Dr Subir Bose
- Tel: 0116 252 3420
- Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
- Office: AC208, Astley Clarke Building
- Office Hours: Tuesday 15:30 - 16:30
- Thursday 15:30 - 16:30
- Game Theory, Auctions, Mechanism Design, Industrial Organization.
Mechanism Design with non-EU preferences. In recent years there has been a lot of new research studying non-Expected Utility preferences. [Ambiguity aversion and regret aversion being two – though by no means the only – important examples ].
While the decision-theoretic work is extremely useful, it is also important to study the implication of such preferences in contexts that economists are familiar with. In particular, we need to study and understand how implementation and mechanism design are affected when agents (and/or the mechanism designer) have these non-EU preferences. Past work has looked into auction design (references needed?) in private values framework when bidders have MMEU preferences (as axiomatized by Gilboa Schmeidler). It would be interesting to extend this to more general interdependent values framework. It is also important to extend the work to encompass more general ambiguity averse preferences. [Subir. Ludovic-Subir.]
Online Trading (and Online Auctions). The advent of the internet has affected significantly the way our societies carry out various economic activities. In particular, online auctions have in some sense expanded the market (by reducing the transactions cost of certain kind of tradings, it has made possible markets that did not exist before), it has also introduced new type of auction designs (for example auctions with buy-now options) that did not exist before (or at least were not used extensively before). It is important to study both the efficiency and the revenue raising effects of these new auction designs ( as also to understand how even well known auction formats might function differently when conducted online). It is to be noted that various auction sites actually often specialize in different formats and hence it is important to study not just the auctions in isolations but these auction sites (and other trading platforms).
- Director of PhD Programmes and PhD Admissions Tutor
Most Recent Publications
- “Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible”, (with Jinhua Zhao) Journal of Economic Theory, July 2007, Vol 135, Number 1, 357-381
- “Exclusive vs. Non-Exclusive Dealings in Auctions with Resale” (with George Deltas), Economic Theory, April 2007, Vol 31, Number 1, 1-17
- “Optimal Auctions with Ambiguity” (with Emre Ozdenoren and Andreas Pappe) Theoretical Economics, December 2006, Vol 1, Issue 4, 411-438