 per cent of all respondents had been visited by the beat officer during the previous year, compared with 14 per cent in the KCS. There were, however, differences between the cities: members of the public were twice as likely to have been visited in Omsk (26%) than either Smolensk or Volgograd (both 12%). The only statistically significant variable was crime victimisation: 23 per cent of respondents who had been visited by the beat officer had been victims of crime during the previous year, compared with 17 per cent who had not.

105 ibid., p.54.
106 Information from the MVD web site: http://www.mvdinform.ru.
Respondents were also asked whether they would like to meet the local beat officer and be more in touch with them. Possible responses were ‘yes’, ‘probably yes’, ‘probably not’, ‘definitely not’ or ‘don’t know’. The results are summarised in Table 10.6.

**TABLE 10.6 WHETHER RESPONDENTS WOULD LIKE TO MEET THE BEAT OFFICERS MORE OFTEN AND BE MORE IN TOUCH WITH THEM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, definitely</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably yes</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probably not</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely not</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost half of all the respondents (48%) were in favour of more frequent contact with their beat officer at least to some extent (definitely – 21%, probably – 27%). A lower proportion (38% in total) were not in favour (23% said probably not and 15% definitely not), while 14 per cent were undecided. These results compare very favourably with the KCS: only one quarter (26%) of respondents in Ukraine were in favour of more frequent contact with beat officers, while 56% were against and 18% undecided.107

There were differences between the cities: respondents in Volgograd were more likely to say they would like to meet the beat officer (54% said yes or probably yes), compared with 48 per cent in Smolensk and 43 per cent in Omsk.

Generally speaking, the older the respondent, the more willing they were to meet the beat officer (64% of over the 60s and 42% of 18-29 year olds said they would definitely or probably like to meet the beat officer more often and be more in touch with him), while conversely, the younger the respondent, the less willing they were to meet the beat officer (44% compared with 23% of the over 60s).

Trust was a significant factor in respondents’ desire to have greater contact with the beat officer: the greater the level of trust in the militia, the greater the desire, and the lower the level of trust, the less the desire to have more contact with the militia: 40 per cent of respondents who definitely trust the militia said they would like to meet them more often, while 36 per cent of those who did not trust the militia said they did not want to meet them more often.

### 10.5 WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN CRIME PREVENTION INITIATIVES

An important aspect of the project is the development of burglary reduction initiatives, the success of which will, to a certain extent, depend on the public’s co-operation. It was therefore important to try to gauge how willing the public is to get involved in crime prevention initiatives. Respondents were asked whether they would be prepared to take part in local schemes. The results are presented in Table 10.7. Around one in three (35%) respondents said they were prepared to take part in local crime prevention schemes, while one in seven (17%) said they were not. Almost half of the respondents were uncertain, and therefore potentially open to persuasion about both the general and individual benefits that could result from their participation.

TABLE 10.7 WHETHER RESPONDENTS ARE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN LOCAL CRIME PREVENTION SCHEMES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Smolensk</th>
<th>Omsk</th>
<th>Volgograd</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents in Smolensk were most willing to take part in crime reduction schemes (40%), followed by Omsk (36%) and Volgograd (28%). A higher proportion of respondents in Volgograd (22%) than in Smolensk and Omsk (both 15%) rejected participation.

In terms of demographics, men were more willing to get involved in crime prevention initiatives than women (37% versus 32%), but they were also more likely to reject involvement (19% against 16%). More female respondents were undecided (51% compared with 44% of men). People between the ages of 18 and 29 were more willing to participate than other age groups (37% compared with 26% of the over 60s). The over 60s were most likely to refuse to participate (28%).

In terms of socio-economic factors, there were very clear associations between willingness to participate in crime prevention schemes and income. Almost half (47%) of the respondents who said they had all they needed (highest income group) were prepared to participate, compared with less than one-third of those who said they could not even afford food (28%). Correspondingly, only 12 per cent of the former, but 22 per cent of the latter were not prepared to get involved. Employment status was also significant, although the differences between groups were not as striking: people in employment (36%) were most likely to be prepared to get involved, while the unemployed were less likely (28%). Unemployed respondents were twice as likely to reject participation as those in employment (31% of the former said no compared with 15% of the latter).

10.6 SUMMARY

These results are encouraging as they suggest that, in spite of the lack of trust and confidence in the militia previously revealed, the public are generally in favour of greater co-operation with them. In this respect, the beat officers have an important role to play in fostering closer links between the public and the militia, but they have been hampered in recent years by shortages in resources, both human and technical. One way of promoting greater co-operation would be to involve the beat officers in promoting crime prevention initiatives, by, for example, providing security advice to local people and participating in the development of more focused initiatives (e.g. neighbourhood watch schemes and voluntary patrols).

It is also encouraging to see that very few respondents were completely against involvement in crime prevention initiatives. However, the results revealed that those most likely to be victimised (those with lower incomes) are the least likely to want to get involved, which is a common phenomenon. Initiatives should therefore seek ways of involving these groups in particular by focusing attention on the benefits in terms of enhanced protection against a crime that disproportionately affects them more than other groups.
11 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This report presents the findings from the first phase of the project, ‘The Development of Crime Reduction Schemes for At-Risk Groups: Context-Specific Approaches for Transitional Societies’. The project is funded by the Department for International Development (DfID) and directed by the Scarman Centre, University of Leicester, in collaboration with Smolensk Law Institute, and Omsk and Volgograd Law Academies in Russia.

The first phase of the project involved the collection of data on the extent and nature of the problem of burglary in Russia. Without this information, which covered areas such as the extent of victimisation, the degree of reporting or non-reporting to the police, the attitudes of citizens to the way they are dealt with by the police and, more importantly, any gaps in expectations and reality, it would not be possible to select the most appropriate burglary reduction schemes and adapt them to the local context for implementation during Phase 2 of the project.

This section summarises the main findings of the primary research undertaken during the first phase of the project – the survey conducted in Smolensk, Omsk and Volgograd. The findings are grouped under various headings, which bring together the main themes discussed in the report: the fear of crime, household security, the risk of burglary, the impact of burglary, public perceptions of the militia, and co-operation between the public and the militia.

THE FEAR OF CRIME/BURGLARY

- The survey found very high levels of fear of crime in general: 61 per cent of all respondents were quite or very worried about crime, including 66 per cent in Omsk, 64 per cent in Smolensk, and 62 per cent in Volgograd.

- Certain groups were more concerned about crime than others, including people between the ages of 50 and 59 (73% were quite or very worried), people who have lived in the area for more than 20 years (67%), women (65%), and victims of crime (64%).

- Burglary is the crime that people most feared becoming a victim of: two-thirds (67%) of respondents were specifically concerned about having their homes broken into and something stolen: 71 per cent in Smolensk, 69 per cent in Volgograd and 60 per cent in Omsk. The fear of crime thus partly mirrored the risk of victimisation (details below), although levels of fear are still far in excess of actual risks, which is a common phenomenon.

- The highest levels of concern about burglary were exhibited by people who had previously been the victim of burglary or other crimes: 75 per cent of victims of any crime and 83 per cent of burglary victims were quite or very worried about having their house broken into and something stolen.

