Professor Sergio Currarini
Professor in Economics
- Tel: 0116 252 5645
- Email: email@example.com
- Office: AC214, Astley Clarke Building
- Office Hours: Wednesdays 16:00 -17:00 (term time only) otherwise by appointment
Research papers can be downloaded via RePEc.
I am willing to supervise students in the following areas:
- Integration and Segregation in Social Networks
- Network Formation
- Games on Networks
- Game Theory
- Games with Incomplete Information
- Games of Coalition Formation
Current Administrative Duties
- UG Syllabus Committee Chair (Mirco)
Most Recent Publications
- S. Currarini and M. Marini (Forthcoming), Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly, The Manchester School
- S. Currarini and F. Feri (Forthcoming), Information Sharing Networks in Linear Quadratic Games, International Journal of Game Theory
- S. Currarini and M. Marini (2012), Majority Rules and Coalition Stability, Economics Bulletin, 33, pp. 1660-1668.
- Y. Bramouille, S. Currarini, M.O. Jackson, P. Pin and B. Roger (2012), Homophily and Long Run Intergration in Social Networks, Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (5), pp. 1754-1786.
- S. Currarini and M. Marini (2012), The Kinked Demand Model and the Stability of Cooperation, Economics Letter, 110, pp. 223-225.
- S. Currarini, M.O. Jackson and P. Pin (2010), Identifying the Roles of Race-based Choice and Chance in High School Friendship Network Formation, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science in the USA (PNAS), 107, pp. 4857-4861
- S. Currarini, M.O Jackson and P. Pin (2009), An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation, Econometrica 77 (4), pp. 1004-1045.