Professor Sergio Currarini

Professor in Economics

Contact DetailsProfessor Sergio Currarini

  • Tel: 0116 252 5645
  • Email:
  • Office: AC214, Astley Clarke Building
  • Office Hours: Wednesdays 16:00 -17:00 (term time only) otherwise by appointment

    Research Interests

  • Network Economics
  • Coalition Theory
  • Microeconomics
  • Public Economics

Research papers can be downloaded via RePEc.

You must apply formally to our Economics PhD programme before we allocate you a supervisor as part of the review process. You do not need to contact our staff separately.


Supervision Interests

I am willing to supervise students in the following areas:

  • Integration and Segregation in Social Networks
  • Network Formation
  • Games on Networks
  • Game Theory
  • Games with Incomplete Information
  • Games of Coalition Formation

Current Administrative Duties

  • UG Syllabus Committee Chair (Mirco)

Most Recent Publications

  • S. Currarini and M. Marini (Forthcoming), Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly, The Manchester School
  • S. Currarini and F. Feri (Forthcoming), Information Sharing Networks in Linear Quadratic Games, International Journal of Game Theory
  • S. Currarini and M. Marini (2012), Majority Rules and Coalition Stability, Economics Bulletin, 33, pp. 1660-1668.
  • Y. Bramouille, S. Currarini, M.O. Jackson, P. Pin and B. Roger (2012), Homophily and Long Run Intergration in Social Networks, Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (5), pp. 1754-1786.
  • S. Currarini and M. Marini (2012), The Kinked Demand Model and the Stability of Cooperation, Economics Letter, 110, pp. 223-225.
  • S. Currarini, M.O. Jackson and P. Pin (2010), Identifying the Roles of Race-based Choice and Chance in High School Friendship Network Formation, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science in the USA (PNAS), 107, pp. 4857-4861
  • S. Currarini, M.O Jackson and P. Pin (2009), An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation, Econometrica 77 (4), pp. 1004-1045.

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