- Other groups of respondents who exhibited heightened levels of concern about burglary included people who lived in flats (74% were quite or very worried), women (70%), and the economically disadvantaged (between 64 and 69 per cent of the lower income groups compared with only 51 per cent of the top income group).
HOUSEHOLD SECURITY

- In spite of the high levels of fear of burglary, home security measures were not widespread amongst respondents.
- The most popular method of home security – trying not to leave homes unoccupied – was also the cheapest. It was mentioned by 44 per cent of all respondents, including almost half of the respondents in Smolensk (49%), 41 per cent in Volgograd and 40 per cent in Omsk.
- Income was a significant factor in whether or not people had taken precautions to protect their homes.
  - Respondents in the higher income groups were consistently more likely than respondents in the lower income groups to have introduced security measures that require any financial outlay.
  - More than half (51%) of all respondents who had not adopted any security measures said this was because it was too expensive (65% in both Smolensk and Volgograd, but only 28% in Omsk).
- A small number of respondents – 14 per cent in total – had not adopted any household security measures, including 16 per cent in Volgograd and Omsk, and 11 per cent in Smolensk.
  - Amongst these respondents, two-fifths (43%) believed that nothing would make a difference to the risk of burglary, including 54 per cent in Smolensk, 42 per cent in Volgograd and 36 per cent in Omsk.
- Fewer than one in four respondents (22%) made arrangements with their neighbours, which is a free and potentially effective way of reducing the risk of burglary.
- In more than one-third of burglaries (39%), respondents considered themselves or someone else apart from the burglar to be responsible (47% in Omsk, 42% in Smolensk and 22% in Volgograd).
  - Some burglaries were successfully committed as a result of householders’ negligence by, for example, leaving doors (5% of cases) or windows (17% of cases) open or unlocked.
- Victimisation has an impact on security consciousness: 75 per cent of all burglary victims had introduced additional home security measures following burglary (86% in Smolensk, 75% in Volgograd and 69% in Smolensk).

RISK OF BURGLARY

- The average prevalence rate (the percentage of households/individuals who were victimised at least once during the previous year) for all burglaries and attempts was 5.5. The risk of victimisation was highest in Smolensk (6.6%), followed by Omsk (5.4%) and Volgograd (4.5%).
- A higher percentage of burglaries were successful (with entry) than not (attempts): a total of two-thirds were successful (67%), which varied only slightly from 63 per cent in Volgograd to 68 per cent in Smolensk.
Aggravated burglaries represented 14 per cent of all burglaries (18% in Smolensk, 12% in Omsk and 11% in Volgograd). Correspondingly, force was more likely to be used in Smolensk (36% of incidents where the victims was at home during the burglary), followed by Omsk (27%) and Volgograd (21%). On average, more than one in four victims (28%) who were home during the burglary experienced violence or force from the offender.

Around one in four victims – 24 per cent – of all types of burglary could expect to be victimised more than once during the year: 18 per cent were victimised twice and 7 per cent three times or more.

- Repeat victimisation was more of a problem in Smolensk, where almost one in three burglary victims (31%) were victimised more than once, than in Omsk (27%) or Volgograd (17%).
- Those most at risk of repeat victimisation were the poor and people who lived in flats.

In terms of overall victimisation, two factors were significant:

- Income: burglary has a disproportionate impact on the poor, but, while this finding was significant in overall terms (for the total sample), it was not consistent across all three cities. Consequently, the poor appear to be more at risk in Omsk, while the better off are more at risk in Smolensk, but no particular group is more at risk in Volgograd.
- Housing type: people who live in flats and hostels were more prone to victimisation than people living in houses. However, while this association was significant across the whole sample and for Omsk and Smolensk, it was not found in Volgograd.

### THE IMPACT OF BURGLARY

- Property was stolen in the majority of incidents reported – 80 per cent. Respondents in Volgograd (86%) were most likely to say that property had been stolen, while those in Smolensk were less, but still very likely (76%) to suffer losses.

- Very few victims had household insurance – only 8 per cent overall. Insurance cover was lowest in Volgograd (only 2% of victims were insured), followed by Smolensk (8%) and Omsk (15%). However, not a single respondent reported burglary to the militia for the purposes of an insurance claim.

- Additional losses were incurred as a result of damage to property during the course of burglary by around three-fifths (61%) of victims. Additional damage was most likely to occur in Smolensk (72%), followed by Volgograd (53%) and Omsk (52%).

- In terms of emotional impact, more than four in five victims were affected ‘very much’ (44%) or ‘a lot’ (39%) by burglary, and only 17 per cent ‘a little’. Burglary had the highest emotional impact on victims in Omsk (52% were affected very much), followed by Volgograd (46%) and Smolensk (37%).

- The most prevalent emotions were anger (46%), shock (39%), and fear (34%), but the emphasis varied slightly between the cities, with a majority of respondents expressing anger in Volgograd (61%), fear in Omsk (63%) and shock in Smolensk (43%).

- No victims had sought or been offered help to cope with their experiences of burglary outside their immediate family and close circle of friends.
• When asked what types of assistance they required immediately after the burglary, respondents were most likely to say help from the militia (in terms of information and protection), but requests were also made for practical, legal and emotional support.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITIA

• Public perceptions of the militia are generally not good. The survey found very low levels of trust amongst the respondents: fewer than half (45%) trusted the militia to any extent, a figure that ranged from 34 per cent in Smolensk to 48 per cent in Volgograd and 53 per cent in Omsk.

• Respondents were highly critical of the militia’s general performance – only 17 per cent thought they did a good job, compared with 30 per cent who thought they did a bad job. Respondents in Omsk were more likely to say the militia did a good job (23%), compared with 19 per cent in Volgograd and just 10 per cent in Smolensk. Respondents in Smolensk were also more critical of the militia’s performance: 35 per cent said they did a bad or very bad job, compared with 31 per cent in Volgograd and 22 per cent in Omsk.

• Respondents who had been victims of burglary were even more critical of the militia’s work: only 27 per cent of burglary victims were quite or very satisfied with the way the militia had handled their cases, compared with 70 per cent who were a little or very dissatisfied. The highest levels of dissatisfaction were expressed by burglary victims in Volgograd (76% were a little or very dissatisfied) compared with 71 per cent in Smolensk and 65 per cent in Omsk.

• With regard to specific contact with the militia, around half of all respondents (46%) thought they had been treated with indifference (36%), irritation (8%) or hostility (2%) by the militia. Indifference was the most likely response from the militia in Smolensk: 43 per cent of respondents said they had faced indifference compared with 37 per cent in Volgograd and 27 per cent in Omsk.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND THE MILITIA

• In spite of the criticisms of the militia voiced by the public, around three-quarters (74%) of respondents recognised the importance of co-operation with them, and more than four-fifths (82%) were prepared to help.

  › Around two-fifths of respondents (44%) were prepared to help the militia unconditionally (43% in Omsk, 44% in Smolensk and 45% in Volgograd).

  › Almost two-fifths of respondents (38%) attached conditions to working with the militia in the future (43% in both Smolensk and Omsk, and 28% in Volgograd. The most commonly attached condition was that co-operation should be properly organised and have good results (selected by 29% of respondents), followed by only if they were contacted by the militia (26%) and only if it was the right thing to do (22%).

  › Only 18 per cent of respondents rejected helping the militia in the future outright (15% in Smolensk, 14% in Omsk and 27% in Volgograd).

• Almost half of the respondents (48%) wanted to have greater contact with the beat officers to one degree or another, including 43 per cent in Omsk (where levels of contact are already twice as high as in the other two cities), 48 per cent in Smolensk and 54 per cent in Volgograd.
• More than one third of respondents (38%) were not in favour of more frequent contact, including 28 per cent in Volgograd, 42 per cent in Omsk and 44 per cent in Smolensk.

• Twice as many respondents were willing (35%) to participate in crime prevention initiatives as were unwilling (17%).

  › Almost half (48%) of all respondents were unsure, suggesting that there is potential to persuade them of the benefits of such initiatives, especially if they are well organised.
12 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

Given the findings detailed in this report and summarised in the previous section, there are several key issues that the next phase of the project should seek to address. These are:

- The fear of crime, especially burglary
- Crime/burglary prevention
- The militia response to burglary
- Public/militia co-operation
- Vulnerable groups and areas

The Fear of Crime/Burglary

High levels of fear of crime – especially of burglary – suggest that the Russian militia are currently failing to address the concerns of the Russian public. Whether people's fears are perceived or real, this is a very serious problem that Phase II of the project should address as a priority.

