Stefano Bertea

Reader
Laureato in Giurisprudenza ( Modena and Reggio Emilia); Dottore di ricerca (Milan).

Email: stefano.bertea@le.ac.uk
Telephone: 0116 233 1061

Personal webpage
SSRN Author page

Stefano Bertea joined the School of Law in 2004 and has been a Reader in Law since April 2010. Previously he had teaching experience in Italy, worked as a Marie Curie Fellow at the University of Edinburgh, was a Visiting Professor at the University ‘Magna Græcia’ of Catanzaro, was an Alexander von Humboldt Fellow at the Christian-Albrechts Universität zu Kiel, and was a visiting research fellow at the University of Amsterdam, at the University of Verona and at the University of Modena. 

He is a member of the Editorial Board of the journal Jurisprudence. 

In the recent years Stefano has given talks at several universities around the world such as Amsterdam, Antwerp, Belfast, Birmingham, Bologna, Edinburgh, Kiel, Krakow, Lima, Padua,  Rotterdam, and Sheffield. 

Research Interests

Legal theory, political theory and legal reasoning.

He welcomes PhD applications in the following topics: nature of law, legal obligation, and normative dimension of law.

Selected Publications

• Forthcoming. “Constitutivism and Normativity: A Qualified Defence", Philosophical Explorations (10,150 words).
• 2011. “El Derecho y la Razón Práctica”, in Carlos Bernal Pulido (ed.), La doble dimensión del Derecho. Autoridad y razón en la obra de Robert Alexy, Lima: Palestra, 143-180.
• 2011. “The Master Rule, Normativity, and the Institutional Theory of Law”, J.E Fossum and A. Menendez, Law and Democracy in Neil MacCormick’s Legal and Political Theory, Dordrecht: Springer, 69-91.
• 2011. “Law and Obligation: Outlines of a Kantian Argument”, in S. Bertea and G. Pavlakos (eds.), New Essays on the Normativity of Law, Oxford: Hart, 199-218
• 2009. The Normative Claim of Law. Oxford: Hart.
• 2008. “Towards a New Paradigm of Legal Certainty”, Legisprudence 2, 25-45.
• 2008. “Law and Legal Reasoning”, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 59, 4-19.
• 2007. “A Critique of Inclusive Positivism”, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 93, 67-81.
• 2007. How Non-positivism Can Accommodate Legal Certainty, in Law, Rights and Discourse: Themes from the Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy, eds. G. Pavlakos and S. Paulson, Oxford: Hart.
• 2005. “The Arguments from Coherence”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 25, 369-391.