The first step in attempting to allay people’s fears is to make them more aware of the actual risk of victimisation – by widely publicising the survey results – while simultaneously emphasising that victimisation is not inevitable, contrary to what many people appear to believe, and that members of the public can take steps, both individually and collectively, to try to protect their homes and property. Given that the public obtains information about crime and crime prevention mainly from the mass media, and from television in particular, this is the form of communication likely to prove most useful in getting the crime prevention message across to the public. In addition to these broadcasts, the provision of crime prevention literature (e.g. fliers/brochures) targeted at more vulnerable groups and areas could help to reduce some of the fear, as well as the risk of victimisation.

As concern about burglary was highest amongst previous victims of this crime, this group in particular would benefit from more targeted assistance. Their fears are evidently compounded by their experiences of crime and could be addressed by the development of support and advice networks for victims of crime, offering some of the services currently provided in the UK by ‘Victim Support’. Very little, if any, support of this kind is available in Russia, which leaves victims dependent on family and friends, who may themselves be traumatised, and not in a position to offer more than a ‘shoulder to cry on’. The provision of personal support and advice would provide an opportunity for burglary victims to come to terms with their experiences in a professional and sympathetic environment and enable them to take measures to reduce the risk of future victimisation.

Crime/Burglary Prevention

With an average prevalence risk of 5.5, the risk of becoming a victim of burglary is higher in Russia than in England and Wales, where this problem has long been prioritised by the government as a key crime issue to be tackled by the police. Although tackling burglary has been identified as a priority amongst some police forces in Russia, evidence suggests that the practice of prevention may not correspond with policy statements: for example, although elaborate plans are periodically drawn up to prevent or combat crime, a lack of appropriate resources (financial/technical/human) can prevent their total or even partial implementation.
Publicly prioritising the fight against burglary would help to reassure a fearful public that the militia are aware of the serious nature of this type of crime and its impact on victims, while the implementation of an anti-burglary strategy by the militia will show that they genuinely mean business.

Although crime prevention should be an integral part of any such strategy, this message does not appear to be getting through to either the general public (many of whom remain unconvinced of the benefits of crime prevention initiatives) or the militia (who routinely do not offer and/or provide crime prevention advice to the public in general or, even more disturbingly, to victims of crime). In this respect, one aim of this strategy should be to raise awareness of crime prevention amongst both groups by, for example, providing more information and formal training on the theory and practice of crime prevention to the militia (i.e. the various activities or tactics that can be used to deliver crime reduction, based on UK experience), and offering more practical information and advice to the public in the form of crime prevention literature, as previously mentioned. As well as offering practical advice, this literature could also encourage people to use common sense in their approach to crime prevention. One obvious example here is to encourage basic security awareness: for example, reminding the public of the dangers of leaving windows and doors open or unlocked and inviting strangers into their homes. Advice could similarly be given about not flaunting new purchases, hiding or locking away valuables and cash, and generally being more circumspect in relation to home security.

In terms of more proactive home security measures, the survey suggested that, despite the public’s uncertainty about their effectiveness, victimisation does have an impact on security consciousness and usually results in the adoption of additional security measures. In other words, preventative measures are likely to be introduced retrospectively, whereas the earlier introduction of security measures may have prevented burglaries from taking place. Evidence from the British Crime Survey has repeatedly shown that enhanced home security is very effective in preventing burglaries, a message worth highlighting in Russia.

Given the lack of insurance, and the financial pressures facing large numbers of people in Russia, it is even more important to highlight the role of prevention. As the survey showed, people report burglaries to the militia mainly in the hope of recovering their property, which, unfortunately, is not the usual outcome. In this respect, an important aim of the next phase should be to reduce the number of burglaries while simultaneously increasing victims’ chances of having their property returned to them when burglaries occur. A simple, relatively cheap and effective way of meeting both these objectives is to encourage people to mark their property. Since large numbers of people, including those most at risk, were concerned about the high relative cost of implementing home security measures, target-hardening initiatives should be low-cost or free to those most at risk. In addition to property marking, the development or expansion of neighbourhood watch schemes, which have proved successful in the past, could also raise general awareness of crime prevention and help to reduce levels of concern. In addition to promoting crime prevention, these schemes could also help to develop the idea of ‘community safety’, moving away from the purely individualistic approach to crime prevention that currently prevails in Russian cities.

The Militia Response to Burglary

Although domestic burglary is generally acknowledged by the militia in Russia to be a serious problem, it has gained significance mainly as a result of the number of crimes committed and subsequently cleared-up (or not as the case may be) by the militia, rather than the number of victims it affects, or how it affects them. The survey findings clearly suggested that many police officers view burglary as little more than a property crime to be recorded and possibly investigated, while the plight of the victim is largely ignored. In this respect, the whole ethos of the Russian militia, which has until fairly recently emphasised quantitative above
Qualitative results, means that very little notice is taken of the needs of victims, which was starkly illustrated by the findings on how victims were treated by the militia.

While the way in which victims are treated by the militia cannot make up for the trauma and losses they may have suffered, it is important that the distressing effects of crime victimisation are not exacerbated by the treatment they receive from the militia. In this respect, awareness should be raised amongst the militia of the fact that burglary is not just a property crime, with purely financial repercussions for victims, but can also be emotionally traumatic. Consequently, the needs of burglary victims extend far beyond replacing stolen goods or repairing damaged property into the sphere of dealing with emotional shock and distress. Whilst it is not suggested that it is the job of the militia to deal with the emotional impact of crime, it should be part of their remit to treat victims fairly and politely, and generally to provide a better standard of service to the public.

According to the survey results, the militia’s current response is at best adequate, and while some of the blame for their lack of service may lie with the system (e.g. the tradition of prioritising quantitative over qualitative performance indicators) or a lack of resources, much of it appears to be related to prevailing practices and attitudes. Attitudes should be influenced – to one extent or another – by the training to be offered on crime prevention, but changes in both practices and attitudes could be facilitated further by the development of good practice guidelines for officers responsible for responding to reports of crime. Such guidelines would be based on the needs of burglary victims as highlighted by the survey results (i.e. the need for a prompt response, attendance where necessary, sympathy, advice about crime prevention and victim support, and follow-up contact to keep victims informed) and included in training courses and modules.

Improving the militia’s standard of service to the public and to victims in particular could have the longer-term effect of improving public satisfaction with, and regard for, the militia. While it may be argued that some of these suggestions could lead to increased demands on the militia’s time, it is only by improving the service they provide to the public that the militia can hope to improve public perceptions of, and attitudes towards them.

Public/Militia Co-operation

The survey showed that there is great scope to develop co-operation between the militia and the public, despite the latter’s overwhelming dissatisfaction with the militia’s performance. For co-operation to be effective, however, the relationship between the militia and the public must be based on mutual respect and an awareness of each others’ needs. Ways in which the militia could develop their understanding of the public’s needs were outlined above, but it is also important that the public is kept informed of the militia’s activities in order to try to increase confidence in, and attitudes towards the police in Russia. In this respect, the publicity surrounding the campaign will help, but more pro-active ways of fostering positive contact between the two groups should be sought, to develop into more formal channels of co-operation. One way of encouraging such contact is through the organisation of police-public consultation (meetings/committees) at local level, where both sides have the opportunity to discuss their needs, expectations, priorities and problems. Once dialogue has been established in this way, the foundations will have been laid for the active participation of both the militia and the public in local crime prevention initiatives, working in partnership, which has formed the cornerstone of crime prevention in the UK during the past few years.

Given the nature of their duties, the local Beat Officers have a crucial role to play in the development of closer and more effective links between the police and the public. They will require training to equip them with the skills to take on this role.
Vulnerable Groups/Areas

Since resources are limited, they should be focused strategically on those groups (individuals and families on low incomes) and places (blocks of flats and hostels in high burglary areas) perceived to be most at risk. However, in terms of the fear of crime, the most vulnerable group are previous victims of crime, who should also be the focus of targeted initiatives.

Having identified these key issues, it is recommended that five broad areas of activity are focused on during Phase II of the project:

1. Advice to the public.
2. Training courses for MVD staff and others.
3. Specific burglary reduction initiatives.
4. Improving militia performance
5. Partnership development.

Each of these areas of activity encompasses a number of initiatives, many of which overlap in terms of addressing the problems outlined above. The individual initiatives and how they fit into the broad framework of the project are described in detail below.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Advice to the Public

Research from the first phase of the project highlighted the lack of information the public feel they receive from the police and other agencies on how to protect their property from future victimisation (see Section 5 of the report). Research in the UK has shown that, for the most part, citizens need to be aware of the risks and take appropriate precautions to protect themselves rather than relying upon the police as the primary means of safeguarding their property. Early research carried out in Eastern Europe also highlighted the general lack of priority citizens give to crime prevention and personal security compared with their Western European counterparts. Partly this is due to economic factors, but also to the lack of advice and information they are given to help them protect their property and to assist them once they have been victimised. The overall objective of providing advice to the public is thus to raise awareness of the risk of victimisation and to provide general and targeted crime prevention advice. This will be done by producing a series of infomercials for broadcast on television and radio (the most important sources of information according to most respondents), producing and distributing crime prevention literature, developing a poster campaign, creating a burglary prevention website, and developing a victim support network.

Infomercials: it is proposed to produce six 10-minute and six five-minute infomercials to be broadcast on local TV channels in each of the cities. The 10-minute slots will focus on raising awareness about the risk of victimisation (without unnecessarily raising the fear of crime) and highlight the benefits of adopting preventative measures. The 5-minute slots will focus on providing information and support for burglary victims, including advice on how to cope with the emotional impact of this type of crime, which is currently not addressed in Russia. In addition, crime prevention information will also be produced for local radio and newspapers.

It is also proposed to produce two mini documentaries around the problem of domestic burglary and the initiatives being carried out by the project team to tackle it. These will be produced at the beginning of the implementation of the schemes and six months later to report progress and offer further advice, once again to be broadcast on local TV channels.
It should be noted that the intention is to adopt a high profile media approach during Phase II of the project, a strategy that has proved very effective in the UK, e.g. Strathclyde Police Force’s ‘Spotlight Initiative’, and the Metropolitan Police Service’s ‘Operation Bumblebee’. While these two campaigns are different in style and focus, they both make extensive use of various types of media to publicise their aims, work and successes, an approach that the Russian partners are eager to emulate. UK research shows that there are many advantages in adopting a high profile approach, with a recognisable brand name or image, the most important of which are that it provides a ‘unifying focus’ to a range of activities, as proposed during Phase II of the project, and helps to show how they can be linked to achieve defined objectives (enhanced domestic security, reduced incidences of burglary, improved relations and co-operation between the police and the public). Where the public are concerned, high profile campaigns may help to make police operations more understandable to them, while simultaneously raising awareness and offering reassurances that the police share their concerns and are actively seeing to improve their performance. Where the police are concerned, it can have a beneficial effect on morale: officers are more likely to show support and commitment when they are fully informed about the objectives and methods to be used, and particularly about their role and responsibilities within the campaign. And finally, research has also shown that publicity helps to deter potential offenders, particularly where such publicity is accompanied by other initiatives, such as target hardening. An effective publicity campaign, coupled with positive media coverage to highlight milestones in the project’s implementation is therefore one of the key elements of a successful anti-burglary strategy.

**Crime Prevention Literature/Material:** a series of leaflets will be produced and distributed to citizens in the three areas in each of the cities taking part in the project. This material will focus upon practical home security advice and will be distributed by the local beat officers and police officers attending the scene of a burglary. In addition, it will also be made available in local police stations and other public buildings such as libraries, local authority buildings and schools and shops. Posters will be produced and distributed in similar locations. A separate leaflet will also be produced for burglary victims, to include advice on how to secure their property in the future and on what support and help they are entitled to from the police and other agencies. It will also direct them to the Victim Support Scheme outlined below. As part of some of the other initiatives outlined below, property-marking stickers will be given out, and street signs installed to warn potential offenders that various initiatives are underway in the area, such as Neighbourhood Watch. Local police officers will also be given ‘contact’ cards to give out to the public to facilitate communication with them.

**Burglary Prevention Website:** the development of a website will serve three purposes: firstly, it will provide open access to up-to-date advice and information on how to secure property; secondly, it will provide those responsible for dealing with domestic burglary with a comprehensive site containing all the relevant information on the topic; and finally, it will allow policy-makers to gain access to current practices and strategies adopted in the UK and elsewhere. In addition, all the information generated by the project will be made available through the website. This will include the research data from the first phase, the training packages and publicity material developed in the second phase, and the evaluation findings

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108 The Metropolitan Police Service’s ‘Operation Bumblebee’ is a high profile anti-burglary strategy, which was launched across London in 1993 following a successful pilot (www.met.police.uk). Strathclyde Police Force’s ‘Spotlight Initiative’, which was launched in 1996, is a more general strategy aimed at reducing violent crime, disorder and the fear of crime in Strathclyde Region. This strategy encompasses both regular and major initiatives, one of which has focused on housebreaking and drugs (launched in 1998) and has led to ‘record successes’ in relation to both crimes (The Spotlight Initiative website is accessible via Strathclyde Police’s website at www.strathclyde.police.uk).


generated in the final phase of the project. The site will also play an important part in the
dissemination strategy of the project, enabling other police forces in Russia and elsewhere to
learn from the experiences of the project team.

**Victim Support Network:** the survey results from Phase I highlighted the extent to which
victims of burglary were dissatisfied with the ‘after incident’ response from the police. It is
intended therefore to set up facilities in each of the participating cities (one office in each city
to be located in the district identified by the survey as having the highest victimisation rates,
namely Dzerzhinskii in Volgograd, Tsentralnyi in Omsk and Leninskiy in Smolensk) to
enable burglary victims to talk to trained counsellors and obtain crime prevention advice. In
the first instance this service will be available for several hours each day in each city and be
co-ordinated by a local NGO. Its existence will be widely advertised through the infomercials
and publicity material outlined above, and by police officers responding to burglary incidents,
who will be asked to provide details of the service to victims and members of their immediate
family.

It is envisaged that this service will be housed in permanent accommodation, to be equipped
with telephone, computer and copying facilities. Ideally, these facilities will also be available
to the Local Resident Association Coordinators and local Beat Officers, who will work
closely together to raise awareness of community and individual safety, and to promote
greater co-operation between the militia and the public. This will initially involve the
organisation of public meetings (see below) to discuss concerns about crime, advertise the
anti-burglary campaign as a whole and encourage involvement in the schemes. The office
facilities will be used for the purposes of planning and as a base for the dissemination of
information – e.g. fliers/newsletters.

**Training Courses for MVD Staff and Others**

Research from the first phase and from studies carried out elsewhere has highlighted the gulf
in levels of trust between the police and the public. Partly this is a legacy of the past when the
police were perceived to be more interested in serving the needs of the state than protecting
the public, which fuelled distrust on both sides. More recently the Russian police have begun
to seek ways of building a better relationship between themselves and the public, through,
amongst other things, improved training programmes for officers and making their services
more accessible to the public. The aim of this part of the implementation phase is to provide
training to a range of groups who will either come into contact with members of the local
community or will provide support and advice to victims of domestic burglary. Its purpose is
partly to facilitate the implementation of the project as a whole (that is, to give those groups
tasked with delivery the necessary skills and competences), but also to explore the extent to
which ‘better’ relations between the police and the public improve levels of reporting of
incidents of burglary, and also the extent to which members of the public are likely to give the
police information on likely offenders. All training will be organised by the local law
academies, although specialist trainers will be brought in where appropriate, including the
participation of NGOs. In addition to the use of traditional training methods, it is also
proposed that one element will involve the use of state-of-the-art computer technology
through the development of multi-media training products for militia officers.

**Local Beat Officer Training:** all the beat officers in the participating areas will be given a
short course on ways in which they can improve relations with the local community. Training
will also be given on providing crime prevention advice and working with the local resident
associations (see below). In addition, beat officers will be given training on how to implement
the schemes outlined below.

**Scene of Crime Officer Training:** those attending an incident of domestic burglary will be
given specific training on how to respond to victims and the approach to be adopted.
Emphasis will be placed upon prioritising the needs of the victim rather than simply fulfilling
the requirements of the criminal justice system. This will include how to keep victims informed about the ensuing investigation and whether victims need any specific help and advice.

**Victim Support Network Training**: the legal advisers and counsellors providing the victim support services will be given specific training. This will be based upon the considerable experience of the Victim Support organisation in the UK, which has agreed to donate all their training materials to the project.

**Local Residents’ Association Co-ordinators’ Training**: one of the proposed initiatives is to establish local neighbourhood associations to co-ordinate community action to reduce the threat of burglary and to liaise more closely with the local beat officer (see below). It is proposed to give specific training to local residents who volunteer to act as the co-ordinators of these associations. The training will focus on the ways in which local groups can respond to the problem of domestic burglary and how they can liaise more effectively with the local police.

**Specific Crime Prevention Initiatives**

In addition to the crime prevention and publicity materials, and training programmes outlined above, it is proposed to introduce two specific large-scale crime prevention initiatives into the areas taking part in the project. These are property marking and the establishment of local resident associations to champion the idea of ‘community safety’.

**Property marking scheme**: such initiatives have been used with varying degrees of success in the UK and elsewhere, and rely upon increasing the risk to the offender of being caught, and therefore deterring them from committing the crime in the first instance. Property marking also improves the prospects of police officers being able to detect stolen property and return recovered goods to their rightful owners. It is intended that both local beat officers and resident association co-ordinators will encourage residents to mark their household property with a unique code based upon a flat, block and district identifier. Patrol officers and other staff engaged in investigating burglaries will be issued with the fluorescent torches that enable property codes to be seen. Those participating in the scheme will be issued with stickers to be displayed on doors and windows warning offenders that the police have marked all the belongings in this property. Street signs and notices in blocks of flat will also be displayed prominently in the area to increase the deterrent aspect of the initiative.

**Local Resident Associations (LRAs)**: Working with the local beat officers, NGOs and existing housing associations, the research teams will endeavour to establish a number of residents’ associations in each of the districts taking part in the project. These LRAs will act as a means of encouraging local residents to work together to deal with common problems and provide a forum for the local beat officer and others to meet with residents on a regular basis. Each LRA will have a designated co-ordinator, to be elected by the members of the LRA, who will serve as the link with the beat officers, with whom they will work closely. As one of the potential problems highlighted by the local researchers is a lack of means of direct communication between the public and police, it is proposed to finance the installation of telephones, where necessary, to facilitate the work of the co-ordinators.

An important function of the LRAs will be to encourage neighbourhood watch activities. The purpose of Neighbourhood Watch (NW) is threefold: to reduce the level of property crime (e.g. offences against flats) by increasing the likelihood of offenders being caught; to act as a deterrent to potential offenders (primarily through greater levels of surveillance and the use of publicity material); and to forge a greater sense of partnership between the police and the public, which, as the survey showed, is currently lacking in Russia.

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Neighbourhood Watch schemes have existed for more than 15 years in the UK, where it is estimated that there are now more than 143,000 schemes covering 6 million households. While research in the UK on the impact of watch schemes on reducing crime has been mixed, they have been recognised for the valuable role they play in ‘forging a greater sense of partnership between the police and the community and making the police better aware of what it is that the public wants and is concerned about’.

Neighbourhood Watch can encompass many different activities and has traditionally focused on the immediate vicinity of members’ homes, with people looking out for anything suspicious or helping their neighbours where necessary. In the UK, however, many schemes have widened their scope of activity to target specific local problems. Spin-offs include ‘cocoon watch’ and ‘street watch’. Cocoon Watch can play a part in helping to tackle the problem of repeat victimisation: it operates by forming a protective ‘cocoon’ around burgled homes, whereby the victim’s immediate neighbours are asked to keep a close watch on the targeted home/flat during the weeks following the burglary and to report any suspicious person or behaviour to the police immediately. Street Watch also covers many different activities, including informal or more formal patrols over regular routes to maintain a close watch on the local area and reporting any trouble or problems to the local police.

The elements of Neighbourhood Watch adopted in each district will depend to a great extent on the area in question and what the local residents want. In general terms, however, the scheme will initially entail:

- Holding regular local meetings with Beat Officers and Local Resident Association Co-ordinators, representatives of NGOs, those taking part in the watch schemes, and representatives of housing, block and street committees.
- Organising publicity material to raise awareness of the schemes, including leaflets and street signs, and using this publicity material to advertise how to get in touch with the local police.
- Developing a mechanism for those taking part to be able to communicate with the local police.

Like a number of the other proposed schemes, the local Beat Officers, working with the Local Resident Association Co-ordinator, will play an important role in setting up and assisting the NW schemes. Before the schemes are introduced, each participating Beat Officer will be given a short course on how to organise watch schemes and their role in the implementation of them. Staff at Smolensk Law Institute and Volgograd and Omsk Law Academies will in the first instance provide this course.

**Improving Militia Performance**

Many of the initiatives discussed in this section call for a new approach from the Russian militia in their handling of, and response to, burglary. These changes will be facilitated by the training packages previously mentioned, but, while training should have a considerable impact on the militia’s work practices, making them more acceptable to the general public and victims of crime in particular, it is crucial that the appropriate environment and structures exist, within which militia officers feel sufficiently secure and confident to use their newly acquired skills. The changes introduced last year by the Russian Interior Minister to the system of evaluating police performance are very encouraging, but there is scope for a more comprehensive review of militia structures in terms of the types of services provided to local communities. To this end, the research teams in Russia have undertaken to conduct a review of the structure of personnel of local police stations, focusing on job descriptions, duties and

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activities. This will primarily involve looking at relevant groups of officers, in particular the beat officers, those responsible for investigating and detecting burglaries and related offences (e.g. the ‘fencing’ and handling of stolen goods), and for crime prevention.

The research teams in Russia are developing this initiative independently with a view to possible militia reorganisation in the longer-term. This research activity forms part of the theoretical background behind improving militia performance, and does not require any additional funding. In more practical terms, however, in attempting to offer a more immediate and appropriate response to burglary, the value of adequate and appropriate equipment for the relevant militia personnel cannot be over-emphasised. It is therefore proposed within the framework of Phase II of the project to supply a number of radios to beat officers working in the districts involved in the project.¹¹⁴ This will facilitate communication between the stations and beat officers in the more vulnerable areas, enabling them to be more easily informed of suspicious circumstances and persons and therefore able to react more quickly. This could contribute to a reduction in burglaries through increased and earlier detection of offenders.

**Developing Partnerships**

Having studied recent UK experience to combat crime, particularly the development of partnerships between the police, local authorities, and other agencies against crime, the Russian project partners are keen to adopt a similar approach in the implementation of Phase II of the project. This will involve the establishment of two different types of forum to encourage as many different groups of people as possible to become involved in the fight against, and the prevention of, crime and disorder. These are:

- Crime Prevention Committees.
- Police-Public Consultative Committees/Meetings.

**Crime Prevention Committees** will be created at regional and local level, bringing together representatives of the militia, the local authorities, NGOs, local businesses and other relevant agencies to develop a local focus for crime (particularly burglary) prevention and reduction. They will provide a mechanism for co-ordinating the work of key agencies involved, both directly and indirectly, in reducing crime and improving community safety.

The Russian project partners have already begun to develop this initiative as a pilot project, with a view to recommending, if successful, the adoption of the partnership approach as a more general guiding principal of crime prevention in Russia in the longer-term. It is envisaged that these committees will meet on a quarterly basis beginning in April 2002, initially to formulate a community safety strategy and subsequently to monitor and evaluate the situation.

**Police-Public Consultative Committees/Meetings** will be created at district level to solicit the views of the public and provide them with feedback. The committees/meetings will have four broad aims:

- To enable the police to reach a broad cross-section of the population.
- To identify public priorities for police action.
- To provide the public with information on policing activities/initiatives.
- To develop partnerships between the police and the public.

¹¹⁴ Some of the districts currently have no radio equipment for beat officers, while the rest are seriously under-equipped.
It is envisaged that meetings will be held once every two months for the duration of the project, also starting in April 2002, to be chaired by the district chief of police, with the active participation of the local beat officers and the resident association co-ordinators. These meetings will be open to the public living in the districts where they are organised. They will be advertised locally using the media and posters.

**New Ways of Dealing With Crime Prevention at the Local Level**

The proposed anti-burglary strategy aims to reduce crime and the fear of crime by adopting a high profile approach to increase awareness about crime prevention and develop the concept of community safety. Taken together, the activities planned for Phase II of the project – the crime prevention campaign, training courses and specific burglary reduction initiatives – combine to produce a strategy that is clearly defined, proactive, and flexible to local needs. It involves the development of multi-agency co-operation and a crime management system that should ensure a more appropriate and co-ordinated response to reports of burglaries, and an efficient, supportive service to victims – key elements of a successful anti-burglary strategy. This package of measures will enable the police to be seen not only as working positively to meet the needs of local communities, but working in partnership with them to seek suitable solutions. It has not attempted to radically overhaul what was already there – that would be both unrealistic and impractical – but to seek ways of evolving existing structures to make them more efficient and effective and to learn from the experiences of Western police forces.
Dear Fellow Residents!

You are asked to take part in a sociological survey being conducted by Omsk Law Academy / Smolensk Law Institute / Volgograd Law Academy in association with the University of Leicester in the United Kingdom. This survey is being conducted in order to obtain a better understanding of the crime situation in your district, including the problems facing local people, their experiences of crime and the work of the militia. The questionnaire is strictly anonymous, which means you do not need to sign it - the data received will be analysed in aggregate form only.

We are counting on your help and support.

1. How many years have you lived in this district? _____________

2. How often do you encounter the following situations in your district?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Quite often</th>
<th>Constantly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Noise in the evening</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. Violation of traffic rules (including parking and drunken drivers)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. Litter and rubbish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4. Pollution (industrial)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5. Squatters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6. Prostitution</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7. Underage drinkers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8. Cruelty to animals</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9. Anti-social behaviour</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10. Drinking and taking drugs on the street</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11. Dangerous dogs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. How worried do you feel about crime in your district?
1. Not at all worried
2. Slightly worried
3. Fairly worried
4. Very worried

4. How worried do you feel about becoming a victim of these different types of crime in your district?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Type</th>
<th>Not at all worried</th>
<th>Slightly worried</th>
<th>Fairly worried</th>
<th>Very Worried</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1. Minor assault</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2. GBH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3. Robbery (street)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4. Racketeering</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5. Extortion by state officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6. Theft of a motor vehicle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7. Theft from a motor vehicle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8. Damage to a motor vehicle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.9. Vandalism/graffiti</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.10. Theft from a dacha</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.11. Cheated in trade</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.12. Burglary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.13. Aggravated burglary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.14. Theft from a garage</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Overall, in your district, would you say the crime rate is …?
1. Low
2. Average
3. High
4. Don’t know
6. In your view, what are the MAIN CAUSES of crime in your local district? (Choose no more than 3 responses)
   1. Too lenient sentencing
   2. Poverty
   3. Lack of discipline from school
   4. Lack of discipline from parents
   5. Drugs / alcohol
   6. Unemployment
   7. Breakdown of family
   8. Too few militia
   9. Inefficient policing
   10. Not enough for young people to do
   11. Other (specify)

7. For the following groups, to what extent are you worried about them in your area?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Not worried</th>
<th>Slightly worried</th>
<th>Fairly worried</th>
<th>Very worried</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.1. Drunks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2. Persons released from prison</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3. Tramps, beggars</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4. People using drugs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5. People selling drugs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.6. Gangs of youths</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. In your view, which of the following would contribute to a reduction in the level of crime in the community? (Choose no more than 3 responses)
   1. Harsher sentences for offenders
   2. Improved employment prospects
   3. Improved militia presence on the streets
   4. More efficient policing
   5. Improved militia co-operation with local people
   6. Greater cooperation between neighbours
   7. More information being provided about crime prevention
   8. The use of alarms
   9. Better street lighting
   10. More things for young people to do
   11. Something else (please specify)

9. What are, in your view, the core tasks of the militia (choose no more than 3 responses)?
   1. Protection of dwellings and property of citizens
   2. Control over drug addicts / alcoholics
   3. Providing safety on the streets and other public places
   4. Removal of squatters
   5. Resolve disputes between neighbours and within families
   6. Work with young people
   7. Traffic control/safety of vehicles
   8. Maintain public order in communities and in blocks of flats
   9. Other (specify)____________________________________

10. How good do you think the local militia are at doing their job in your area?
    1. Very good
    2. Good
    3. Neither good nor bad
    4. Bad
    5. Very bad

11. Have the militia contacted you at all during the past 12 months for any reason?
    1. Yes
    2. No
12. If yes, for what reasons did the militia contact you?
   1. To return missing property or animals
   2. To deal with ringing burglar alarm
   3. Investigate other noise or disturbance
   4. To search your house
   5. To make an arrest
   6. During a cordon
   7. To ask you to give them information about events/people in your area
   8. Ask you to be a witness or help in other way
   9. Other reason (please specify)

13. Have you helped the militia during the past 12 months?
   1. Yes
   2. No

14. Have you helped the militia prior to this?
   1. Yes
   2. No

15. Are you willing to help the militia in the future?
   1. Yes, unconditionally (go onto question 17)
   2. Yes, under certain conditions
   3. No (go onto question 17)

16. If yes, under certain conditions, what are they?
   1. Only if they contact me
   2. If I think it is the right thing to do
   3. Only if it is organised properly and will achieve good results
   4. Only if the militia change for the better and meet my expectations
   5. Only if other people do not know
   6. Only if I will be paid or rewarded in some other way
   7. Other (please specify)

17. Did you contact the militia for any reason during the past 12 months?
   1. Yes
   2. No (go on to question 21)

18. If yes, on the last occasion, for what reason did you contact them?
   1. To report a crime of which you or someone in your household was the victim
   2. To report a crime of which someone else was the victim
   3. To report a traffic accident or medical emergency
   4. To report other suspicious circumstances or persons
   5. To report any type of disturbance, noise or nuisance
   6. To report a missing person
   7. To report that you had lost something (including animals)
   8. To ask for directions
   9. Other (please specify)

19. If the militia were contacted to report a crime, can you tell me why you decided to report this crime to them? (Choose no more than 3 responses)
   1. All crimes should be reported/right thing to do/duty/automatic
   2. Serious/major/upsetting crime
   3. In the hope that property would be recovered
   4. In the hope that offenders would be caught/punished
   5. For purposes of insurance claim
   6. Militia were on the spot
   7. Other (please specify)

20. If you did contact the militia, on the last occasion how did they treat you?
   1. With attention and sympathy
   2. With some attention
   3. With indifference
   4. With irritation
   5. With hostility
21. Do you trust the local militia?
   1. Yes, definitely
   2. Probably yes
   3. Probably not
   4. Definitely not
   5. Don’t know

22. Do you think it is necessary for maintaining public order in your area to establish closer links between the residents and the local militia?
   1. Yes, definitely
   2. Probably yes
   3. Probably not
   4. Definitely not
   5. Don’t know

23. During the last 12 months has the beat officer visited you at home?
   1. Yes
   2. No

24. Would you personally like to meet the beat officer more often and be in touch with him?
   1. Yes
   2. Probably yes
   3. Probably not
   4. No
   5. Don’t know

25. Have you been the victim of any crime during the past 12 months?
   1. Yes
   2. No

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of crime</th>
<th>Have you been the victim?</th>
<th>How many times did you report incidents to the militia?</th>
<th>If incident was not reported, why not? (No more than 3 answers from list below)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27. Racketeering</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Extortion by state officials</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. GBH</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Minor assault</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Theft of motor vehicle</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Theft from motor vehicle</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Damage to motor vehicle</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Theft from a garage</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Vandalism/graftiti</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Theft from a dacha</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Cheated in trade</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38. During the last 12 months if you have been a victim of crime and you didn’t report it to the police, why not? (each crime not reported is coded)
   1. Reported to other authorities
   2. Fear of reprisal by offenders
   3. Attempt at offence was unsuccessful
   4. Insignificant damage, not worth reporting
   5. I do not trust militia
   6. I think it is useless to report/there is no point, militia could have done nothing/would not be bothered/not been interested
   7. Inconvenient/too much trouble/no way to report
   8. The person responsible (criminal) compensated me for losses incurred
   9. Private/personal/family matter
   10. It was, to some extent, my fault that this happened
   11. Advice from people close to me (family, friends)
   12. Dealt with matter myself
   13. I am afraid of bureaucratic delays and do not want to waste my time
   14. Other

39. How many times, if any, have you been burgled during the past 12 months?
40. Did you report the incident to the militia?
41. Yes (how many times?)
42. No (why not?)
43. How many times, if any, has your household experienced attempted burglary during the past 12 months?
44. Did you report the incident to the militia?
45. Yes (how many times?)
46. No (why not?)
47. How many times, if any, were you the victim of aggravated burglary during the past 12 months?
48. Did you report the crime to the militia?
49. Yes (how many times?)
50. No (why not?)
51. How many times, if any, were you the victim of attempted aggravated burglary last year?
52. Did you report the crime to the militia?
53. Yes (how many times?)
54. No (why not?)
55. How worried are you about having your home broken into and something stolen?
   1. Not at all worried
   2. Slightly worried
   3. Fairly worried
   4. Very worried
56. What precautions do you take to protect your property from criminal encroachments? (Choose as many as you like.)
   1. No precautions
   2. Try not to leave my property without somebody being there
   3. Pay for security guard
   4. Make arrangements with neighbours to look after house/flat
   5. A dog
   6. Burglar alarm in the dwelling
   7. Installed bars on windows
   8. Better locks
   9. Metal door
   10. Double / strengthened door
   11. Entry phone system
   12. Insurance
   13. Other (please specify)
57. If no precautions are taken, why not? (Choose as many answers as you like)
   1. No fear of burglary
   2. No precautions are taken because nothing will make a difference (burglary will happen anyway)
   3. Too expensive to take such precautions
   4. Lack of suitable advice / information
   5. This is not a priority for me
   6. Other reason (please specify)
Appendix I

58. From where do you receive information on crime and crime prevention measures? (Mark all answers)
   1. Television
   2. Radio
   3. Newspapers / magazines / newsletters
   4. Militia
   5. Friends / word of mouth
   6. From victims of crime
   7. Other (please specify)

59. From which sources would you prefer to receive information about crime prevention? Television – Radio – Newspapers / magazines / journals

60. Would you be prepared to participate in local crime prevention schemes?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Don’t know

In conclusion, several words about yourself

61. Your age:

62. What is your marital status?
   1. Single
   2. Divorced
   3. Married and living with spouse
   4. Widowed
   5. Married and separated

63. What is your current employment situation (do you have a job)?
   1. In employment
   2. Unemployed
   3. Not economically active (housewife / husband; student; pensioner)

64. What is your level of education?
   1. Primary, incomplete secondary
   2. Secondary special
   3. Secondary
   4. Higher / incomplete higher

65. How many people are there in your household? ……………………………

66. How would you describe your level of income?
   1. Not enough even for food
   2. Just enough for food but nothing else
   3. Enough for food and clothing but cannot afford anything else
   4. Have some savings and can afford durables now and again
   5. Have all that we need

67. What type of accommodation does your household occupy?
   1. House / part of a house
   2. Flat or room in flat in a block with only a few storeys
   3. Flat in a ‘malosemyeka’ (high block of flats)
   4. Hostel

68. If you live in a block of flats, on which floor is your flat located?
   1. Ground
   2. Top floor
   3. Other (which)

69. Is the property?
   1. Private (owned by your family)
   2. Local authority property
   3. Rented privately
70. Do you have a car?
1. Yes
2. No

71. Do you have a garage?
1. Yes
2. No

The following information should be recorded by the interviewer, not in view of the respondent

72. Gender
1. Male
2. Female
VICTIM FORM

You mentioned that your household had experienced some form of burglary or attempted burglary during the past 12 months. I would like to ask you a number of questions to enable us to classify exactly what happened. If more than one incident occurred last year, please tell me about the last incident of this kind.

73. When did the incident take place? ______________

74. Did the incident happen during the week or at the weekend?
   1. During the week
   2. At the weekend

75. At what time of the day did it happen?
   1. Morning (6a.m. – midday)
   2. Afternoon (noon – 6 p.m.)
   3. Morning/afternoon (can’t say when)
   4. During evening (6p.m. - midnight)
   5. During night (midnight – 6 a.m.)
   6. Evening/night (can’t say when)

76. Did the burglar (try to) get in through the door?
   1. Yes
   2. No (go on to question 69)

77. If yes, how did they (try to) get in through the door?
   1. (Tried to) push past person who opened the door
   2. Door was not locked
   3. They had a key
   4. (Tried to) force/break lock
   5. (Tried to) break/cut/remove panel of door or panel beside door
   6. By false pretences
   7. Other (please specify)

78. Did the burglar (try to) get in through the window?
   1. Yes
   2. No (go on to question 70)

79. How did they (try to) get in through the window?
   1. Window was open/could be pushed open
   2. (Tried to) force window lock/catch
   3. (Tried to) break/cut glass
   4. Other ________

80. Did they (try to) get in by any other way, apart from through a door or a window? (e.g. skylight, roof space, cellar)
   1. Yes
   2. No (go on to question 73)

81. If yes, please describe how they tried to get in

82. Was anything at all stolen, even if you later got it back?
   1. Yes
   2. No (go on to question 75)

83. If yes, could you tell me what was stolen?
   1. Purse/wallet
   2. Cash
   3. Video equipment
   4. Television
   5. Stereo/hifi equipment
   6. Video camera
   7. Computer/computer equipment
   8. Jewellery
   9. Tools
   10. Household electrical goods (consumer durables)
   11. Clothes
   12. Documents (e.g. savings account book/passport)
   13. Food
   14. Something else (please specify)
84. Was the person / people who committed the burglary responsible for any additional material losses?
   1. No
   2. The outside of the property was damaged
   3. The door / window was damaged
   4. Door / window locks were damaged
   5. Property inside the flat / house was damaged
   6. Other damage occurred (please specify)

85. Was any of the property stolen covered by an insurance policy?
   1. Yes
   2. No

86. Apart from the offenders, would you say you or anyone else was responsible for what happened, because of something you or they did or forgot to do?
   1. No, no-one
   2. Respondent
   3. Other household member
   4. The person responsible for guarding the property
   5. Other (who) ____________

87. If you or someone else was responsible, in what way were you/they responsible?
   1. Too naïve / trusting
   2. Provoked offender
   3. Failed to lock/bolt door/window
   4. Failed to close door/window
   5. Failed to set burglar alarm
   6. Failed to lock something away
   7. Failed to hide something away
   8. Other (please specify)

88. Were you or a member of your family at home at the time of the incident?
   1. Yes (go on to question 81)
   2. No

89. If no-one was at home, how long had the flat/house been left empty?
   1. Less than 1 hour
   2. Less than 3 hours
   3. Less than 24 hours
   4. 24 hours – 3 days
   5. 4 – 6 days
   6. 7 days – 1 month
   7. More than 1 month

90. Can I just check, at the time it happened, were you or anyone else aware of what was happening?
   1. Yes
   2. No (go on to question 20)

91. If yes, who was aware?
   1. Respondent
   2. Other household member
   3. Colleague/companion/friend
   4. Other person from outside household

92. If the respondent can say anything about the offender, did the burglar have a weapon or something they used or threatened to use as a weapon?
   1. Yes
   2. No (go on to question 22)

93. What was the weapon?
   1. Knife
   2. Screwdriver/stabbing implement
   3. Stick/club/hitting implement
   4. Pistol/rifle
   5. Airgun/air rifle
   6. Gun –can’t say what sort
   7. Other (what)
Appendix I

94. Did the burglar(s) actually use force or violence on you (anyone else) in any way, even if this resulted in no injury?
   1. Yes
   2. No

95. Many people have emotional reactions after indicants in which they are the victims of crime. Did you or anyone else in your household, including children, have any of these reactions after the incident?
   1. Yes
   2. No (go on to question 90)

96. Who was it that reacted that way?
   1. Respondent
   2. Other adult in household
   3. Child under 16

97. Which of these emotional reactions did you personally have?
   1. Anger
   2. Shock
   3. Fear
   4. Difficulty sleeping
   5. Crying/tears
   6. Other

98. Overall, how much were you affected?
   1. Very much?
   2. A lot?
   3. A little?

99. Did the militia come to know about the burglary?
   1. Yes (go on to question 92)
   2. No

100. If the militia did not become aware of the incident, why not? (No more than 3 answers)
   1. Reported to other authorities
   2. Fear of reprisal by offenders
   3. Attempt at offence was unsuccessful
   4. Insignificant damage, not worth reporting
   5. I do not trust militia
   6. I think it is useless to report (there is no point, militia would have done nothing/would not be bothered/not been interested)
   7. Inconvenient/no way to report
   8. The person responsible (criminal) compensated me for losses incurred
   9. Private/personal/family matter
   10. It was, to some extent, my fault that this happened
   11. Advice from people close to me (family, friends)
   12. Deal with matter myself
   13. I am afraid of bureaucratic delays and do not want to waste my time
   14. Other

101. If the militia did come to know about the incident, how did this happen?
   1. Militia told by respondent
   2. Militia told by another person in respondent’s household
   3. Militia told by other person
   4. Militia were there
   5. Militia found out from another source

102. If you reported the incident to the militia, how did you do this?
   1. In writing
   2. In person
   3. Someone else reported it in person on my behalf
   4. By telephone
103. If you or someone else reported the incident to the militia, why did you (they) decide to report this crime to the militia?
   1. All crimes should be reported / right thing to do / duty / automatic
   2. Serious / major / upsetting crime
   3. In the hope that property would be recovered
   4. In the hope that offenders would be caught / punished
   5. For purposes of insurance claim
   6. In the hope of avoiding repetition of crime to oneself (including loss of keys etc.)
   7. In the hope of avoiding repetition of crime to someone else
   8. Needed assistance
   9. Militia were on the spot
   10. Other (please specify)

104. Did you or anyone else in your household have any FACE-TO-FACE contact with the militia about this matter?
   1. Yes, the respondent
   2. Yes, someone in the household
   3. No, no face-to-face contact
   4. Don’t know / can’t remember

105. Can I just check, did the militia actually see you or anyone in your household at HOME at any time about the burglary?
   1. Yes
   2. No

106. How long did you have to wait before the militia attended the matter?
   1. Less than 1 hour
   2. Between 1 and 6 hours
   3. Between 6 and 12 hours
   4. More than 12 hours

107. If you had to wait for the militia, did the length of time you had to wait seem reasonable to you or not?
   1. A reasonable time
   2. Not a reasonable time

108. How much INTEREST did the militia show in what you/anyone else had to say?
   1. Sufficient interest
   2. Insufficient interest

109. How much EFFORT would you say the militia put into dealing with this matter?
   1. Sufficient effort
   2. Insufficient effort

110. How well did they keep you / the victim informed of the progress of their investigation? Was it …
   1. Very well informed?
   2. Well enough informed?
   3. Not very well informed?
   4. Badly informed?
   5. (MILITIA HAVE NOT INVESTIGATED)

111. Overall, were you /the victim satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the militia handled this matter?
   1. Very satisfied
   2. Fairly satisfied
   3. A little dissatisfied
   4. Very dissatisfied
   5. Too early to say

112. Did they give or send you or someone in the household the phone number of the officer responsible for your case or the number of the ‘crime desk’?
   1. Yes
   2. No

113. And did they give you any information about crime prevention?
   1. Yes
   2. No
114. And did they ask you for details of the (material) losses your household suffered?
   1. Yes
   2. No

115. And did they ask you for details of the personal injuries you or anyone in your household suffered?
   1. Yes
   2. No

116. Did the militia find out or know who was responsible for the burglary?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Not yet
   4. Don’t know

117. Generally speaking, do you think the militia are sufficiently sympathetic and helpful to victims of crime?
   1. Yes, the militia are sufficiently sympathetic and helpful
   2. Yes, the militia are sufficiently sympathetic, but not helpful
   3. No, the militia are not sufficiently sympathetic or helpful

118. This card lists some of the types of support or advice that people sometimes need after being the victim of a crime. What types of support or advice would you say you (/victim/household) wanted immediately following the incident?
   1. Information from the militia (e.g. whether the offender had been identified)
   2. Advice on security / crime prevention
   3. Practical help (e.g. with clearing up / repairs to property)
   4. Someone to talk to / moral support
   5. Help with insurance / compensation claims / advice on financial problems
   6. Protection from further victimisation / harassment
   7. Help with reporting the incident / dealing with the militia
   8. Legal advice
   9. None of these / did not want any support
   10. Other (please specify)

119. After this incident did you (the victim/anyone in the household) ask for or get offered help from any of these people or organisations?
   1. No-one, none
   2. Family / friends / relatives / neighbours
   3. Militia
   4. Victim support organisations
   5. Doctor / hospital / psychiatrist / psychologist
   6. Housing department
   7. Social services
   8. School / Education Department
   9. Trade Union / Professional body
   10. Employer
   11. Other answer _____________

120. Did you take any specific measures to try to avoid becoming a victim of burglary again?
   1. Yes
   2. No (go on to question 50)

121. If yes, what specific measures did you take?

122. Finally, was this a single incident, or was your household burgled more than once last year?
   1. Single incident
   2. Been burgled more than once (how many times?)